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Abstract 
 
In this thesis I argue that there are qualities of literary writing which can 
illuminate human rights discourse and, specifically, its limit points. I focus on one such 
limit-point: the difficulty of fully possessing human rights. Rights are most likely to be 
securely guaranteed under the legal system of a nation-state. However, such rights – 
possessed on the basis of citizenship rather than through humanness – are not always 
considered human rights. The position of the nation-state, the possibility of legal 
enforcement and the category of the human are therefore ambiguities for the discourse.  
Literary texts from two countries which have been central to debates about human 
rights – Uganda and South Africa – will provide the focus for this study. 
Joseph Slaughter proposes that the plot of the Bildungsroman both resembles 
and promulgates the citizenship model of human rights-possession. However, in texts 
addressing the involvement of children in war in Uganda, I read experiments with the 
Bildungsroman form to indicate human rights discourse’s preoccupation with merely 
human identity. Child soldier narratives appeal to a decontextualized, universal image of 
the child, while in the fiction of Goretti Kyomuhendo there is an excessive repetition of 
familial language and symbol which throws the traditional narrative arc of the 
Bildungsroman off course.  
 Critics including Slaughter see literature as compensating for the ambivalence 
of human rights discourse about the possibility of its own enforcement through the law.  
Instead, I explore the ways in which certain texts, in the context of South Africa, enact 
their own irreducibility to legal categories. I make this argument through a discussion of 
the way the literature and the literary appear in the Report of South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission alongside readings of Antjie Krog’s Begging to Be Black and 
Nadine Gordimer’s Burger’s Daughter and The House Gun.  
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Introduction 
 
In this thesis I argue that human rights are defined by how difficult it is to fully 
possess them. Drawing on what human rights theorist Jack Donnelley describes as the 
‘possession paradox’, I contend that a human rights claim is most meaningful in a 
situation of rightlessness and vulnerability.1 Human rights are the rights nobody wants 
to be forced to rely on, because to make a human rights claim means that all other 
options have been exhausted. In particular, it means that the everyday protection of 
basic rights, which should generally be guaranteed through citizenship, is under threat. 
On the other hand, human rights discourse seems to have little to do with a situation in 
which rights are freely enjoyed without restriction. Perhaps it would even sound 
hyperbolic to use human rights language where rights are always (or almost always) 
guaranteed. That is, it is difficult to grasp human rights because they seem to exist 
primarily in their non-possession: they have value when they are under threat, and 
appear irrelevant where they are enjoyed.  
I draw attention to three, linked ambiguities in the discourse of human rights 
which are caused by this crisis of possession: the position of the nation-state, the 
category of the human and the possibility of legal enforcement. International human 
rights law is a last resort. Its mechanisms can only be accessed once domestic remedies 
have been exhausted. This suggests that the preferable forum for the legal realization of 
human rights is the nation-state. However, this makes the protection of human rights 
dependent on the protective capability of the nation-state, and this seems to contradict 
the claims of human rights to universality or to being based simply on human identity. 
There are two alternative models of the possession of human rights here, and neither is 
entirely satisfactory. Rights may be legally possessed through the nation-state, but these 
rights do not seem to be human rights, both because they are possessed (and thus lack 
the association with human vulnerability and crisis) and because they are citizenship 
rights rather than rights possessed through humanness. On the other hand, the nation-
state might abuse or fail to protect your rights, in which case you would have recourse 
to the weaker and less effective international legal system. But here rights are not 
                                                 
1 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2nd ed (London: Cornell University Press, 
2003), p.9.  
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possessed, except in the sense that a human rights claim is being made – in fact, the 
possession of rights is in jeopardy.  
This difficulty is not just a problem of inadequate realization: it is a limit-point 
which is inherent in the way human rights discourse has been articulated. It is for this 
reason that literary writing has a crucial role to play in disentangling what human rights 
discourse is and how it operates. What is distinctive about literary writing is its tolerance 
of tension and ambivalence; literariness, I argue, is in large part connected with the 
simultaneous existence of multiple meanings. Unlike theoretical writing or writing 
which makes an argument, literature can keep in play multiple possibilities without 
contradiction.  Here I do not assume that literature can in a straightforward way 
represent and intervene in an external reality. Literary texts are much more self-
conscious about their own representational ability than this would imply. But this is why 
they are useful for thinking through the incompletions and tensions of human rights 
discourse.  
What are Human Rights?  
The contemporary discourse of human rights has achieved remarkable 
prominence as a global language of politics and of morality whilst remaining, in 
important ways, difficult to define satisfactorily or grasp conceptually. One source of 
ambiguity is the controversy over the historical origins of the concept of human rights.  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the UN’s General 
Assembly in 1948 and sometimes considered to be the first major landmark in the 
development of contemporary human rights, is written in such a way as to mimic and 
recall the eighteenth-century declarations of rights; its form, structure and language are 
reminiscent of the French declarations of rights of 1789 and 1793.2 As human rights 
scholar Stephen Marks has argued, the ‘French heritage of the UDHR appears in the 
                                                 
2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UN General Assembly 
Resolution 217 A (III) (UDHR), available at  
<http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/> [accessed 23 August 2014].  
An alternative translation of the French ‘Déclaration des droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen’ is Declaration 
of Human and Civic Rights. ‘Declaration of Human and Civic Rights of 26 August 1789’, available at 
<http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/cst2.pdf> 
[accessed 23 August 2014]. ‘Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen from the Constitution of Year I 
(1793)’, available at <http://www.columbia.edu/~iw6/docs/dec1793.html> [accessed 23 August 2014].  
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writing style and the basic structure of the text’3 and the UDHR ‘follows the same 
structure as the French Declarations, with the length of the preamble, the number of 
articles, and the degree of generality.’4  
The stylistic similarities have led some critics to argue that there is direct 
trajectory between the eighteenth-century tradition and contemporary rights talk. Lynn 
Hunt suggests in her account of the relationship between eighteenth-century rights 
discourse and literature, for example, that:  
[f]or nearly two centuries […] the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and Citizen incarnated the promise of universal human rights. In 
1948, when the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, Article 1 read, ‘All human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights.’ In 1789, Article I of the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen had already proclaimed, ‘Men are born and 
remain free and equal in rights.’ Although the modifications in 
language were meaningful, the echo between the two documents is 
unmistakable.5  
However, this link between eighteenth-century ideas about the rights of man 
and contemporary human rights discourse has been vigorously challenged. For the 
historian Samuel Moyn, ‘the droits de l’homme that powered early modern revolution and 
nineteenth century politics need to be rigorously distinguished from the “human rights” 
coined in the 1940s’.6 This is because the eighteenth-century declarations emerged as 
the modern democratic nation-state was founded; ‘[t]he overwhelmingly important 
point’, he writes, ‘is that the rights of the revolutionary era were very much embodied in 
the politics of the state’.7  
Moyn argues that contemporary understandings of human rights represent a 
break with, rather than a continuation of, this eighteenth-century tradition. 
Consequently, ‘the central event in human rights history is the recasting of rights as 
                                                 
3 Stephen Marks, ‘From the “Single Confused Page” to the “Decalogue for Six Billion Persons”: The 
Roots of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the French Revolution’, Human Rights Quarterly, 
20.3 (1998), 459-514 (p.486).  
4 Marks, p.488.  
5 Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (London: Norton, 2007), p.17.  
6 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (London: Harvard University Press, 2010), p.12. 
For Moyn’s direct engagement with Hunt, see Samuel Moyn, Human Rights and the Uses of History (London: 
Verso, 2014), pp.1-18.  
7 Last Utopia, p.25.  
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entitlements that might contradict the sovereign nation-state from above and outside 
rather than serve as its foundation.’8 Where Hunt suggests that ‘the Declaration of the 
Rights and Man and of the Citizen incarnated the promise of universal human rights’,9 
Moyn argues that applying the phrase ‘human rights’ to an eighteenth-century document 
disguises a fundamental conceptual discontinuity.  
I return to this question of the nation-state in eighteenth-century and 
contemporary conceptions of human rights in Chapter One. For now the key point is 
that it is widely agreed that the concept of human rights is not timeless – it emerged and 
caught hold of political imagination at a particular historical moment. The difficulty is 
that there is very little consensus on the date in question. This is complicated by the 
multidisciplinary uses of human rights discourse. Tom Bingham is discussing the rule of 
law, though he could easily be discussing human rights, when he states that ‘the 
expression was constantly on people’s lips, I was not quite sure what it meant, and I was 
not sure that all who used the expression knew what they meant either, or meant the 
same thing.’10 Human rights have been institutionalized in international law, campaigned 
for by international human rights organizations and adopted as ostensible guiding 
principles for the foreign policies of governments. But there is, of course, no guarantee 
that in these very different contexts the term ‘human rights’ has the same meaning.  
A third reason for human rights’ lack of conceptual clarity is that, in what seems 
like a contradiction, one of the characteristic features of human rights discourse is that it 
is often articulated in such a way as to obscure its defining and distinctive 
characteristics. For this reason, the particularity of its imaginative framework – the 
specificity of its guiding assumptions and its patterns of representation – has tended to 
be difficult to isolate analytically or characterize precisely.  Take for example the way in 
which the protection of human rights is routinely described as pragmatic, minimalist 
and neutral. Politician and human rights theorist Michael Ignatieff, a prominent 
representative of this approach, has stated that human rights ‘is not a creed; it is not a 
metaphysics.’11 He argues that human rights should be compatible with many different 
                                                 
8 Last Utopia, p.13.  
9 Hunt, p.17.  
10 Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (London: Allen Lane, 2010), p.vii.  
11 Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, ed. by Amy Gutman (Woodstock: Princeton 
University Press, 2001), p.53.  
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kinds of religions, with atheism, and with the varying cultures of the world because they 
do not rely on claims about human nature or about what the good life is: 
people from different cultures may continue to disagree about what is 
good, but nevertheless agree about what is insufferably, inarguably 
wrong. The universal commitments implied by human rights can only 
be compatible with a wide variety of ways of living only if the 
universalism implied is self-consciously minimalist. Human rights can 
command universal assent only as a decidedly ‘thin’ theory of what is 
right, a definition of the minimum conditions for any kind of life at 
all.12 
Human rights can be universal, he argues, but this is a particular version of universality: 
human rights do not prescribe what is right, or even what is advisable, but proscribe 
only what is utterly unacceptable. Human rights show us what cannot be accepted 
under any circumstances and in this way they can fit in with almost all human diversity 
and be accepted by all cultures. They tell us what must never be allowed to happen but 
leave all other choices about social organization open.  
 In Ignatieff’s account this leads to a restricted set of goals for ‘believers in 
human rights’: 
[w]e may not be able to create democracies or constitutions. Liberal 
freedom may be some way off. But we could do more than we do to 
stop unmerited suffering and gross physical cruelty. That I take to be 
the elemental priority of all human rights activism: to stop torture, 
beatings, killings, rape, and assault and to improve, as best we can, the 
security of ordinary people. My minimalism is not strategic at all. It is 
the most we can hope for.13 
Human rights discourse aims at the prevention of the worst abuses. This is a minimalist 
aspiration, Ignatieff argues, despite the obvious difficulty of accomplishing such a goal, 
because it does not entail any attempt to establish political structures or change the 
organization of political communities on the macro scale.  
In a telling reading of Ignatieff’s argument, however, Wendy Brown points out its 
problems: 
there is no such thing as mere reduction of suffering or protection from 
abuse, the nature of the reduction or protection is itself productive of 
political subjects and political possibilities. Just as abuse itself is never 
generic but always has particular social and subjective content, so the 
                                                 
12 Ignatieff, p.56.  
13 Ignatieff, p.173.  
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matter of how it is relieved is consequential. Yes, the abuse must be 
stopped but by whom, with what techniques, with what unintended 
effects, and above all, unfolding what possible futures? The pragmatist, 
moral, and antipolitical mantle of human rights discourse tends to 
eschew, even repel, rather than invite or address these questions.14 
Brown makes two important arguments here. First she shows that, though the urgent 
necessity of ending the worst kinds of abuses cannot be argued with, this does not mean 
that the methods used to end such abuses are similarly obvious and unquestionable. She 
shows that there is nothing neutral or given about the way suffering is opposed; 
methods are chosen from a range of possible options, they have their own particular 
consequences in the world, and they structure the way future events are understood.  
Secondly, she suggests that by presenting the program of ending the most 
egregious violations of rights as a pragmatic, minimalist approach, Ignatieff is able to 
foreclose any discussion about the particularity of the responses to suffering proposed 
by ‘believers in human rights’.15 In other words, the lack of definitional clarity associated 
with human rights has a purpose: constructed as minimal, as concepts for emergencies 
only, as the last possible resort for the worst of all possible situations, human rights 
escape critical scrutiny, appearing as necessary, inevitable, natural and essential. 
Possessing Human Rights 
In this thesis, I focus on one particular ambiguity which, I suggest, structures 
human rights discourse: the difficulty, even impossibility, of ever fully possessing 
human rights. Literary and cultural historian Peter de Bolla suggests that contemporary 
discussions of universal human rights are paralyzed by a blurring of the distinction 
between two ways of thinking about the possession of rights, both of which originated 
in the eighteenth century. At present, he states, ‘we are trapped within a conceptual 
architecture that will not do the work we demand of it.’16  On the one hand, human 
rights tend to be understood ‘as a set of claims that have content. These claims will 
always be on behalf of claimants and therefore antagonistic to those upon whom the 
                                                 
14 Wendy Brown, ‘“The Most We Can Hope For…” Human Rights and the Politics of Fatalism’, South 
Atlantic Quarterly, 103.2/3 (2004), 451-463 (p.460).  
15 Ignatieff, p.173.  
16 Peter de Bolla, The Architecture of Concepts: The Historical Formation of Human Rights (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2013), p.278.  
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claims are made.’17 When we think of human rights in this way, he argues, we produce 
lists of rights – the right to housing,18 say, or the right to freedom of assembly19 – that 
imply definable obligations. For example, if I have a right to freely assemble, then the 
government has a responsibility to ensure that the police do not use unreasonable force 
to suppress protests.  
 The problem, de Bolla argues, is that is difficult to conceive of such a list of 
distinct claims which can also belong to all humans at the same time: ‘[w]e need to 
recognize […] that rights as claims cannot be universal in the sense of always and 
everywhere simultaneously applied equally.’20 A list of rights of definable rights like this 
requires a bounded, limited political community – like, for example, a nation-state – in 
which rights claims can be balanced against one another. If rights as claims are to be 
universal, then there will inevitably be conflict between rights holders and not 
everybody can possess all rights at the same time.  
He suggests an alternative. Human rights, ‘rather than being defined as those we 
hold by dint of being human, may come to be understood […] as our collective 
aspiration on behalf of humanity.’21 In this case, rights are ‘human’ because they express 
hope for the future, a way of articulating what is wrong with current systems of political 
organization and attempting to imagine a different system. But ‘rights’ here does not 
express a set of claims, and thus it misleading to speak of rights as things which might 
be possessed. de Bolla argues that, in this way of thinking about human rights, they are 
‘unspecifiable, simply those rights that are aspirational, those that can be declared as a 
bundle […] but not necessarily be realized as specific claims’.22 That is, if we understand 
rights to mean claims that imply obligations then we cannot have universal human 
rights: not all humans can have such rights at the same time. On the other hand, if we 
                                                 
17 de Bolla, p.285.  
18 UDHR, art.25.  
19 UDHR, art.20.  
20 de Bolla, p.285.  
21 de Bolla, p.288.  
22 de Bolla, p.286.  
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think of human rights as non-specifiable aspirations for the whole of humanity then we 
have to give up on the idea of rights as possessions.23   
The difficulty of possessing human rights recurs again slightly differently in what 
Donnelly describes as the ‘possession paradox’, in which ‘“having” a right is of most 
value precisely when one does not “have” (the object of) the right – that is, when active 
respect or objective enjoyment is not forthcoming.’24 Donnelly observes that if ‘[r]ights 
are a sort of “last resort”’ in that ‘they usually are claimed only when things are not 
going well’ then human rights ‘are the final resort in the realm of rights: no higher appeal 
is available.’25 Human rights seem to be important, even relevant, only in the situation of 
lack.  
When human rights are not possessed they become more significant. For 
Donnelly, it is this which distinguishes them from legal rights: 
[o]ne can – and usually does – go very far before human rights 
arguments become necessary. An appeal to human rights usually 
testifies to the absence of enforceable positive (legal) rights and 
suggests that everything else has been tried and failed, leaving one with 
nothing else (except perhaps violence) […] Legal rights ground legal 
claims to protect already established legal entitlements. Human rights 
ground moral claims to strengthen or add to existing legal entitlements. 
That does not make human rights stronger or weaker, just different. 
They are human (rather than legal) rights. If they did not function 
differently, there would be no need for them.26 
                                                 
23 Another alternative to thinking of rights as possession is, Howard Caygill argues, suggested by 
Emmanuel Levinas, for whom ‘[t]he origin of right does not lie in an act of possession but in the event of 
dispossessing the self before the other’. (Howard Caygill, Levinas and the Political (London: Routledge, 
2002), p.152.) According to Caygill, Levinas ‘insists on the a priori character of human rights, a priori in the 
sense of being prior to institutions and acts of association’ and ‘derives the a priori character of human 
rights from his ethics of alterity, now developed in the direction of an account of responsibility and love 
that aspires to universal fraternity.’ (Caygill, p.152). However, in Chapter Three I will argue through a 
reading of Jacques Derrida’s work on the fraternal that the concept of fraternity is centrally implicated in 
human rights discourse’s difficulties of possession. 
24 Donnelly, p.9. 
25 Donnelly, p.12.  
26 Donnelly, pp.12-13.  
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Donnelly thus distinguishes human rights from legal rights: appeals to human 
rights occur in the ‘absence’ of legal rights.27 However, though it is clear that human 
rights ‘function differently’28 from legal rights, they are also closely linked to them: 
[c]laims of human rights thus ultimately aim to be self-liquidating […] 
Human rights claims characteristically seek to challenge or change 
existing institutions, practices, or norms, especially legal practices. Most 
often they seek to establish (or bring about more effective enforcement 
of) a parallel ‘lower’ right. For example, claims of a human right to 
healthcare in the United States typically aim to create a legal right to 
health care.29 
But here we see the reverse side of the possession paradox: once ‘active respect 
or objective enjoyment’30 of a right is enjoyed, or where an accessible legal process has a 
reasonable chance of ensuring that such a right is protected in future, it tends not to be 
considered a human right at all. Discussing the changing tactics of social movements in 
postwar Britain, Adam Lent writes that ‘the peaceful march and rally through a drizzly 
central London had become such an accepted feature of political life that, by the early 
1980s, it could hardly be regarded as a radical tactic anymore.’31 Even though the ability 
to march unimpeded up the Mall in the rain is to enjoy the right to freedom of 
association, the possession paradox suggests that human rights language is only likely to 
be invoked, is only likely to be thought in play, if the police start to attack protestors, or 
if the right is put in jeopardy in some other way.  
Both Donnelly and de Bolla therefore understand human rights to be difficult, 
perhaps impossible, to possess. For de Bolla this is because of the connection between 
the terms ‘human’ and ‘rights’. If we understand that connection to mean that all 
humans can claim a list of definable rights, then human rights cannot ever be universally 
be possessed because this will inevitably cause conflict between different rights-holders. 
This would require adjudication between different parties – as is facilitated by the legal 
system within nation-states. But such adjudication would seem to betray the essence of 
human rights, which are thought to be unequivocally possessed on the basis of humanity 
                                                 
27 Donnelly, p.12.  
28 Donnelly, p.13.  
29 Donnelly, p.12.  
30 Donnelly, p.9.  
31 Adam Lent, British Social Movements Since 1945: Sex, Colour, Peace and Power (Houndmills, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2001), p.185.  
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alone. On the other hand, if human rights are understood as aspirations for humanity – 
a description of what humanness should mean – they are not able to be possessed, 
because rights understood in this aspirational way are not things, or particular claims, to 
be possessed by individuals. They belong to humanity as a whole, to the idea of 
humanity, not to individual humans.  
For Donnelly human rights are difficult to possess because they have most value 
where they are not respected – where they are a last resort. Where they are securely 
possessed they are not really human rights at all. They tend to be thought of in a 
different way, lacking human rights’ sense of urgency, and protected as civil rights in 
national legal systems. The possession of human rights is therefore always caught up in a 
moment of crisis. They are possessed only in their non-possession. In this thesis I argue 
that this is a limit-point for the discourse of human rights, and I propose that literary 
texts can show how and why this is the case.  
Structure of Thesis 
In Chapter One I compare the definitions of human rights advanced by historian 
Samuel Moyn and literary theorist Joseph Slaughter.32 Moyn argues that what is 
distinctive about human rights is that they are thought to be possessed on the basis of 
human identity alone. He suggests that human rights are thought to belong to a world 
citizenry of human beings, one which has not yet been fully brought into being, but 
which is in the process of being built. This new cosmopolitan order tends to be 
distinguished from or defined against the Westphalian system. On the other hand, 
Slaughter points to the mechanics of international human rights law to argue that, 
despite the cosmopolitan rhetoric with which they are associated, human rights are 
realized through citizenship in nation-states. I argue that human rights discourse is 
characterized by the tension between these ways of conceptualizing rights possession.  
This is to suggest that the difficulties Hannah Arendt identified in eighteenth-
century conceptions of rights have not been dealt with. In fact, though Arendt shows 
that simple humanness cannot ground the possession of rights in a meaningful way, 
there is a recurrent strain in contemporary human rights discourse which attempts to 
enable sheer human identity to do just this. This is because the distinctiveness of human 
                                                 
32 Joseph Slaughter, Human Rights, Inc.: The World Novel, Narrative Form, and International Law (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2007).  
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rights as a category is thought to require the concept to mean more than simply the legal 
rights of citizens. I suggest that the concept of the rights-possessing citizen is, within 
human rights discourse, always shadowed by the ideal of the rights-possessing human.  
Furthermore, I suggest that this tension can be read in literary terms – that 
literary texts can make it apparent and make its limiting effects legible. Slaughter 
proposes that the Bildungsroman and human rights discourse are homologous, because 
both share a commitment to the integration of the individual into the nation-state. He 
suggests that where Bildungsromane experiment with generic conventions, this suggests 
the difficulties of fully realizing human rights in actuality. I suggest that the nation-statist 
model of rights possession is not the whole story about human rights, because there is 
always a suggestion that human rights might be able to be possessed through merely 
human identity. Accepting that the Bildungsroman models and reflects the nation-statist 
version of human rights, I propose that there are certain types of innovation with the 
form of the Bildungsroman which do not just bring to light the problems of practical 
implementation, but suggest a more fundamental problem: the tension between human 
rights as the rights of citizens, and human rights as the rights of the human being as 
human being.   
Chapter Two focuses on child soldier narratives because these are texts which 
have been directly used for the purposes of human rights campaigning which also 
resemble the Bildungsroman. Focusing on Ugandan examples, I suggest that analyzing 
the way in which these texts adopt the Bildungsroman form is revealing about the way 
human rights discourse works. Where the Bildungsroman is typically a story about 
growing up, child soldier narratives attempt to maintain the childish state of their 
protagonists. Where the Bildungsroman is usually concerned with the development from 
a pre-political home life to belonging in the political, public sphere, the child soldier 
narratives tend to halt development while the central figure is isolated and vulnerable.  
This is not a mimetic representation of the consequences of rights abuse – it is a 
strategic narrative choice. I suggest that where the Bildungsroman represents the model 
of rights possession through the nation-state, the variations on the Bildungsroman’s 
formal conventions typical of Ugandan child soldier narratives suggest the alternative 
version of human rights: the idea that rights can be grounded on mere humanness. I 
support this through a discussion of the wider narrative practices of human rights 
organizations, and, in particular, their use of decontextualization strategies. These work 
17 
 
to construct the subject of rights as a vulnerable figure, isolated from social context. 
That is, they tend to reproduce (rhetorically at least) the consequences of rights violation 
in the attempt to bring such violation to an end.  
In Chapter Three I ask why this is the case. Why should rights, which ought to 
be guarantors of agency and freedom, produce a discourse which tends towards the 
representation of disempowered and constantly vulnerable, always-injured subjects? I 
pursue this question through literary analysis. In this chapter I focus on three novels by 
the Ugandan novelist Goretti Kyomuhendo. Like the child soldier texts, these novels 
have been understood by critics as types of Bildungsromane. However, what I draw 
attention to in my readings of these texts is the way the conventions of the 
Bildungsroman are not only interrupted – as in some of the experimental examples 
Slaughter examines – but are also interrupted by a specific strain of imagery: an 
excessive and overwhelming repetition of familial language and symbol.  
Jacques Derrida argues that the family is an innately ambivalent symbol within 
the political discourse of the democratic nation-state. He argues that democracy has at 
once two contradictory desires: to welcome everyone, and to construct a political 
community based around sameness which excludes difference. The imagery of the 
family symbolizes this ambiguity. For example, the concept of fraternity is used to 
describe the freely chosen relations between the equal individuals of the democratic 
public sphere. It is, therefore, supposed to represent the opposite of the pre-political 
family sphere. But, of course, in one of its meanings fraternity is a familial word. Why 
choose a word which means ‘brotherhood’ (the ties of blood and birth) to symbolize the 
exact opposite of literal brotherhood (constructed equality and deliberately chosen ties)? 
Derrida suggests that the word is, in this way, an example of democracy’s autoimmunity, 
its inherent contradiction.   
My question is what the family might symbolize for human rights discourse. The 
point is not to suggest that there is anything innately non-political about the family, or 
that actual familial relations are merely human in a way that relationships between 
citizens, say, are not. The family is an intrinsically political space. In fact, legal theorists 
Celina Romany and Catherine MacKinnon critique human rights discourse on precisely 
this basis: they suggest that it reproduces conventional divisions between the public and 
private so that particular kinds of violence which disproportionately harm women, and 
which often take place in the domestic sphere, do not figure in discussions of human 
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rights abuse.33 What matters here is that the family has often been understood to stand for 
what is outside of the political sphere, though – as Derrida suggests – in a conflicted 
and complicated way. The family signals, contradictorily, both apolitical and political 
identity. If the Bildungsroman is, as Slaughter proposes, the literary form which reflects 
and promotes the citizenship model of human rights possession, then the repetitious 
presence of familial imagery represents a deep contradiction for the discourse. 
When the citizen-developing form of the Bildungsroman is disrupted by the 
familial, it indicates the limits of Slaughter’s account of human rights, which associates 
them exclusively with the abstract identity of the citizen in the nation-state. It suggests 
instead that the citizenship model of rights protection is troubled by mere humanness, 
and that these two ways of thinking about human rights are mutually implicated and 
inseparable. Furthermore, because, as Arendt suggests, rights cannot be possessed on 
the basis of mere humanness, this appears to support Donnelly’s claim that the 
possession of human rights is always inseparable from their non-possession.   
 In Chapters Four and Five, I suggest there are legal dimensions of this crisis of 
possession. Human rights discourse has often been understood as legalistic. However, if 
human rights exist most fully in their non-possession, then they may actually have an 
ambivalent relationship with the possibility of their own enforcement through the law. I 
                                                 
33 Celina Romany, ‘Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in 
International Human Rights Law’, Harvard Human Rights Journal, 6 (1993), 87-125. Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, Are Women Human and Other International Dialogues (London: Belknap Press, 2006), see pp.17-
27 and pp.41-43. For more general critiques of the invisibility of issues specifically affecting women to the 
human rights frame, see Women’s Rights, Human Rights, ed. by Julie Peter and Andrea Wolper (London: 
Routledge, 1995). It should also be noted that ‘the family’ is not a universal phenomenon – it signifies 
differently in different societies. This is particularly important to note in the context of discussing literary 
texts from Uganda. For the complexity of the relation between human rights norms and family structures 
in comparative African perspective, see Fareda Banda, Women, Law and Human Rights: An African Perspective 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), pp.85-157. But again, my emphasis is not on the family as a complex 
formation with multiple iterations but on what the family signifies in the context of Bildungsroman. As 
Louise Yelin notes, discussing Burger’s Daughter, one of the texts I will discuss in Chapter Five, ‘the 
conventional trajectory of the bildungsroman […] takes its protagonist away from mother and father’, and 
in this way figures social and political identity as distinct from the family sphere, and as contingent on its 
being left behind. (Louise Yelin, ‘Problems of Gordimer’s Poetics: Dialogue in Burger’s Daughter’, in 
Feminism, Bakhtin and the Dialogic, ed. by Dale M. Bauer and Susan Jaret McKinstry (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1991), pp. 219-238 (p.223)).  
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make this argument through a discussion of the role human rights discourse played in 
South Africa’s transition to democracy. On the one hand, human rights were 
instrumental in the development of the interim Constitution. But on the other, they 
played a crucial role in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, a quasi-legal body. 
The TRC’s quasi-legality was defended and justified in its Report through reference to 
human rights discourse. 
I then ask what literature can contribute to a fuller understanding of human 
rights’ ambivalent legality. Slaughter’s argument about the Bildungsroman suggests that 
where the law is weak – as the international law of human rights is – literary texts might 
take on some of its functions. He argues that the Bildungsroman disseminates human 
rights norms in the absence of fully effective international mechanisms. I respond in 
two ways to this. First, I suggest that positioning literature as if it can compensate for 
the ambivalence of human rights’ legal enforcement is to miss the point about human 
rights somewhat. I suggest that ambivalence about legality is central to the way the 
discourse operates – it is not a problem caused by inadequate implementation. If we 
want to understand the contemporary discourse of rights, then it is this uneasiness 
concerning the possession of rights that we need to probe further. Positing that 
literature can make up for some of the limits of human rights’ relationship with the law 
has the effect of decentring the importance of those limits for an understanding of how 
the discourse operates.   
Secondly I suggest that this use of literature to make up for what the law cannot 
accomplish risks subordinating literature to legalistic criteria. I show this through a 
discussion of the way Desmond Tutu reads a play – Ariel Dorfman’s Death and the 
Maiden – in his foreword to the TRC Report. He invokes the literary text at precisely the 
moment of crisis I have been discussing: he uses it to show that the TRC’s quasi-
legality, and in particular the emphasis on truth that it implies, can do something that 
the law cannot. In so doing, he associates literature with the category of truth. But when 
his reading is examined, it becomes clear that he flattens some of the play’s ambiguities. 
Even though he is using the play to discuss the value of the quasi-legal, legalistic 
definitions of truth become apparent: it is the play’s insistence on suggesting multiple 
possibilities without fully resolving them which is lost.  
 This leads me to ask whether there is another way to conceptualize the link 
between literature and the ambivalent legality of human rights. Is there an alternative to 
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the use of literature to make up for the limits of the law? The first step towards an 
answer is suggested by Nadine Gordimer’s novel The House Gun, published in 1998. 
Although it thoroughly celebrates the new constitutional order partly brought into being 
through human rights discourse, it also articulates a conception of justice which seems 
to oppose the new rights-based order. This alternative is articulated through the 
characters’ readings of literary texts. In the novel, therefore, the existing practices of the 
law and the alternative vision of the literary are therefore rigorously separated.   
 Having shown through my discussion of the South African transition that 
human rights discourse was used to defend the quasi-legal as well as to establish the law, 
and therefore that human rights have an ambivalent relation with their own fully-legal 
enforcement, I move on to consider a second dimension of this ambivalence: the 
paradigmatic situation for the making of a human rights claim. As Costas Douzinas 
writes, ‘[t]he absence of legislative approval, often the legislator’s opposition to the new 
[human rights] claims, is their structural characteristic.’34 Donnelley argues similarly that 
human rights ‘are the final resort in the realm of rights: no higher appeal is available’35 
and that they tend to be appealed to most when the law does not guarantee them. In 
Chapter Five, I focus on two texts which directly engage with and represent contexts 
where there appears to be little possibility of the recognition of human rights through 
the law: Antjie Krog’s Begging to Be Black and Nadine Gordimer’s Burger’s Daughter. In 
Burger’s Daughter this is the height of apartheid in the 1970s, for Begging to Be Black it is 
the period immediately preceding the first democratic elections in which violence 
dramatically escalated.  
In both of these texts it becomes apparent that human rights cannot be secured 
through the law. Slaughter argues that, where international human rights law is 
insufficient, the Bildungsroman performs some of the work that the law cannot 
perform. However, in contrast to Slaughter, I suggest that these texts continually draw 
attention to their own points of failure. For example, Begging to Be Black is preoccupied 
by the limits of imagination and suggests that though fiction may produce the sense of 
imaginative connection, it may be more necessary to be confronted with the extent to 
                                                 
34 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2000), p.344. 
35 Donnelly, p.12.  
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which some other lives are unimaginable.36 Burger’s Daughter has a shifting and unstable 
narrative surface in which perspective is continually moving around. It also includes a 
wide range of quotation. In these ways, it refuses, within its own structure, to associate 
literature with the category of truth: the reader is unsettled in her attempt to find a 
secure narrative perspective or a straightforward narrative voice. Given human rights’ 
ambivalence about legal enforcement, I argue that a connection between literature and 
human rights might therefore be located in the way literary texts produce their own 
irreducibility to legalistic criteria.   
The Nation and International Human Rights 
 Chapter One therefore introduces the concerns of the thesis in theoretical 
terms. Chapters Two and Three focus on literary texts from or concerning Uganda, and 
Chapters Four and Five on South African texts. One of the major arguments I make in 
this thesis is that human rights discourse is ambivalent about the nation-state: it is 
understood as a key location for the realization of rights, but also as an obstacle 
impeding the development of a world of individual human rights. I have chosen to 
focus on two distinct national contexts because I propose that this is the best way to 
investigate and to better understand the ambivalent place of the nation-state for human 
rights discourse.  
I could have selected literary texts from a number of different countries, which 
has been the approach of a number of the existing accounts of relationships between 
literature and human rights.37 But in Chapter Two I argue that the texts produced by 
                                                 
36 I therefore distinguish my discussion of the human rights-literature link from that of Lynn Hunt, who 
strongly centres empathy and imagination. For example, she writes that in the eighteenth century ‘reading 
accounts of torture and epistolary novels had physical effects that translated into brain changes and came 
back out as new concepts about the organization of social and political life. New kinds of reading (and 
viewing and listening) created new individual experiences (empathy), which in turn made possible new 
social and political concepts (human rights).’ Hunt, p.33-4. The texts I consider – notably Begging to Be 
Black – are much more sceptical than Hunt about the connection between reading, empathetic 
engagement, and political organization.  
37 Slaughter takes this approach as does Elizabeth S. Anker in Fictions of Dignity: Embodying Human Rights in 
World Literature (London: Cornell University Press, 2012). I engage with Slaughter’s ideas throughout this 
thesis. My account can be distinguished from Anker’s because she tends to associate human rights with 
liberalism more generally, while I try to distinguish the conceptual specificity of human rights, particularly 
through the difficulty of possession.  
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human rights organizations tend to draw links between disparate political communities 
on the basis of the type of abuse perpetrated within them. This replaces contextual 
information and explanation with injury and works to conceptualize the injured 
primarily through their vulnerability to abuse. This is suspicious, I suggest, because it 
makes invisible precisely what I have been arguing is a problem – the relation of the 
individual to the nation-state in rights discourse. This seems too convenient; 
decontextualizing de-emphasizes, and thus makes less amenable to scrutiny and 
discussion, the position of the nation-state.   
 This is a problem I have wanted to avoid replicating. In order to draw attention 
to the ways in which historicization is being performed or avoided, I focus in-depth on 
selected political contexts rather than drawing upon examples from a wide range. Yet, at 
the same time, I argue in Chapter One that one of the key features of human rights 
discourse is a tension concerning the nation-state. As we have already seen, it is unclear 
whether rights are possessed on the basis of citizenship, or on the basis of humanness 
alone. I suggest that there is always a dimension of human rights discourse which seeks 
to transcend the nation-state. Because I suggest that it is crucial to take into account the 
tension between the projected cosmopolitanism of the discourse of human rights and 
its national realization, there is a need to focus on more than one national context.  
I have chosen to focus on Uganda and on South Africa in particular because in 
different ways both have been deeply implicated in the development of human rights 
norms.  
Uganda and Human Rights Discourse 
Uganda’s inhabitants have repeatedly been the victims of extreme violations of 
human rights, including massacres of particular ethnic groups, extrajudicial killings, the 
imprisonment of political opponents of multiple governments, torture, the expulsion of 
all Asian residents of the country in 1972, extensive failures to protect freedoms of 
speech and expression, and the abduction of children who are forced to become 
soldiers. The country has also repeatedly been the focus of international human rights 
campaigns and reporting, but the extremes of violence and the high points of 
international attention to human rights abuses in the country have not always precisely 
coincided – these are two parallel though not identical narratives. 
23 
 
Samuel Moyn argues that 1977 was the ‘breakthrough year’ for human rights and 
he identifies the 1970s more generally as the decade in which the concept first became 
used as part of an international ethical language.38 In arguing that human rights achieved 
unprecedented international prominence in the 1970s, Moyn stresses in particular the 
importance of American presidential interventions and the growth in the number and 
influence of human rights organizations like Amnesty International. Uganda was 
affected by both factors.  
As human rights began in the 1970s to be understood as a category of the foreign 
policy of rich and powerful states, a language through which other countries could be 
denounced from Washington or London but one with very limited use in the West’s 
own domestic sphere, Uganda was from the outset placed in this new type of global 
spotlight. The rule of Uganda’s most internationally notorious president, Idi Amin, very 
neatly coincided with this period: he came to power after a coup in 1971 and he was in 
turn deposed in 1979 by Ugandan exiles and the Tanzanian army, who had been 
provoked by Amin’s annexing of Tanzanian land. In 1978 the US began a trade 
embargo with Uganda, specifically because of human rights concerns; Ralph D. 
Nurnberger writes that ‘the October 10, 1978, embargo of United States’ trade with 
Uganda established new precedents in America's commitment to human rights’ because 
it made an explicit link between substantive economic action and violations of human 
rights, articulated as such.39  
Uganda was also the subject of sustained attention from international NGOs in 
the 1970s; between 1974 and 1976 the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) alone 
made five separate submissions about human rights violations in Uganda to the United 
Nations.40 Hans Peter Schmitz argues that international human rights organizations, 
including Amnesty International and the ICJ, ‘transformed the international image of 
                                                 
38 Last Utopia, p.122.  
39 Ralph D. Nurnberger, ‘The United States and Idi Amin: Congress to the Rescue’, African Studies Review, 
25.1 (1982), 49-65 (p.49). 
40 International Commission of Jurists, Uganda and Human Rights: Reports of the International Commission of 
Jurists to the United Nations (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1977).  
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human rights violating regimes in Kenya and Uganda’; in the case of Uganda, he argues, 
this transformation began in 1973-4.41  
The evidence provided by the ICJ reports produced very little substantive 
response from the UN – by 1977, in fact, Uganda had become a member of the Human 
Rights Commission, the UN body tasked with investigating abuses of human rights. It 
did, on the other hand, provoke a significant response from the Ugandan government. 
Amin and his ambassadors regularly denounced Amnesty International and the ICJ at 
the UN, but criticisms of the regime on human rights grounds also prompted a response 
couched in the same language as the critiques themselves: in March 1978, Amin created 
a national human rights committee.42  
The Tanzanian invasion forced Amin into exile and began a period of extreme 
political uncertainty – between April 1979 and December 1980 there were three 
presidents for short periods and then a presidential commission. In 1980 Milton Obote, 
who was Uganda’s first post-independence prime minister, took power again in 
controversial elections and his five-year rule was characterized, like Amin’s, by extreme 
repression. Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA, but later known as the 
National Resistance Movement or NRM) seized power in 1986 and Oliver Furley and 
James Katalikawe write that their ‘[t]he campaign was not to end in just another coup 
d'etat; it was to bring about a major change in the way in which Uganda was to be 
governed.’43  
The period after 1986 saw increasing, though partial, stability after the violence 
of Amin’s government and the government of Milton Obote which followed it. 
However, democratic institution-building and the growth of civil society occurred 
alongside extensive use of presidential power and electoral violence. When in power, the 
NRM’s democratizing reforms were centrally concerned with public participation in 
politics: it decentralized power and some judicial authority to local bodies known first as 
                                                 
41 Hans Peter Schmitz, ‘Transnational Activism and Political Change in Kenya and Uganda’, in The Power 
of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, ed. by Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and 
Kathryn Sikkink (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.39-77 (p.40).  
42 See Schmitz, pp.46-7.  
43 Oliver Furley and James Katalikawe, ‘Constitutional Reform in Uganda: The New Approach’, African 
Affairs, 96.383 (1997), 243-260 (p.259).  
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Resistance Councils and then as Local Councils in the 1980s, for example.44 In 1995 a 
new constitution was written after what the chair of the Constitutional Committee, 
Justice Benjamin J. Odoki, describes as an unprecedentedly open process: ‘neither 
Uganda nor any other country I am aware of had ever gone through such a lengthy, 
comprehensive and participatory exercise in forming its constitutional order.’45 
Despite the increasingly participatory nature of politics, Ali Mari Tripp has 
described Uganda during this period as ‘semiauthoritarian’ arguing that ‘[a]s many 
African countries moved toward electoral democratization in the 1990s, Uganda 
remained essentially authoritarian, but incorporated democratic innovations in varying 
degrees.’46 Political parties were banned until 2006, the NRM characterized itself as an 
all-encompassing movement for the whole of Uganda, rather than merely a party, and 
candidates for political office were to be voted for on the basis of individual merit and 
not party affiliation.47 When the ban on political parties was finally reversed, this was 
accompanied by a number of other changes to the constitution, including removing the 
two-term limit for Presidents. This is an ambiguous situation, Tripp argues: 
[t]o portray a semiauthoritarian state like Uganda as a country without 
overt oppression is to gloss over numerous continuing violations of 
rights of association and free speech. At the same time, to study only 
the limits of political freedom overlooks important changes that have 
occurred in autocratic African rulers' behavior since the early 1990s.48 
The major way in which Uganda featured in international human rights 
discourse in the late 1990s and 2000s was through the issue of children involved in 
armed conflict. Uganda became closely associated with the issue of child soldiers 
because the insurgent group the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which has been 
fighting the government led by Museveni since 1986, regularly abducted children. It has 
committed extreme violence against civilians across the north of Uganda and more than 
one and half million people in the region were moved into internal displacement camps 
                                                 
44 For a discussion of the Resistance Councils, see Rosalind E. Boyd, ‘Empowerment of Women in 
Uganda: Real or Symbolic’, Review of African Political Economy, 16.45-46 (1989), 106-117 (pp.109-111).  
45 Benjamin J. Odoki, The Search for a National Consensus: The Making of the 1995 Uganda Constitution 
(Kampala: Fountain, 2005), p.289.  
46 Ali Mari Tripp, ‘The Changing Face of Authoritarianism in Africa: The Case of Uganda’, Africa Today, 
50.3 (2004), 3-26 (p.4).  
47 See Tripp, pp.7-8 and pp.15-19.  
48 Tripp, p.4.  
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with unsanitary and dangerous conditions as a result of the group’s operations.49 After 
2006, the LRA was forced out of Uganda to the Central African Republic and 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Despite this, in 2012 Uganda became the focus of 
an extremely controversial and high-profile human rights campaign organized by the 
American NGO Invisible Children. I will discuss this further in Chapter Two.  
Human Rights in the South African Transition to Democracy 
 The language of human rights was central to South Africa’s transition from 
apartheid to democracy. This was a surprising development. Though the negotiations 
involved a wide range of groups, the two key parties were the National Party (NP), led 
by F.W. de Klerk, which had been in power since 1948 and instigated the development 
of the apartheid system, and the opposition African National Congress (ANC) 
unbanned only in 1990, and led by Nelson Mandela.50 Saul Dubow notes that ‘if there 
was one issue uniting Afrikaner and African nationalisms through most of the second 
half of the 20th century, and throughout the Cold War, it was a mutual suspicion of 
liberal ideology and of individual-based human rights.’51 On the ANC’s part, this was 
because of a commitment to alternative ways of thinking about freedom and justice. 
According to Steven L. Robins,  
[d]uring the course of the ANC’s dramatic transformation from 
liberation movement to ruling party there was a seismic shift in its 
political lexicon. Radical keywords and concepts such as socialism, 
national liberation, class struggle, peoples’ revolution, resistance to 
racial capitalism and colonialism-of-a-special type, were replaced with 
tamer words such as rights, citizenship, liberal democracy, nation-
building, transformation, black economic empowerment (BEE) and 
so on.52  
                                                 
49 See Tim Allen and Koen Vlassenroot, ‘Introduction’, in The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. 
by Tim Allen and Koen Vlassenroot (London: Zed Books, 2010), pp.1-23 (pp.14-15).  
50 An extensive body of legislation enforced racial segregation in South Africa before 1948, but it was the 
election of the National Party in that year which brought about the transition from segregation to 
apartheid which ‘purported to be a rigorous and totalizing ideology in a way that segregation had never 
been.’ (William Beinart and Saul Dubow, ‘Introduction: The Historiography of Segregation and 
Apartheid’, in Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth-Century South Africa, ed. by William Beinart and Saul 
Dubow,  (London: Routledge, 1995), pp.1-24 (p.12)). 
51 Saul Dubow, South Africa’s Struggle for Human Rights (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2012), p.14.  
52 Steven L. Robins, From Revolution to Rights in South Africa: Social Movements, NGOs and Popular Politics After 
Apartheid (Woodbridge: James Currey, 2008), p.3.  
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  ‘That the apartheid government exhibited active hostility to the concept of 
individual human rights’, Dubow remarks, ‘is undeniable’:  
[t]his attitude followed from the brand of conservative anti-humanism 
and neo-Calvinism which led its ideologues to equate the notion of 
liberal rights-bearing individuals as a fearsome challenge to God’s 
primacy and therefore as coextensive with other secular heresies, 
communism most especially.53 
The use of human rights as a common language was partly made possible by 
factors outside of South Africa. In the speech he made to parliament announcing the 
unbanning of the liberation movements and the release of Mandela in February 1990, 
de Klerk said that ‘the year of 1989 will go down in history as the year in which Stalinist 
Communism expired’: 
[t]he collapse, particularly of the economic system in Eastern Europe, 
also serves as a warning to those who insist on persisting with it in 
Africa. Those who seek to force this failure of a system on South 
Africa, should engage in a total revision of their point of view.54 
As Richard Wilson suggests, the ‘fall of the Berlin wall […] challenged the National 
Party elite to revise its ideological commitment to fighting the “international 
Communist threat” which had for so long been the mantra to justify state repression.’55 
This allowed the NP to adopt the language of human rights.  
Additionally, for the purposes of the negotiations, the lack of a human rights 
tradition articulated as such within either the ANC or the NP became a benefit. Wilson 
argues that 
[d]espite the apparent discontinuities between National Party and anti-
apartheid political thought, rights talk was indeterminate enough to suit 
the programs of both the NP and ANC […] The ascendancy of human 
rights talk thus resulted from its inherent ambiguity, which allowed it to 
weld together diverse political constituencies.56 
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The global struggle against apartheid, meanwhile, was not always framed in 
human rights terms either.57 Håkan Thörn has described the ‘discursive diversity’ of the 
anti-apartheid movement: 
[a]lthough human rights was an important element in the discursive 
repertoire of the movement throughout the anti-apartheid struggle, the 
issue was also articulated through discourses with different ideological 
implications – for example, anti-imperialism, national self-
determination, de-colonization, anti-capitalism, or Pan Africanist anti-
racism.58  
However, though the global opposition to apartheid was not always understood 
as a human rights issue, apartheid was crucial to the development of international 
human rights standards. Richard Schifter has suggested that because South Africa was 
so internationally isolated, its human rights violations could become the subject of 
strong international response at the UN in a way that other states’ actions could not:  
it very well may have required a friendless, racist human rights violator 
such as South Africa to break down the barriers that stood in the way 
of United Nations scrutiny of a member state’s abusive treatment of its 
own citizens.59  
For Rob Skinner, ‘is possible to go so far as to say that the attention and criticism 
focussed on South Africa over its racial policies provided a context for the emerging 
language of human rights’.60 The country became, he argues, ‘the subject of a discursive 
shift in which ideas of democracy and universal rights became a normative standard for 
political legitimacy.’61 And Dubow suggests that ‘[f]ollowing Sharpeville, apartheid 
became a global metonym for the racially motivated abuse of human rights’ and that the 
                                                 
57 Additionally, there were few institutional connections between Britain’s Anti-Apartheid Movement 
(which began as a boycott campaign in 1959 in London) and Amnesty International (founded in 1961 in 
London). In his detailed study of AAM in Britain, Roger Fieldhouse notes that it was only ‘[i]nfrequently 
and irregularly over the years’ that Amnesty International and AAM ‘exchanged information about the 
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‘internationalisation of apartheid’s iniquities thereby gave fresh currency to wordwide 
human rights awareness.’62  
For a combination of reasons, then, both internal and external to South Africa, 
the discourse of human rights became important and strategically useful during the 
transition to democracy. It was a language which both the ANC and the NP became 
comfortable with using to describe their visions of the future of the country, however 
much these visions competed, and in this way it facilitated dialogue and negotiation. In 
Chapters Four and Five I focus on two particular ways in which human rights discourse 
was used in the transition: the quasi-legal TRC and the drafting of the interim 
constitution. I suggest that, read together, these indicate the ambivalence of the 
relationship between human rights discourse and the law, a particular dimension of the 
difficulties of possession which are characteristic of the discourse.  
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Chapter One: The Person and the Human in 
Human Rights Discourse 
 
What are human rights? The most straightforward answer is the one proposed 
by human rights theorist Jack Donnelly, who argues that ‘[h]uman rights are, literally, 
the rights that one has simply because one is a human being.’1 Others suggest that 
human rights are only realizable for – or are only able to be truly possessed by – citizens 
of nation-states, and thus that the qualification of citizenship, rather than simple 
humanness alone, is the grounds for human rights possession. This is an ambiguity first 
explored by Hannah Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism in reference to the rights 
discourse of the eighteenth century.2 Although there are important differences between 
contemporary human rights discourse and this earlier rights tradition, I suggest that the 
problems Arendt identifies have not been fully resolved.  
In this chapter, I compare the way historian Samuel Moyn and literary scholar 
Joseph Slaughter define human rights. Moyn suggests that what is distinctive about 
contemporary human rights is that they are thought to be possessed on the basis of 
human identity alone.3 He argues that human rights as we understand them today 
emerged as an influential and widely-used concept only in the 1970s. In his account, 
what distinguishes contemporary human rights from earlier rights ideas is their 
independence from the nation-state: they do not envisage the nation-state as the 
primary protector of rights claims. Instead, they attempt to establish institutional forms 
                                                 
1 Donnelly, p.10.  
2 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 2nd edn (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958).  
3 It is important to note that Moyn, unusually among theorists of human rights, is not seeking to defend 
or promote a particular understanding of the discourse of human rights which he finds theoretically 
persuasive. Instead he is arguing that human rights mean something specific – it is a key thesis of his 
book that this specificity is often ignored in contemporary discussions of human rights. But he is, to a 
significant extent, sceptical of the efficacy of human rights as he understands them, and of the desirability 
of their current formulation. As a shorthand, I will refer throughout to Moyn’s conceptualization of 
rights, but it should be noted that this is not a way of thinking that he ever suggests is convincing or 
conceptually rigorous, but rather one which he thinks is accurate as a way of describing what human 
rights are and how they operate as a language of contemporary morality.  
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with greater power than the nation-state in order to protect the rights of individuals. By 
contrast, Slaughter argues that in practical terms the universal commitments of human 
rights discourse become realized only through the mechanism of citizenship in nation-
states. 
Both Moyn and Slaughter convincingly point to aspects of human rights 
discourse in order to support their very different descriptions of the human rights-
nation link, so in reading them together it becomes apparent just how contradictory the 
discourse of human rights is. Here I am not seeking to resolve what seems like a 
contradiction, or suggest that one perspective is the correct interpretation. Instead, I 
consider the effects of this tension. I suggest that one of its important consequences is a 
confusing and conflicted picture of the ‘human’ to whom rights are thought to belong. 
For Moyn, the distinctiveness of contemporary human rights resides in their attempt to 
make humanness alone the grounds of rights possession. Lynn Hunt describes this 
definition of human rights when she suggests that ‘[f]or rights to be human rights, all 
humans everywhere in the world must possess them equally and only because of their 
status as human beings.’4 For Slaughter, the crucial characteristic of the human rights-
possessing subject is not human identity but the identity offered by citizenship.   
My argument is that the confused picture of the human rights-possessing 
human – who is, variously, only a human and also a citizen – constitutes a limit-point 
for human rights discourse. I propose that literary texts can show how and why this is 
the case. For Slaughter, there is an important relationship between human rights and the 
Bildungsroman. He shows that the drafters of the UDHR referred to Robinson Crusoe as 
they debated whether or not society was essential for the development of an individual’s 
personality.5 Slaughter argues that, in the end, the human rights norms developed 
through the UDHR came to share the same basic assumption as the Bildungsroman 
form: that integration into society and into social identity is the primary aim towards 
which individuals should aspire. For both, too, the society in question is that of the 
nation-state. Slaughter argues that this is not merely a homology. He suggests that the 
Bildungsroman works to support, promote and normalize the discourse of human 
rights.  
                                                 
4 Hunt, p.20.  
5 Human Rights, Inc., pp.47-55.  
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My understanding of human rights differs from Slaughter’s, resulting in a 
different way of reading the Bildungsroman. Where for him human rights are realized 
through citizenship in the nation-state, I suggest that this concern with citizenship is in 
tension with the idea that human rights ‘are, literally, the rights that one has simply 
because one is a human being.’6 Slaughter shows that the Bildungsroman is both an 
analogy of and a partner in the attempt to protect human rights through national 
citizenship. But I suggest that securing rights through the nation-state is always an 
ambiguous project for human rights discourse because human rights have often been 
defined in opposition to the nation-state, and understood to be possessed on the basis 
of humanness alone. There are, I suggest, literary terms in which this tension becomes 
apparent, and through which it can be better understood.  
It has been widely noted that critics have paid as much attention to the ways in 
which actual examples of Bildungsromane deviate from the form’s conventions as to 
how they meet them. In the context of thinking about the meaning of human rights, I 
suggest that experiments with the generic conventions of the Bildungsroman take on 
particularly important meaning. Slaughter argues that experimental Bildungsromane, 
particularly postcolonial examples, reveal the difficulties of producing fully-incorporated 
citizens. By departing from the formal traditions of the Bildungsroman and disrupting 
the moment of social integration which is their anticipated climax, Slaughter suggests 
that these texts stage the frustrations and difficulties of realizing contemporary human 
rights guarantees.  
I argue that experiments with the Bildungsroman do not merely show how the 
reality of human rights protection fails to accord with an ideal, or depict the general 
ambiguities or difficulties of human rights realization. I agree with Slaughter that the 
Bildungsroman is an apt model of the nation-statist understanding of human rights. But 
I propose that particular types of experimentation with the form of the Bildungsroman 
suggest not merely the difficulty of realizing human rights, but a tension at the heart of 
the concept itself. Those innovations which interrupt the Bildungsroman’s citizen-
forming logic can make this uncertainty about the basis of rights possession apparent, 
and show why it is a limit for the discourse of human rights.  
 
                                                 
6 Donnelly, p.10.  
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Hannah Arendt and ‘the Right to Have Rights’  
Hannah Arendt argues that eighteenth-century discussions of the rights of man 
ambiguously conflated universal rights, held by all ‘men’, with the rights of the members 
of the particular territorially and imaginatively bounded community of the nation-state - 
that is, with the rights of citizens. This conflation has been extensively discussed; 
Etienne Balibar, for example, writes that the French Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and of the Citizen is ‘an intrinsically equivocal text, as is indicated by the dualities of its 
title and of its first line’: 
rights of man and of the citizen, are born and remain, free and equal. 
Each of these dualities, and particularly the first, which divides the 
origin, harbour the possibility of antithetical readings: Is the founding 
notion that of man, or of the citizen? Are the rights declared those of 
the citizen as man, or those of man as citizen?7   
Arendt argues that this ambiguity had disastrous consequences, which only became 
visible during the crises of statelessness of the twentieth century. When their citizenship 
rights were revoked, the stateless were forced to rely on their rights as ‘men’. If 
inalienable, universal rights had value (if the rights declared were those of the ‘citizen as 
man’) 8 the stateless should have been able to fall back on their protection. But when 
they became non-citizens, they became vulnerable precisely because of their identity as 
‘men’ and only ‘men’ – this identity was the source of their defencelessness, it did not 
guarantee their rights.   
Arendt makes this argument as part of a wider contention in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism that various structures and behaviours in European history can be causally 
related to the emergence of totalitarian governments in the twentieth century; though 
the death camps are ‘insane’, the coming into being of social conditions which allow the 
emergence of such camps are not – they are, she argues, ‘transparent and logical’.9 Seyla 
Benhabib cautions that the relationship Arendt posits is fragile and dependent, not an 
                                                 
7 Etienne Balibar, ‘Citizen Subject’, in Who Comes After the Subject?, ed. by Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor 
and Jean-Luc Nancy (London: Routledge, 1991), pp.33-57 (p.44). Discussions of Arendt’s argument 
about the citizen/man confusion include: Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 
trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp.126-135. Julia Kristeva, 
Strangers to Ourselves, trans. by Leon S. Roudiez (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp.97-
99 and pp.148-154.  
8 Balibar, p.44.  
9 Origins of Totalitarianism, p.447.  
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‘inevitable continuity’10 – for her The Origins of Totalitarianism emphasizes ‘the radical 
contingency of the historical moment that led to the constellation of elements resulting 
in the disasters of humanity in the twentieth century.’11  
What Arendt traces are certain patterns in Western history to give what she 
describes as a ‘historical account of the elements which crystallized into 
totalitarianism’.12 Part of the distinctiveness of her discussion of the rights of man is the 
place they occupy in this historical account; her suggestion is that a failure of rights 
discourse – and, in particular, an unconsidered aspect of the way the rights of man are 
implicated in state formations – allowed the emergence of some of those elements 
which ‘crystallized into totalitarianism.’13  
After the First World War millions of people – the mass unemployed, the 
minorities created by the re-organization of European state boundaries in the Peace 
Treaties, and the stateless – formed an unprecedented mass of humanity who were 
unheeded, unable to play any role in society and whose situation could not be helped by 
any government or power. They were, Arendt says, ‘living corpses’.14 She argues that the 
development of the conditions in which so many people throughout Europe became 
like living corpses and yet could not be helped acted as ‘silent consent’ to the mass 
physical death instigated by totalitarian governments in concentration camps.15  
                                                 
10 Seyla Benhabib, The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), p.64. 
11 Reluctant Modernism, p.71.  
12 Hannah Arendt, ‘A Reply’, Review of Politics, 15.1 (1953), 76-84 (p. 78).  
13 ‘A Reply’, p.78. Arendt’s discussion of the links between the Holocaust and rights talk is particularly 
important because it has become widely accepted that the horrors of the Holocaust caused the 
international community to revive, institutionalize and internationalize eighteenth-century 
conceptualizations of rights in the 1940s. For an example of such a history of human rights, see Ignatieff, 
pp.63-66 and 77-95, and for a critique of this connection on historical grounds, which argues that it was 
not until the 1970s that the Holocaust became central to the development of human rights discourse, see 
Samuel Moyn, Human Rights and the Uses of History, pp.87-98. Arendt’s depiction of the relationship 
between human rights and the Holocaust is strikingly different, and more troubling for our understanding 
of rights.  
14 Origins of Totalitarianism, p.447.   
15 Origins of Totalitarianism, p.447.  
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But for Arendt, the situation of the ‘living corpses’16 - people without place or 
role or social meaning - is itself the consequence of something else: the failure of 
traditional understandings of the rights of man.   
[it] could only happen because the Rights of Man, which had never 
been philosophically established but merely formulated, which had 
never been politically secured but merely proclaimed, have, in their 
traditional form, lost all validity.17  
Arendt’s critique of these rights is based on her perception of a fundamental flaw in the 
concept, a flaw which in the inter-war period allowed a process to begin which reached 
its final realization in the concentration camps.  
Arendt argues that a tension is present from the very emergence of the rights of 
man in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. The 
Declaration represents a change in the conceptualization of law in history because ‘[i]t 
meant nothing more or less than that from then on Man, and not God’s command or 
the customs of history, should be the source of Law.’18 But at the same time, the entire 
document is the basis for national sovereignty, and the figure of the abstract Man of 
rights thus becomes indistinguishable from the citizen of the newly founded nation-
state. Arendt writes that 
man had hardly appeared as a completely emancipated, completely 
isolated being who carried his dignity within himself without reference 
to some larger encompassing order, when he disappeared again into a 
member of a people.19  
She argues that in historical terms, this merging of the figure of the abstract 
Man of rights and the citizen did not become apparent until the crises of statelessness 
and of minorities following the First World War. The Rights of Man claim to be 
inalienable, and  
should remain valid and real even if only a single human being existed 
on earth; they are independent of human plurality and should remain 
valid even if a human being is expelled from the human community.20  
                                                 
16 Origins of Totalitarianism, p.447.  
17 Origins of Totalitarianism, p.447.  
18 Origins of Totalitarianism, p.290.  
19 Origins of Totalitarianism, p.291.  
20 Origins of Totalitarianism, pp.297-298.  
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In the situation of those made stateless, Arendt sees a group who are indeed removed 
from the human community; people who should, nonetheless, be protected by those 
inalienable rights which attach to humans because of their humanity.  
Arendt calls the stateless the ‘most symptomatic group in contemporary 
politics’.21 Each new political occurrence after the First World War, she argues, added 
more people to this symptomatic group, through widespread state cancellation of 
naturalization and denationalization. For example, refugees were created all over 
Europe in unprecedented numbers when, having left their countries due to revolutions 
or changes of government, they had their nationalities taken away; Arendt writes that  
[t]o this group belong, in chronological order, millions of Russians, 
hundreds of thousands of Armenians, thousands of Hungarians, 
hundreds of thousands of Germans, and more than half a million 
Spaniards – to enumerate only the more important categories.22   
The stateless posed an enormous challenge to European nation-states. Benhabib 
argues that for Arendt statelessness is part of a transformation in the way that 
sovereignty is understood in the twentieth century. That minorities were protected by 
the League of Nations under the Peace Treaties suggested that governments could not 
be trusted to protect the rights of those who did not belong to the nation. Similarly, 
Benhabib argues, the consequent crisis of statelessness illustrated the growing 
identification of legal status and rights with belonging to the nation. She writes that the 
creation of stateless peoples,  
of groups of people who were rejected by their respective nation-states, 
the massive denaturalizations of other groups of individuals who were 
deemed ‘alien’ by their host countries, were simply juridical steps that 
increasingly transformed the nation-state into an instrument serving the 
needs and interests of one group only.23  
As Margaret Canovan puts it, the stateless revealed ‘a profound tension between the 
notion of the state as the legal guarantor of rights, and the idea of the nation as an 
                                                 
21 Origins of Totalitarianism, p.277.  
22 Origins of Totalitarianism, p.278.  
23 Reluctant Modernism, p.81.  
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exclusive community.’24 The stateless were, therefore, in a very particular and troubling 
situation; they were humans with no governmental protection.  
For Arendt, the problem is that when faced with the existence of such humans, 
removed from the life of their nation-states, ‘[t]he conception of human rights, based 
upon the assumed existence of a human being as such, broke down’.25 This conception 
of human rights proposes that rights are possessed on the basis of humanness alone, 
and other qualities or considerations – such as being the citizen of a nation-state, or 
being a member of a particular community – are irrelevant. However, when humans 
who seemed to fulfil the conditions of this individual human subject emerged – the 
stateless – they were in fact revealed to be completely without rights. She argues that  
it turned out that the moment human beings lacked their own 
government and had to fall back upon their minimum rights, no 
authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to 
guarantee them.26  
In the situation of the stateless then, the idea of essential rights based upon humanness 
alone was revealed to be a fiction – without the protection of citizenship and seen only 
in their humanity, the stateless had, Arendt argues, no rights at all.  
But for Arendt this rightlessness is of a very particular character. She argues that 
the stateless have not lost specific rights; they are rightless not because they have lost 
individual human rights articulated in declarations but because they do not belong in 
any context where possessing such rights matters. For example, she argues, Jews in Nazi 
Germany were not initially made rightless through the attack on their right to life – the 
beginning of the process was the steady erosion of their ability to hold rights at all 
through their removal from the political community: they were made second class 
citizens, removed to ghettos and concentration camps and before the Nazis ‘set the gas 
chambers into motion they had carefully tested the ground and found out to their 
satisfaction that no country would claim these people’.27 For Arendt, rightlessness 
means a position in which one’s speech and action are unimportant and 
inconsequential. Stateless people may have freedom of opinion or some freedom of 
                                                 
24 Margaret Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of her Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), p.32.  
25 Origins of Totalitarianism, p.299.  
26 Origins of Totalitarianism, p.292. 
27 Origins of Totalitarianism, p.296.  
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movement – they may possess some of the classic rights of man – but this does not 
alter their fundamental situation of rightlessness if their opinions do not matter or if 
their physical place within the state is vulnerable and uncertain.  
Therefore:  
[s]omething much more fundamental than freedom and justice, which 
are rights of citizens, is at stake when belonging to the community into 
which one is born is no longer a matter of course and not belonging no 
longer a matter of choice.28  
The situation of statelessness reveals a right which underlies and is more critical than 
the types of rights enunciated in bills of rights; ‘the right to have rights’.29 Arendt argues 
that ‘[t]he fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested first and above all in 
the deprivation of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions 
effective.’30 To have rights, she argues, you must exist within a framework which gives 
your rights meaning.  
In what sense though is this right more fundamental or important than the right 
to freedom or to justice? The argument hinges on how we understand the distinguishing 
features of human life. Before the crisis of statelessness in the twentieth century, Arendt 
writes, ‘what we must call a “human right” today would have been thought of as a 
general characteristic of the human condition which no tyrant could take away’.31 She 
argues that since Aristotle the human ‘has been defined as a being commanding the 
power of speech and thought’ and as the ‘“political animal,” that is one who by 
definition lives in a community’32; the loss of the right to have rights means that speech 
is irrelevant and that the place in the community is revoked. The rightless person thus 
loses some of the most important characteristics of human identity.  
Statelessness shows that a person can be removed from the context in which 
their speech and actions have value, in a way that was inconceivable for Aristotle and 
consequent political theory. The stateless thus exist in a kind of sheer humanness. 
Arendt writes: 
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[i]f a human being loses his political status, he should, according 
to the implications of the inborn and inalienable rights of man, 
come under exactly the situation for which the declarations of 
such general rights provided. Actually the opposite is the case. It 
seems that a man who is nothing but a man has lost the very 
qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a 
fellow-man.33   
She argues that the stateless are thrown back upon ‘mere givenness’34, upon the 
individual difference which is characteristic of the private life in Arendt’s thought.35 
According to Serena Parekh:  
[f]or Arendt, the phrase ‘nothing but human’ means that the stateless 
person has lost her public persona, her legal status, all distinctions that 
require public recognition, and her unique identity. All that is left when 
we see such a person, all that she has to fall back upon, is her givenness, 
her existence as a human being.36  
Paradoxically, however, this mere human existence for Arendt is not enough to 
guarantee the rights we think of as the rights of the human – in fact, she argues, mere 
humanness can be a danger to the rightless person.  
Givenness is antithetical to the political sphere, to what Arendt calls the human 
artifice. For her, the political world is entirely different from the private: ‘[e]quality, in 
contrast to all that is involved in mere existence, is not given us, but is the result of 
human organization insofar as it is guided by the principle of justice’.37 The person who 
is merely human and who does not have an equal place in the political sphere to act and 
to speak therefore carries a danger:  
[t]he ‘alien’ is a frightening symbol of the fact of difference as such, and 
indicates those realms in which man cannot change and cannot act and 
in which, therefore, he has a distinct tendency to destroy.38  
In the political sphere, humans act and create and rule, but mere humanness - the 
simple fact of being human, of being a human who is alive, and the irreducible 
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34 Origins of Totalitarianism, p.301.  
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individuality of each human life – can never be controlled in this way. Paradoxically, it is 
difficult for the stateless person to be treated as human precisely because she seems to 
embody the qualities of the private and merely human in the public sphere, and thus 
appears alienated from its public equality. 
The rights of man suggest that rights are possessed on the basis of human 
identity alone – but the stateless, who could only rely on their identity as humans, rather 
than as citizens, found themselves in a position of utter rightlessness. Arendt argues that 
human life in the political sphere is antithetical to given human life; when the stateless 
found themselves outside frameworks in which their speech and actions were effective, 
their mere humanness, the biological fact of being human, was not enough to guarantee 
them rights. In fact, it suggested something alien to the humanly constructed artifice 
and equality of the political sphere – they were reliant on what they merely were – and 
became dangerous to them. The rights of man were revealed to be, instead, the rights of 
the citizen. 
Universal Human Rights in the UN Era 
The Origins of Totalitarianism was published in the early years of the United 
Nations’ existence. In the final years of the Second World War, the Allies had begun to 
plan the re-organization of international relations to attempt to secure lasting and 
prosperous peace. In this attempt to ‘replace a world of chaos and conflict with a new, 
rules-based system’39 as Philippe Sands puts it, a new international organization, the 
United Nations, was formed to replace the beleaguered League of Nations and to 
become the centre of greater international co-operation in the pursuit of worldwide 
security. As Arendt was arguing that the unacknowledged ambiguities of the rights of 
man had contributed to the crisis of statelessness, the UN began to deploy rights 
discourse after a long period in which the notion of rights had little political purchase. 
As Peter de Bolla notes, ‘rights talk faded from public discourse in the […] one hundred 
fifty or so years’ between ‘the late eighteenth century and the mid-twentieth’.40  
In wartime rhetoric, certain moral values had become bound up with the Allies’ 
efforts; President Roosevelt’s January 1941 address to Congress, for example, focused 
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on ‘four freedoms’, baseline guarantees for life which, he argued, should be enjoyed 
around the world.41 The four freedoms were freedom of speech, freedom of religion, 
freedom from want (‘which […] means economic understandings which will secure to 
every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants’) and freedom from fear (‘a 
worldwide reduction of armaments […] that no nation will be in a position to commit 
an act of physical aggression against any neighbour’).42 The US, he said, was committed 
to freedom, and ‘[f]reedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere.’43 
The UN Charter, the organization’s founding document, was signed on 26th 
June 1945 at the San Francisco Conference on International Organization. Amongst the 
seven articles in the Charter which mention human rights are Article 62.2, which says 
that the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) ‘may make recommendations for the 
purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all’,44 and Article 68 which allows ECOSOC to establish a Human Rights 
Commission.45 This Commission was created and met for the first time in 1947 with 
Eleanor Roosevelt as its chair; it immediately began considering how the UN might use 
an international bill of rights to, as the Charter promised, ‘promote respect for, and 
observance of, human rights.’46 The initial debates concerned the form such an 
international human rights bill would take and over the course of the Commission’s 
next sessions, it was agreed to draft a non-binding declaration of principles, to be 
followed by a binding treaty. It was envisaged that the treaty and the declaration 
together would form the international bill of rights. 
As the Commission drafted the initial declaration, which would become the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, various philosophical positions were espoused 
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by the delegates.47 However, there was little attempt to resolve differences in 
philosophical opinion; as Vratislav Pechota notes,  
[n]othing in the records suggests that the Commission ever felt the 
need of a uniform theory, let alone ideology of human rights […] The 
goal of the Commission was not to achieve doctrinal consensus but to 
reach a set of agreements that might be justified even on highly 
divergent doctrinal grounds.48  
The Declaration, therefore, lists the human rights which could be agreed upon in 1948 
despite philosophical differences; it does not represent any attempt to formulate a 
coherent philosophy of rights.  
The key question here is: to what extent does the conceptualization of human 
rights which emerges from the UDHR render the difficulties identified by Arendt 
obsolete? A distinctive answer to this question has been advanced by Joseph Slaughter 
and it is one which centrally implicates literary texts. What the desperate situation of the 
stateless reveals, for Arendt, is a split in the category of the human itself, a split which, 
she argues, would have been incomprehensible to Aristotelian political philosophy. 
What the stateless and, later, the death camps illustrate is that the natural human is not 
always also Aristotle’s ‘political animal’ – the two can be separated.49 The eerie givenness 
of natural life can be split off from ‘the being commanding the power of speech and 
thought’50 who has ‘a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions 
effective’.51 In Human Rights, Inc. Slaughter argues that contemporary international 
human rights discourse can be understood as an attempt to repair this split between 
‘man’ and ‘citizen’. 
This repairing of the split between man and citizen is accomplished, he argues, 
through the use contemporary human rights ideas make of the concept of the 
‘personality’. He observes that in the UDHR, ‘[e]xcluding the title’, 
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the word ‘human’ appears […] eleven times […] and only twice does 
it act like a noun to denote a ‘human being’. ‘Person’, on the other 
hand, appears eight times, always as a noun (person or personality).52 
These words, ‘human’ and ‘person’, have tended to be treated as synonyms in 
discussions of the UDHR and human rights law more generally, but for Slaughter this is 
a mistake. In order to understand how the rights regime brought into being by 
contemporary human rights law works, ‘we must understand the juridical meaning of 
the word “person” and the work that “person” does that human does not.’53  
The person in human rights law, Slaughter argues, is an artificial construct, a 
substitute or place-holder for the human in the legal sphere. He writes that: 
in the case of human rights, ‘person’ is the rhetorical vehicle through 
which the law personifies (or incorporates) the human as a creature 
capable of bearing rights. It is the legal mask (persona) for the human’s 
figural projection in the law – in the sense of both an image and a task 
still to be completed.54 
‘Incorporation’55 is Slaughter’s preferred term to describe the work performed by the 
construct of the person under the law; it is through the formal structure of the person 
and its legal recognition that individuals, in all their difference and multiplicity, come to 
be recognized and given rights within legal systems, their individual difference – 
givenness, in Arendt’s terms – replaced by a formal equality under the law. That is, ‘as it 
appears throughout human rights law, “personality” does not have the popular 
psychological meaning of the complex of characteristics that are unique to the 
individual’.56 Instead, ‘it is imagined to be an individual instance of the abstract, 
universal human personality.’57 
The aim of human rights law is that the ‘legal image of the person might come 
to be seen as coextensive with the actual human being.’58 That is, the ‘goal […] is to kill 
the very metaphor that founds human rights, the enabling analogy that establishes the 
                                                 
52 Human Rights, Inc., p.332, fn. 50.  
53 Human Rights, Inc., p.57.  
54 Human Rights, Inc., p.58. 
55 Human Rights, Inc., p.23.  
56 Human Rights, Inc., p.58. 
57 Human Rights, Inc., p.58. 
58 Human Rights., Inc., p.22. 
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figural correspondence between – but that also separates – the human and the person.’59 
Human rights law aims to incorporate the natural human into the person under the law 
and thus to remove the distinction between them. In this way, Slaughter argues, it tries 
to ‘repair the rupture between man and citizen that […] Arendt critiqued’.60 It can be 
understood as the project of bringing humanity into line with personality, or ensuring 
that all humans possess the artificial personality to which rights attach. 
At first sight, this might seem like a restatement of Arendt’s argument: mere 
human givenness is not enough; humans must also possess ‘a place in the world’, here 
understood through the concept of personality.61 But Arendt is criticising an assumption 
made by earlier discussions of rights. She argues that the rights of man merely assumed 
that the sheer human creature and political identity were coextensive, believing that 
‘man’ and ‘the citizen’ were the same and – like Aristotle, as Arendt reads him – that 
political identity was not something that could be removed. Slaughter’s discussion sees 
human rights developing at the point at which this earlier assumption was shown (by 
the stateless and by the death camps) to be extraordinarily dangerous. Contemporary 
rights ideas address the problem of split in the category of the human, Slaughter argues. 
They do so not by merely assuming that humanness coincides naturally with political, 
social being, but by seeking to put in place the mechanisms by which humanness can be 
transformed into political, social being.  
The personality is thus understood to be both something which is integral to 
human identity (this is the same kind of assumption that the French Declaration makes 
as it enunciates the rights of man and of the citizen) and to be something which is to be 
brought into being (this is its key innovation). That is, contemporary human rights law 
in Slaughter’s account responds to the problems identified by Arendt by positing 
political identity as that which is to be partly developed, rather than that which is merely 
assumed to occur naturally.  
The preamble to the UDHR, Slaughter writes,  
initially treats the human personality as if it were an innate aspect of the 
human being, but the articles describe it as an effect of human rights – 
the product of contingent civil, political, social, cultural, and economic 
                                                 
59 Human Rights, Inc., p.22. 
60 Human Rights, Inc., p.22. 
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formations and relations; on the whole, the Declaration images the 
human person as an improbable composite of a pre-social, natural 
human personality and a positive project of personality development.62 
For example, Slaughter argues that equality and dignity are characteristics of 
human personality: ‘[t]he abstract equality of the inalienable human personality and its 
inherent dignity is the theoretical foundation of contemporary human rights law’.63 But 
these qualities of equality and dignity are presented both as ‘inalienable’ properties of 
the human person and, at the same time, as the result of the protections human rights 
law brings about. Tautologically, human rights protections seek to bring into existence 
the personality already belonging to the human and develop the human into the person 
she is always understood to be already.64 In stressing the personality as something which 
is to be, at least partially, developed in this tautologous manner, Slaughter suggests that, 
instead of the fact of the split between man and the citizen which Arendt identifies, 
what contemporary human rights law attempts is a way of turning the human into the 
rights-bearing personality; the movement and progression – development – is crucial.  
The development of the human rights-bearing personality in Slaughter’s account 
is always imagined to occur through social relations. Slaughter shows that when the 
UDHR was constructed, the drafters turned to a novel, Robinson Crusoe, to articulate 
their differing conceptions of human personality and its relation to society. The Belgian 
representative, Fernand Dehouse, said that ‘[i]t might...be asserted that the individual 
could only develop his personality within the framework of society; it was, however, 
only necessary to recall the famous book by Daniel Defoe, Robinson Crusoe, to find proof 
of the contrary.’65 Alexei Pavlov, the Soviet representative, responded that the novel 
actually proved that human personality development is dependent on society, because 
                                                 
62 Human Rights, Inc., pp.61-2. 
63 Human Rights, Inc., p.55. 
64 In fact, Slaughter argues that this is near-tautological rather than fully tautological because though 
equality and dignity are inalienable characteristics of the human person, the human person is not a 
naturally-occurring phenomenon, but something which is constructed, itself brought into being by human 
rights law. The human person does not always exist but where it does, all persons are equal and 
characterized by dignity.  
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‘Robinson had...at his disposal the products of human industry and culture, namely the 
tools and books he had found on the wreck of his ship.’66  
This debate ended with the adoption of Article 29; Slaughter comments: 
if a vote can be taken as evidence of such things, Pavlov’s reading 
proved the more compelling to the interpretative community of the 
UN […] with no objections and six abstentions, human personality 
entered international law as both the product and medium of social 
relations in Article 29: ‘Everyone has duties to the community in 
which alone the free and full development of his personality is 
possible.’67  
Personality in this sense is, again, tautologous and has two roles in relation to society: it 
develops because of the organization of society, and it also is the form individual 
humanity takes on in order to enable social relations. For human rights, the society in 
question, Slaughter goes on to assert, is primarily the nation-state.   
The second way in which contemporary human rights law responds to and tries 
to remedy the problems described by Arendt is its new iteration of citizenship. It 
announces a new version of international citizenship to operate through and with 
national belonging (which was of course the key locus of political community in the 
pre-UN era). Human rights are often understood through concepts like universal 
human values and the cosmopolitan but, though the version of internationalism 
Slaughter identifies is indeed different from traditional models of national citizenship, it 
is also more complicated, and more entangled with the nation-state, than a 
straightforwardly universalistic register implies. This is a consequence of the way 
international law works, and so disentangling this complex interrelation of the national 
and the international in Slaughter’s account requires, first, a brief discussion of the 
international legal system.  
International Human Rights Law and the Nation-State 
International human rights law is a branch of international law. International law 
originally developed to regulate the relationships between states; it sought to establish 
principles for the interaction of states as entities. States, not individuals, were therefore 
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its primary subjects.68 It concerned itself with the way that state A related to state B, but 
state A was understood to be forbidden from involving itself in the way state B treated 
state B’s own citizens. The lives of individuals living within states were considered to be 
a matter for their own governments.69  
International human rights law, by contrast, has used the mechanisms and 
structures of international law to furnish all individuals everywhere with rights in their 
capacity as individuals; in the process it makes individuals the subjects of international 
law for the first time. This places a limit on state sovereignty – the principle which 
means that the state has complete power over its own domestic affairs.  As Rosalyn 
Higgins writes, it also ‘stipulates that obligations are owed directly to individuals (and 
not to the national government of an individual)’.70  
The Minority Treaties in the aftermath of the First World War had required the 
protection of minorities in certain countries. But these were protections for certain 
groups in particular countries rather than rights possessed by all individuals everywhere. 
Moreover, as Paul Gordon Lauren notes, ‘the League did not apply these obligations to 
all members, would not create effective measures for enforcement’ and was continually 
hampered by states’ insistence that their sovereignty did not allow international 
oversight of such issues.71 Higgins observes that under such systems, ‘[t]he individual is 
left with no direct access to a forum, no legal right that he can call his own, no redress 
against his own state.’72 International human rights law seeks to provide all three of 
these elements missing from the minority protections, recalibrating the relationship 
between the nation-state and the individual.  
                                                 
68 The subjects of law are those entities to whom it is addressed. According to Dixon, McCorquodale and 
Williams, aside from the state and (today) the individual, additional subjects of international law are ‘other 
territorial entities’, ranging from Taiwan to Northern Ireland to Chechnya, (p.138), international 
organizations such as the UN and EU (p.144) and, in some situations and ‘depend[ing] on the 
acquiescence of, or recognition by, States’, groups such as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
or NGOs (p.155). Martin Dixon, Robert McCorquodale and Sarah Williams, Cases and Materials on 
International Law, 5th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).  
69 On the other hand, if state A’s citizens were mistreated in state B, state A could justifiably involve itself.  
70 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1994), p.95.   
71 Paul Gordon Lauren, ‘First Principles of Racial Equality: History and the Politics and Diplomacy of 
Human Rights Provisions in the United Nations Charter’, Human Rights Quarterly, 5.3 (1983), 1-26 (p. 3).  
72 Higgins, p.95.  
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It is for such reasons that international human rights law has often been 
described as ‘cosmopolitan’. Seyla Benhabib argues, for example, that 
since the UN Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, we have entered 
a phase in the evolution of global civil society which is characterised 
by a transition from international to cosmopolitan norms of justice.73 
She argues that ‘[n]orms of international justice most commonly arise through 
international treaty obligations and bilateral agreements among states and their 
representatives’ and ‘regulate relations among states and other principles that are 
authorized to act as the agents of states in multiple domains’.74 On the other hand, 
‘[c]osmopolitan norms of justice, whatever the conditions of their legal origination, 
accrue to individuals as moral and legal persons in a worldwide civil society.’75  
However there are significant limits to the cosmopolitanism of human rights 
law, and to its attentiveness to the individual; it should not be understood as the 
superseding of the nation-state or its replacement by an international system. Benhabib 
explains:   
[t]he evolution of cosmopolitan norms […] is rife with a central 
contradiction: although territorially bounded states are increasingly 
subject to international norms, states themselves are the principal 
signatories as well as enforcers of the multiple human rights treaties 
and conventions through which international norms spread. In this 
process, the state is both sublated and reinforced in its authority.76 
Let us take an example. After the creation of the UDHR, a non-binding declaration of 
principles, the UN’s Human Rights Commission turned its attention to the other part of 
the projected international bill of rights: a multilateral treaty, which would be binding as 
international law. In 1949, the year after the UDHR was adopted by the General 
Assembly, the Human Rights Commission began considering such a convention.  
By 1952 it had been agreed to split the convention into two documents, one 
dealing with economic, cultural and social rights (which became the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)) and one dealing with 
civil and political rights (which became the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
                                                 
73 Seyla Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism, with Jeremy Waldron, Bonnie Honig and Will Kymlicka, ed. by 
Robert Post (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.15-16.  
74 Another Cosmopolitanism, p.16.  
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76 Another Cosmopolitanism, p.31.  
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Rights (ICCPR)).77 The ICCPR includes rights such as the right to a fair trial, the 
freedom from torture and freedom from slavery where the ICESCR includes the right to 
an adequate standard of living, the right to work and the right to join a trade union, 
amongst others.78 
The ICCPR and the ICESCR set out binding human rights standards and 
mechanisms for the enforcement of these standards. But the covenants are only binding 
on those states which have signed them. The US, for example, has not ratified the 
ICESCR, so those living under its jurisdiction will not be guaranteed the rights 
contained in it under international law, although they may be protected by constitutional 
or other guarantees. In this way, rights protection is dependent on the decisions made by 
governments; if your government does not sign the treaty, then you will not be 
protected by it. Though the rights protections listed in the covenants restrict the power 
of the state, the state can avoid restrictions on its power by simply refusing to sign and 
ratify the treaty in the first place.79  
                                                 
77 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 
March 1976) 999 UN Treaty Series 171 (ICCPR), available at: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx> [accessed 23 August 2014]. 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered 
into force 3 January 1976) 993 UN Treaty Series 3 (ICESCR), available at:  
< http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/cescr.aspx> [accessed 23 August 2014].  
78 Certain theoretical arguments were advanced to justify the splitting of the covenants. It was argued, for 
example, that ESC rights could not be immediately enforced by States because they require positive 
action, often expensive positive action. The freedom from torture is said to require nothing from States; 
they must just refrain from torturing. The implementation of a system of social security is, by contrast, a 
costly and long-term project. But the theoretical debates were underpinned by ideological division which 
made resolution and agreement impossible. What seems like a fundamental conceptual division between 
two types (or ‘generations’) of rights has profoundly political roots in the Cold War. Matthew Craven 
writes: ‘[t]hat economic, social, and cultural rights have been identified as a discrete category of human 
rights is most usually explained in terms of their distinct historical origin […] In fact the reason for 
making a distinction […] could be more accurately put down to the ideological conflict between East and 
West pursued in the arena of human rights.’ Matthew Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its Development (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp.8-9. 
79 There are a limited number of exceptions to this, known as jus cogens norms. Torture, for example, is 
always illegal under international law, regardless of the ratification of treaty law.  
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Similarly, both the ICCPR and the ICESCR have individual complaints 
mechanisms, contained in optional protocols.80  Although states do not have to ratify 
the optional protocol in order to be party to the convention as a whole, as of 2014 the 
ICCPR’s has 115 state parties.81 The protocols means that individuals living under the 
jurisdiction of those states party to them can submit complaints to the Committee 
about abuses of rights contained in the treaties. This enables the individual whose rights 
have been violated to bypass their own nation-state (or the nation-state under whose 
jurisdiction the violation has been committed) and seek the arbitration of an 
international body. But this by-passing of the state is partial; you can only access the 
individual complaints procedure once you have ‘exhausted domestic remedies’.82 
According to international law, the international mechanism can only be used once 
domestic solutions have been tried and have failed. This locates the optimum remedy 
for human rights abuses in the nation-state.   
 
                                                 
80 First Optional Protocol to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 
December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UN Treaty Series 171, available at: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPCCPR1.aspx> [accessed 23 August 2014].  
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN General Assembly 
Resolution 63/117 (adopted 10 December 2008, entered into force 5 May 2013) UN Doc 
A/RES/63/117, available at: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPCESCR.aspx> [accessed 23 August 2014].  
81 For the status of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, including current number of ratifications, 
see the UN Treaty Collection, available at: 
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
5&chapter=4&lang=en> [accessed 23 August 2014].  
As of 23 August 2014, the ICESCR’s Optional Protocol has only 15 state parties; while the ICCPR’s 
individual complaints procedure has been in operation since 1976, the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR 
was opened for signature only in 2009, and had to wait until 5 May 2013 to enter into force. The 15 states 
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Verde, Ecuador, El Salvador, Finland, Gabon, Mongolia, Montenegro, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain and 
Uruguay. 
For the status of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, see 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3-
a&chapter=4&lang=en> [accessed 23 August 2014].  
82 Additionally, as long as the domestic remedies are not overly prolonged; see the Optional Protocol to 
the ICCPR Article 5.2 (b) and Optional Protocol to the ICESCR Article 3.1.  
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Human Rights, National Citizenship and the Bildungsroman 
What this amounts to, Slaughter argues, is a modification of the nation-state 
system. International human rights law does not mean that nation-states have ceased 
dominating the international law; what it attempts instead is a particular configuration 
of national citizenship: 
[i]n its articulation of an international imaginary that is based on 
nation-statist forms, the UN deferred to what it understood to be the 
de facto geopolitical relations of state sovereignty and reserved the 
adjudication of so-called international human rights to its member 
states. Thus, the projected human rights-based international order has 
little in the way of forms of its own. I do not mean that it has no 
material immediacy or sensible existence; rather, its institutional and 
administrative structures remain weak.83 
Slaughter argues that there was a clear desire in the postwar period to bring about a new 
kind of international order. But even though certain non-governmental organizations 
did have an influence on the development of the United Nations and its human rights 
commitments, nation-states were always the most important decision-makers.84 
Consequently the UN’s human rights regime and its recognition of universal human 
rights revolve around nation-states. An important degree of state sovereignty was 
sacrificed, and in fact in a number of instances powerful states found that their 
rhetorical commitment to human rights ended up costing them much more than they 
had envisaged.85 But, nonetheless, the developing focus on human rights still centred the 
nation-state as the forum in which rights should be protected.  
                                                 
83 Human Rights Inc., p.84. 
84 On the influence of NGOs in the development of the UN Charter, see Jan Herman Burgers, ‘Road to 
San Francisco: The Revival of the Human Rights Ideal in the Twentieth Century’, Human Rights Quarterly, 
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85 In an early example of this, the contradiction between the universalist rhetoric being employed by the 
major powers and the reality of continuing colonial domination was exploited by many anticolonial 
campaigners. A.W Brian Simpson gives the example of Chapter XI of the UN Charter, which ‘in effect 
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governments to provide regular reports on the ‘economic, social and educational conditions’ in the 
colonies ‘became a major bone of contention as the anti-colonialists attempted to develop machinery for 
supervision out of a Charter designed not to provide one.’ (Simpson, p.271). In a way utterly unforeseen 
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Therefore, international human rights law adopts the nation-statist forms that 
preceded it, imagining the society in which the individual’s personality will be developed 
as the nation-state. But while national citizenship remains absolutely central to rights 
protection as envisaged in human rights law, Slaughter argues, it is a modified version of 
citizenship, inflected with the values of a universally-imagined humanity.  
Specifically, it is the notion of the ‘free and full development of the human 
personality’ which works as ‘a means of remediation’ between the state and the 
individual.86 Slaughter argues that it is through the notion of personality that human 
rights law reconciles the concern with the individual which characterizes its universalist, 
cosmopolitan rhetoric with the continued importance of the nation-state system to the 
international system. On the one hand, human rights law proposes that free and full 
development of the human personality is only realizable as a citizen in a nation-state; in 
this way, the dominance of the international order by the state is re-entrenched. On the 
other hand, international law establishes the features of human personality – its dignity 
and formal equality, for example – and binds states to respect and protect these equal 
and dignified persons. In this way, the power of the state is attenuated and the state and 
the individual are brought into a new kind of relationship.  
For Slaughter international human rights law is, perhaps unexpectedly, primarily 
concerned with the conditions and possibilities of belonging in the nation-state. He 
argues that human rights aim to incorporate the human into the rights-bearing 
personality, that personality is always envisaged in human rights discourse as 
developable in society, and that that society is typically the nation-state. As the 
description of the person defined through abstract equality and dignity indicates, this is 
an understanding of human rights which places the discourse squarely within a liberal 
political register.87 The nation-state envisaged in his argument as the primary site for the 
development of the human personality is, specifically, one organized on the liberal 
democratic model.  
                                                                                                                                          
by the colonial powers, the mechanisms of the UN became a site for debates about the continuation of 
colonial rule, even as Britain’s Colonial Office (for example) thought it was merely restating the status 
quo.  
86 Human Rights, Inc., p.90.  
87 See Elizabeth S. Anker’s Fictions of Dignity for an extended discussion of the liberal assumptions at the 
centre of human rights discourse.  
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The fact that the new internationalist rights language does not have particularly 
substantial legal institutions has another consequence, Slaughter argues. It means that 
cultural forms have been conscripted to support, promulgate and disseminate its norms; 
Slaughter suggests that in ‘contrast to the weakness of legal apparatuses, cultural forms 
like the novel have cooperated with human rights to naturalize their common sense.’88 
Further, because the weakness of international institutions has led human rights law to 
modify the conditions of citizenship in the nation-state rather than developing new 
forms, Slaughter suggests that ‘it has little in the way of cultural forms that are not 
proper to the nation-state to provide symbolic legitimation for its projected social 
formations.’89 Just as the nation-state system is modified in order to place the rights of 
individuals at the centre, so human rights adopts cultural forms traditionally associated 
with the liberal democratic nation-state, specifically the Bildungsroman, to assist with the 
dissemination of human rights norms.  
This is possible because of the assumptions that human rights and the 
Bildungsroman share: 
[b]oth the Bildungsroman and human rights law recognize and construct 
the individual as a social creature and the process of individuation as an 
incorporative process of socialization, without which individualism 
itself would be meaningless.90 
The Bildungsroman in its traditional form depicts the coming of age of an individual: 
the plot is typically a process of individual development; the narrative conclusion tends 
to be a moment of social becoming. The protagonist progresses from individual family 
life to the scene of public integration. The Bildungsroman is, Slaughter suggests, ‘the 
liberal public sphere’s most favored novelistic form for plotting human personality 
development and the acquisition of human dignity as the normative story of modern 
socialization’.91 Because of these overlaps with the concerns of human rights: 
[t]he Bildungsroman has acted as a cultural surrogate for the missing 
executive authority of international human rights law, expanding its 
purview by projecting the social and cultural conditions out of which 
human rights might be recognised as commonsensical.92 
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Human Rights and the Human 
However, this is not the only way that human rights have been understood. For 
Samuel Moyn, contemporary understandings of human rights are so different to earlier 
rights ideas that they need to be thought of separately, as a distinct category. What 
causes him to insist on this distinction is the link contemporary human rights envisage 
between rights and the nation-state. Rights in the eighteenth century were articulated 
and achieved institutional form as a part of the process of forming and founding the 
democratic nation-state: the rights they were concerned with were the rights of citizens, 
despite the expansive, universal language they were sometimes framed in. Moyn argues 
that contemporary human rights discourse is different because it ‘promises to penetrate 
the impregnability of state borders, slowly replacing them with the authority of 
international law.’93  
It therefore, he argues, sets itself up in opposition to the power of the nation-
state in the name of a universal humanity: ‘[t]he phrase implies an agenda for improving 
the world, and bringing about a new one in which the dignity of each individual will 
enjoy secure international protection.’94 Slaughter argues that human rights’ 
cosmopolitan rhetoric exists alongside the centrality of the nation-state to their practical 
implementation. But Moyn is concerned to differentiate contemporary conceptions of 
human rights from earlier rights discourse, and for him the key difference – the essential 
aspect of human rights’ conceptual specificity – is their rejection of the nation-state.  
It is the 1970s rather than the 1940s (when the UDHR was drafted) which is the 
founding moment for Moyn’s notion of human rights, because he thinks of the 
contemporary discourse as dependent upon a high level of public awareness. By this, he 
generally means public awareness in the US and Europe. He argues that human rights 
can be said to have truly emerged when they became embedded in everyday discussion; 
though the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the UN in 1948, he 
argues that human rights ideas did not spur public discussion or social movements at 
that time, the UN’s human rights efforts generally toiling in arcane obscurity until much 
later.  
                                                 
93 Last Utopia, p.1.  
94 Last Utopia, p.1.  
55 
 
But in 1977, which Moyn considers to be human rights’ ‘breakthrough year’.95 
American President Carter was inaugurated in January and his inauguration speech, 
according to Moyn, ‘put “human rights” in front of the viewing public for the first time 
in American history.’96 Moyn argues that ‘the symbolic novelty and resonance of the 
phrase in Carter’s policy is what mattered most of all, since he embedded it for the first 
time in popular consciousness and ordinary language.’97 In Czechoslovakia the Charter 
77 movement brought dissent in the Soviet states to worldwide attention and used the 
language of human rights to do so. At the end of the year Amnesty International would 
be given the Nobel Peace Prize. ‘For the first time in large numbers’ he writes ‘people 
started to use the language of human rights to express and act on their hopes for a 
better world’.98  
  The understanding of human rights which became so prominent in the 1970s 
was always about somewhere else.  President Carter, in Moyn’s reading, introduced 
Americans to the notion of human rights, but it was human rights understood primarily 
as an approach to foreign policy: Carter first began by drawing attention to rights abuses 
in the Soviet Union, before, in Moyn’s word, ‘scolding’ Uganda, then ruled by Idi Amin, 
before ‘the focus shifted to Latin American dictatorships’.99 The significance of the 
Carter presidency for Moyn is that  
American foreign policy discussions were permanently altered, with 
new relevance for a ‘moral’ option that now referred explicitly to 
individual human rights. And even more important, Carter introduced 
the idea in all of its ambiguity to a vast global audience it had never 
reached – and Americans first among them.100 
Taking this moment in the 1970s as a paradigmatic example of what contemporary 
human rights discourse means allows Moyn to distinguish human rights from earlier 
notions of the rights of man: ‘[t]he one implied a politics of citizenship at home, the 
other a politics of suffering abroad’101; the ‘“rights of man” were about a whole people 
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incorporating itself in a state, not a few foreign people criticizing another state for its 
wrong-doing.’102  
The rejection of the nation-state through which he defines human rights causes 
him to distinguish contemporary human rights emphatically from other political 
discourses which might ordinarily assumed to be linked to it. For example, he writes, 
‘[i]nsofar as a generally rights-based movement like the women’s movement took on 
international form, its internationalism was about sharing techniques and building 
confidence for national agitation, not making the global forum itself a scene of 
intervention or reform.’103  
 He makes a related argument about anticolonialism:  
[a]nticolonialism’s vision of rights remained […] so selectively focused 
on the threshold right of self-determination, qualified by subaltern 
antiracism only, as to count as a wholly different conception. In fidelity 
to earlier Euro-American conceptions of rights, anti-colonialism 
prioritized the independence and autonomy of the new nation as the 
forum in which rights had to be won.104 
In fact Moyn goes further in this case, arguing that for human rights to achieve its 
discursive dominance as the global language of idealism, colonial rule needed to have 
ended. But, secondly,  
the widespread rise of the belief that anticolonialism in its classic forms 
had shipwrecked as a moral and political project mattered a great deal 
too – not least because of the sorts of concerns once thought 
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legitimately put on hold while third-world leaders consolidated 
power.105 
For a time, he suggests, some restrictions on civil liberties were considered 
acceptable in newly-independent states, for the greater national good. Only when this 
consensus could be reconsidered – in the wake of disappointment with postcolonial 
governance – could a new supranational concern with individual rights achieve 
widespread appeal:  
[o]nly when self-determination entered crisis, for Western observers at 
least, could there be an opening for a move from the enduring dream 
of postcolonial liberation to the far more recent utopia, the hope of a 
world of individual human rights.106 
‘Western observers’ here is somewhat disingenuous; Western states were never merely 
observers. Former colonial powers bear significant responsibility for the shape and 
structure of postcolonial governments, and for a number of difficulties facing their 
polities. In Chapter Two, for example, we will see that the differential treatment of 
ethnic groups by British colonial powers in Uganda led to tensions and to conflict in the 
postcolonial state.     
But the main point for the purposes of this chapter is not the historical accuracy 
of this statement, but rather its conceptual grounding. This is a different and more 
specific argument than the suggestion that anticolonial movements used the language of 
human rights sparingly, and tended to conceptualize their struggle in different ways. 
Moyn argues that anticolonialism cannot be considered a human rights movement 
because it was centrally concerned with the nation-state, and with the founding of 
national government. For this reason anticolonialism, he argues, was much more like 
eighteenth-century rights discourse than it was like contemporary human rights.   
Moyn freely acknowledges that this conceptualization of human rights does not 
solve the difficulties raised by Arendt. Discussing her argument, he writes: 
Arendt contended that the so-called ‘right to have rights’ accorded by 
collective membership remained key to the values that the new 
Universal Declaration of Rights listed: without communal inclusion, the 
assertion of rights itself made no sense. Rights had been born as the 
first prerogatives of citizens; now, she felt, they risked becoming the 
last chance of ‘humans,’ without membership and therefore without 
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protection. She was correct: there is a clear and fundamental difference 
between earlier rights, all predicated on belonging to a political 
community, and eventual ‘human rights.’107 
But what guarantees the right to have rights if not the nation-state?  Moyn argues that in 
the eighteenth century  
it was universally agreed that […] rights were to be achieved through 
the construction of spaces of citizenship in which rights were 
accorded and protected […] human rights after 1945 established no 
comparable citizenship space, certainly not at the time of their 
invention – and perhaps not since.108  
I suggest, therefore, that there is a tension in human rights discourse between 
the idea that rights can be possessed on the basis of humanness, and the idea that rights 
can only be possessed through the nation-state. The difficulty is that, as Arendt suggests, 
simple human identity cannot guarantee human rights in any meaningful way. She writes 
that ‘[m]an […] can lose all so-called Rights of Man without losing his essential quality as 
a man, his human dignity. Only the loss of a polity itself expels him from humanity.’109 
Conversely, a human could possess all human rights and be fundamentally rightless, in 
Arendt’s account, if she lacked political status, an identity to make rights meaningful, a 
place from which to act and to speak. I make two key arguments as a consequence of 
this. One is that there is a recurrent idea that the possession of human rights can rely on 
humanness rather than citizenship, the second is that this idea encodes a fundamental 
rightlessness – a failure to possess human rights – at the heart of human rights discourse 
itself. I suggest that this can be explored and clarified through literary texts.   
The ‘dissensual’ Bildungsroman 
For Jerome Buckley  
the hero of the English bildungsroman is typically “the young man from 
the provinces” who completes his initiation, for better or for worse, in 
the city to which he travels. The values of his childhood are frequently 
challenged, yet sometimes prove sustaining, and the first sensitive 
impressions remain traumatically vivid [...] Yet it is part of the youth’s 
ordeal to suffer ‘alienation’, to experience the loss of home and father 
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and the correlatives of innocence and faith, and to seek self-realization in 
a new often unaccommodating environment.110 
However, Tobias Boes has pointed out, it is ‘surprisingly hard to discover 
novels that fulfill the strictures of totality, teleology, and normativity demanded by the 
idealist understanding of Bildung, even if one consults works that were written in 
immediate temporal vicinity to Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship.’111 But not only does the 
theory of the form rarely coincide with actual examples of it, but, he argues, ‘the most 
interesting thing about the Bildungsroman […] is that the fact of its “nonfulfillment” isn’t 
merely accidental to, but rather constitutive of, the critical tradition that it has 
spawned.’112 That is, critics have generally proceeded by showing how actual texts 
deviate from what are assumed to be the Bildungsroman’s conventions.  
Slaughter argues that deviations from the formal conventions of the 
Bildungsroman can be read as reflections of the suffering caused by human rights 
violations, or as critiques of human rights ideas. For example, his reading of Michael 
Ondaatje’s novel Anil’s Ghost argues that the text initially establishes one of the key 
tropes of the Bildungsroman: the return home of the matured protagonist. In this case 
Anil, a forensic anthropologist who has been living in the West, returns to Sri Lanka to 
work for an NGO. This, Slaughter argues, ‘poses the problem of Anil’s identity in terms 
of a conflict between her Sri Lankan past and her contemporary cosmopolitan habits 
and assumptions as a “citizen of the world” who represents a court of world opinion.’113 
But, though the narrative ‘poses the problem’, the ‘projected harmonization of 
Anil’s cosmopolitan desires and Sri Lanka’s national needs never materializes.’114 The 
‘plot of the novel unfolds under a declared permanent state of emergency that 
suspended the 1978 constitutional protections of human rights’115 and when she 
discovers a body of a man who has been tortured and killed, she presents her research 
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and analysis to government representatives who refuse to accept her findings. Anil’s 
Ghost seems as if it is going to be story about the incorporation of Anil into Sri Lankan 
society, and ends up frustrating this suggested narrative resolution. 
Slaughter reads this truncation of the Bildungsroman’s form as a comment on 
the international human rights regime, which Anil represents because of her job with 
the NGO. He argues that the novel shows that international human rights ideas cannot 
flourish without ‘an egalitarian national public sphere, a functional democratic nation-
state, and a common national narrative.’116 Anil’s Ghost indicates that where the 
governmental structures of the nation-state have declined into violence, the individual’s 
personality cannot be realized. Even where the Bildungsroman form is adapted or 
deviated from, Slaughter argues that it can still be read as an engagement with the ideas 
of personality development which link it with the project of human rights.  
Moreover, Slaughter argues that ‘the idealist Bildungsroman […] is conventionally 
narrated in the third person’.117 But where Bildungsromane are narrated in the first 
person, and ‘particularly in postcolonial Bildungsromane, which are suspicious of the 
genre’s traditional missionary plot logic,’118 the novel form comes to (even) more closely 
resemble the structure of human rights law in a way which opens up particular 
opportunities for critiquing it. In the Bildungsroman narrated in the first person, the 
plot works to show how the narrator grew into the personality narrating the story: 
[t]hese novels plot the acquisition of self-narrative agency in stories 
that circle back to where they began after bringing the past into 
conjunction with the present and an earlier protagonist self into 
correspondence with the later narrator self, producing the ostensibly 
self-substantiating figure of the narrator-protagonist119 
The first-person Bildungsroman, that is, narrates the process of becoming what 
the narrator already is. In this way it is a more direct analogue for international human 
rights law than the third person mode, because it reflects the tautology which for 
Slaughter is central. Human rights law proposes that dignity and equality are inalienable, 
and, at the same time, proposes that dignity and equality are the products of rights 
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protection. Personality development is presented as the process of becoming the rights-
bearing citizen that one is also already understood to be.  
In the examples that Slaughter examines, the Bildungsroman narrated in the first 
person also allows critiques of the logic of human rights to be made. Of Tsitsi 
Dangarembga’s Nervous Conditions, for example, Slaughter argues that there is a 
significant gap between the ‘sardonic disposition’ of the narrator and her coming-of-age 
story.120 The reader never quite finds out what it is that creates the tone and attitude of 
the narrating voice and this gap is explicitly acknowledged in the text:  
something in my mind began to assert itself, to question things and 
refuse to be brainwashed, bringing me to this time when I can set down 
this story. It was a long and painful process for me, that process of 
expansion. It was a process whose events stretched over many years 
and would fill another volume.121 
In this way ‘what is narrated in the guise of the Bildungsroman is not the fusion but the 
fission of the narrator-protagonist.’122 The tautologous logic of personality development 
which underlies human rights law and the Bildungsroman and human rights law is in 
this way drawn into question.  
In Tununa Mercado’s In a State of Memory, the central character is exiled from 
Argentina during the military dictatorships. Slaughter suggests that ‘Mercado’s narrator 
suffers exile as depersonalization and dissociation, a disappearance that traps her 
between the social world of public personality and the self-absorption of lyrical 
subjectivity.’123 This, he argues, is manifested in literary terms. He observes that the 
book has a ‘fragmented structure’124, creating a ‘sedimentation of discrete episodes 
(which are not events in the narratological sense) that exposit various states of being 
and unbelonging’.125 This is very different to the cumulative incidents which produce 
the citizen in the conventional, ‘idealist’ Bildungsroman. ‘For the narrator,’ Slaughter 
writes, 
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to be expelled from the national public sphere is to be exiled from 
biographical and historical time, consigned to the detained present of 
‘lyrical immediacy,’ which she suffers as a kind of suffocating, socially 
insignificant Arendtian individuality.126 
 At the end of the text, having returned to Argentina but having found that this 
return does not produce the social incorporation that she has hoped for, and which the 
Bildungsroman traditionally moves towards, Mercado’s narrator ‘finally manages to 
write in earnest after exile, on a wall outside the window of her Buenos Aires 
apartment.’127 Slaughter observes: 
[t]he wall is transformed […] until, in the novel’s final sentence, it 
slips ‘down into the line at its very foundation, like a sheet of paper 
sliding vertically into a slot.’ The narrator’s ultimate act of writing 
assumed the symbolic significance of an act of balloting – that 
quintessential democratic activity that links the individual to the 
community.128 
 Slaughter argues that this text is a particular type of Bildungsroman, which he 
describes as ‘dissensual’.129 He writes: 
I posit that among contemporary examples of Bildungsromane 
(especially from the Global South) the most common variation of the 
genre […] places an ambivalent, double-edged marginality […] at the 
center of the field of Bildungsroman possibilities. This dissident 
subgenre depicts the imperatives of modernization, socialization, and 
human personality development not as an idealist process of 
consensual harmonization, but neither does it discount such 
concordance as an absolute, abstract impossibility […] it neither 
accepts the grossly compromised terms of enfranchisement […] nor 
rejects them outright; instead, it holds onto the ideal of harmonious 
integration even as it narrates the unfulfilment of the promises of 
human rights and the idealist Bildung.130 
In the text, the final gesture in which writing is transformed into voting offers the 
possibility of the full integration of the citizen into the state. In this way it ‘holds onto 
the ideal of harmonious integration’ even as, throughout the majority of the text, the 
narrator has been able to grasp ‘no more than fleeting impressions of belonging, of 
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transcendence of Arendtian individuality’.131 The ideal remains, even as it is shown to be 
difficult to fulfil.  
 Here we can observe the consequences, in literary terms, of Slaughter’s 
interpretation of Arendt. He sees ‘Arendtian individuality’132 as the consequence of the 
nonfulfillment of rights. He proposes that if only we could make the development of 
personality – public identity within the nation-state – a realistic possibility for all around 
the globe, then the vulnerability that Arendt identifies in the merely human could be 
eradicated. That is, he suggests that it is the non-possession of human rights which 
produces ‘Arendtian individuality’133 and that in literary terms this is readable in 
fragmented Bildungsromane, which postpone or trouble the textual realization of social 
identity.  
 I suggest a different way of thinking about human rights discourse. I argue that 
the idea that human rights can be possessed through the nation-state is always in 
tension with the idea that human rights ‘are, literally, the rights that one has simply 
because one is a human being.’134 As Arendt shows, human identity cannot ground the 
possession of rights meaningfully, because what underlies lists of rights is the more 
fundamental right to have rights: the right to belong to a political community. Simple 
humanness, however, is antithetical to the way political community is understood in 
Western political theory, and for this reason the merely human subject is a source of 
fear and anxiety for the political sphere, and is in danger. Slaughter suggests that 
‘Arendtian individuality’135 might be ameliorated through the integration into the nation-
state which human rights aims to deliver. I argue that because of the persistence of the 
idea that simple humanness can ground human rights, the possession and non-
possession of human rights are always inseparable: the vulnerability of utter 
rightlessness is not something to which human rights discourse is wholly opposed. 
Instead it can be found at the very centre of what it is to possess human rights. This is 
something which can be examined in more detail through a comparison of what 
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Slaughter means by the term ‘dissensual’ with what it means for Jacques Rancière, from 
whom he adopts it.  
Rancière’s account of human rights is based upon his distinctive definition of 
politics. For him, much that would be generally called politics, for example ‘the set of 
procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the 
organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for 
legitimizing this distribution,’ is not truly political.136 This realm of activity he calls 
policing. Policing is concerned with locating things in their proper place: it has to do 
with order, allocation and differentiation. Steven Corcoran writes that for Rancière 
‘every hierarchical order ultimately rests on a logic of the “proper” that works to 
separate out different domains, and to allocate different shares to groups based on the 
supposed propriety of their place and function of their activity.’137  In every such order 
is a group – Rancière calls them the demos – who are inferior in this order, who ‘in a 
given classification are unequal to others in that classification,’ as Todd May puts it. 138 
True politics, Rancière argues, bases itself on the presumption of equality, 
starting from the point at which all speaking subjects, especially including the demos, 
are equal – not the factual proof of equality in all senses, but the theoretical 
presumption of equality as a beginning point for political action.139 Political activity has, 
then, a very specific character: Rancière writes that it ‘is whatever shifts a body from the 
place assigned to it or changes a place’s destination […] [it is] always a mode of 
expression that undoes the perceptible divisions of the police order by implementing a 
basically heterogeneous assumption’.140 Politics demonstrates this through bringing into 
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conflict the logic of policing and the logic of the political, and this itself happens 
through political subjects.  
For Rancière, the ‘subject’ need not imply a discrete individual. As Costas 
Douzinas writes, glossing Rancière, human rights ‘do not belong to humans, rights 
constitute the subject of modernity’.141 Rancière argues that ‘[p]olitics is a matter of 
subjects, or, rather, modes of subjectification.’142 Subjectification, in this account, means 
a process whereby identities (such as ‘women’ or ‘workers’) become political subjects – 
that is, become opened up as spaces of dispute between the ostensible role of the 
woman or worker under the logic of policing (which sees the woman or the worker as 
unimportant to the social hierarchy) and the underlying equality of all, (because of 
which women and workers are in reality indispensible to the social order).  
In the case of workers, it is the process of subjectification which brings to light 
the Marxist sense of a contradiction between the economic importance of workers and 
their societal degradation. The coming into being of a political subject ‘workers’, means 
that the subject ‘measures the gap between the part of work as a social function and the 
having no part of those who carry it out within the definition of the common of the 
community.’143  The political subject ‘workers’ thus displays a conflict, which Rancière 
calls dissensus. ‘A political subject’ he writes ‘is a capacity for staging scenes of 
dissensus.’144  
Rancière claims that the ‘subject’ of human rights (again, not an individual) is 
‘enacted through a double negation. The subject of rights is the subject - or more 
accurately the process of subjectivation, that bridges the interval between the two forms 
of existence of those rights.’145 Rights, he argues, exist in two forms: one, as written 
inscriptions; as concrete guarantees of certain conditions for existence, which must 
shape the way the community understands itself. This is true even when rights claims 
are not fulfilled – the existence of guarantees of rights acts to shape or affect the 
political space, even in the situation of being without rights.  
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Secondly rights exist in action, in the way in which the content of the right is 
established and its borders delineated by the practice of possessing rights. Rancière 
explains the two forms of existence of rights by reference to women’s rights during the 
French Revolution; on the one hand women used the inscribed rights of the 
Declaration to show that they did not yet possess the rights they were entitled to; on the 
other their actions showed that they had the rights, for example to participate in the 
political process, which they did not possess by law. Rancière argues that ‘they acted as 
subjects of the Rights of Man in the precise sense that I have mentioned. They acted as 
subjects that did not have the rights that they had and had the rights that they had 
not.’146 For Rancière, then, the political subject of human rights is structured by a 
dissensus in which two types of possession of rights are displayed.  
For Rancière, this is exactly the political potential (though not current reality) of 
human rights:  
[t]he strength of those rights lies in the back-and-forth movement 
between the initial inscription of the right and the dissensual stage on 
which it is put to the test. This is why the subjects of the Soviet 
constitution were able to make reference to the Rights of Man in 
opposition to the laws that denied their effectiveness […] When such 
groups can – and there are always individuals among them that do – 
make something of these rights to construct a dissensus against the 
denial of rights they suffer, they really have these rights.147  
However, in contemporary political practice Rancière sees an attempt to close 
the distance between the two relations to rights, to finally settle and decide the positive 
character of the subject of rights, rather than allow the productive tension to continue. 
Consequently, he argues, human rights begin to appear empty in some contexts:  
[a]nd when rights are of no use, then just like charitable persons do 
with their old clothing, they are given to the poor. Appearing useless, 
these rights are sent abroad along with medicine and clothes to people 
deprived of medicine, clothes and rights. As a result of this process, the 
Rights of Man become the rights of those who have no rights.148  
Rancière suggests that when the subject of rights is fixed, rather than being allowed to 
maintain the ongoing process of subjectification the tension between the possession 
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and non-possession of rights becomes a binary, in which the poor are continually 
figured as the lacking subject.  
When Rancière’s discussion of dissensus is fully explored, it becomes clear that 
a Bildungsroman is very unlikely to be dissensual in his sense of the term. There are 
three reasons for this. First, Rancière’s subject of human rights is collective, not 
individual. For Slaughter, the subject of human rights (and the protagonist of the 
Bildungsroman) is the individual who comes to be incorporated into the nation-state. 
For Rancière, the subject of human rights is a group in the demos. Second, Rancière’s 
subject is brought into being by the scene of dissensus – which means that rights are 
truly possessed in the moment of dissensus, the dissensus is not a staging post on the 
way to fully incorporated personality.  
That is, the dissensus for Rancière is what it means to possess rights – for 
Slaughter it means not fully possessing rights. Slaughter’s dissensual Bildungsroman is 
one in which full incorporation has not yet occurred, and in the idealist form, there is a 
picture of what the fully-incorporated citizen might look like. What Rancière is 
suggesting, meanwhile, is that there is a sense in which human rights are fully realized at 
the moment where they are in question; that they have meaning precisely in the gap 
between their enunciation and their entrenchment in law. For Slaughter, the ‘dissensual’ 
Bildungsroman is produced by human rights’ failures, their incompletion, but Rancière 
does not see dissensus as incompletion – he suggests that it is a sudden glimpse of the 
truly political.  
Finally, Rancière’s dissensus is unpredictable. It doesn’t occur at the end of a 
teleological process, but appears suddenly. The Bildungsroman is a form concerned 
with the progressive development of an individual. It is difficult to imagine any 
Bildungsroman which could really be dissensual – collective/unpredictable – in 
Rancière’s sense of the term. To reiterate, Rancière argues:  
[t]he strength of [human rights] lies in the back-and-forth movement 
between the initial inscription of the right and the dissensual stage on 
which it is put to the test. This is why the subjects of the Soviet 
constitution were able to make reference to the Rights of Man in 
opposition to the laws that denied their effectiveness […] When such 
groups can – and there are always individuals among them that do – 
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make something of these rights to construct a dissensus against the 
denial of rights they suffer, they really have these rights.149  
Slaughter writes: 
[i]nternational human rights derive their energy from a […] 
discrepancy that emerges when the proposition that such universal 
things exist is confronted with the historical evidence and experience 
that they do not; that is, the struggle for human rights occurs in the 
space between the world that law and discourse (including the idealist 
Bildungsroman) imagine and the one that they address in fact.’150 
For Slaughter, the possession and non-possession of rights are opposed to one 
another, and human rights’ ‘energy’151 is a consequence of this gap between the world as 
it is and the world as it should be. This is why the Bildungsroman is so closely linked to 
human rights for him: it is a progressive genre of development, in which a particular 
state or stage of existence (for example, childhood and its association with the private 
life) can be replaced by another (the abstract identity of the person under the law). But 
Rancière is not proposing a ‘discrepancy’152 he is proposing a ‘back and forth’.153 This 
indicates a more complicated relationship between the possession and non-possession 
of rights. Slaughter says that ‘historical evidence and experience’ indicate that promised 
‘universal things’ such as rights do not exist.154 For Rancière, though, where rights do 
not exist in fact they exist in the grasping of them. He writes that when groups who are 
denied their rights in practice ‘make something of these rights to construct a dissensus 
against the denial of rights they suffer, they really have these rights.’155  
For me, Rancière suggests a more radical interpretation of the way human rights 
work than Slaughter’s Bildungsroman-human rights analogy can contain. For Rancière, 
human rights are fragile and fleeting – they appear and then they disappear, and their 
possession is always entwined with non-possession. I do not think the Bildungsroman, 
with its predictable climax of social integration, is the literary form which can model or 
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enact the possession of human rights in this sense. From here, this thesis develops in 
two connected directions.  
Over the next two chapters I advance my own theory of how deviations from 
the Bildungsroman form can be understood. I agree with Slaughter that the 
Bildungsroman is a homology of the nation-statist version of human rights discourse. 
However, I argue that this this model of rights-possession is always in tension with the 
idea that rights can be founded on humanness alone. If the Bildungsroman analogizes 
human rights discourse, I suggest that some variations from the form of the 
Bildungsroman might be read not merely to indicate the problems of real-life realization 
of rights but also to suggest the tension between the human rights-possessing citizen 
and the merely human. Reading Bildungsromane can therefore reveal how this tension 
acts as a limit-point for human rights discourse, its costs and its difficulties.  
Having suggested that the ambiguity of possession is a limit-point for human 
rights discourse, in the final chapters of this thesis I return to a question I have raised 
here. The entwining of possession and non-possession is limiting for human rights 
discourse, and in Chapters Two and Three I show why this is the case. But for Rancière, 
the tension between possession and non-possession may, sometimes and somewhat 
unreliably, be the discourse’s source of value. I have argued here that the 
Bildungsroman cannot be dissensual in Rancière’s terms, but in Chapter Five I suggest 
that there are forms of writing which do allow human rights’ delicate and troublesome 
difficulties of possession to be thought and understood more clearly.  
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Chapter Two: Child Soldier Narratives and 
Mere Humanness 
 
Child soldier narratives directly employ the form of the Bildungsroman for the 
purposes of human rights campaigning. But where the traditional Bildungsroman aims 
at social incorporation, development in the child soldier narrative tends to be presented 
as interrupted and frustrated. In part, of course, this is because the texts’ protagonists 
are the victims – and in many cases also the perpetrators – of serious human rights 
violations. It is logical to expect that when childhood is so disrupted, the form of the 
traditional coming-of-age narrative would come under significant pressure as it seeks to 
represent these children’s experiences.  
But in this chapter I argue that this is not all that is going on. The child soldiers 
tend to be depicted as vulnerable and isolated. But their vulnerability and isolation is not 
presented as a temporary condition produced by a particular situation. Instead it is their 
defining characteristic: it is who they are in the texts’ terms. The projected end-point of 
the conventional Bildungsroman is the incorporation of the individual into society. But 
in the child soldier text which is the main focus of this chapter, Girl Soldier: A Story of 
Hope for Northern Uganda’s Children, the child soldier’s personal experience of trauma is 
textually separated from the discussions of the historical and political factors which 
produced the war she fought in.1 I argue that in insisting on the separation of personal 
experience from context, Girl Soldier refuses the integration of the individual into the 
nation-state which is the Bildungsroman’s usual resolution.  
As we have seen, in his account of the relationship between literature and 
human rights, Slaughter focuses on the Bildungsroman for two connected reasons. In 
the first place, the form is homologous with his understanding of human rights 
discourse: he argues that human rights aim at the incorporation of the individual into 
the society of the nation-state, and that this is also the standard narrative arc of the 
Bildungsroman. Secondly, and because of this homology, the Bildungsroman can be 
                                                 
1 Faith J.H. McDonnell and Grace Akallo, Girl Soldier: A Story of Hope for Northern Uganda’s Children (Grand 
Rapids: Chosen Books, 2007).  
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used to promote and normalize human rights discourse. It therefore makes up for the 
inadequacies of international law: international human rights law is too weak to fully 
realize its aims, so the Bildungsroman transmits human rights norms in its place.  
The child soldier narrative is a particularly direct example of this second point 
because it is a variation on the Bildungsroman that has been specifically used by human 
rights organizations for advocacy purposes. Because it is directly employed in this way, I 
propose that reading the child soldier narrative’s deviations from the traditional 
conventions of the Bildungsroman is revealing about human rights discourse itself. In 
the Bildungsroman, the development from childhood to adulthood comes to signify the 
movement from private life to political identity. It is for this reason that Slaughter 
suggests it is analogous and complementary to human rights: he sees contemporary 
human rights discourse as an attempt to repair the rupture between man and the citizen 
through the figure of the person.  
It is precisely this aspect of the Bildungsroman that Girl Soldier draws into 
question. Where the typical Bildungsroman is about the development of a child into an 
adult through her incorporation into the social-historical world, the child soldier 
narrative is a story about a child who, in the narrative, must remain a child, a 
maintenance of childhood which is accomplished through a distancing from society and 
from history. Slaughter suggests that the Bildungsroman and human rights discourse are 
closely related because both are concerned with the development of abstract 
personality. But the child soldier narrative is an example of a way in which the form of 
the Bildungsroman has actually been put to use by human rights discourse, and in the 
examples of child soldier texts that I consider, it is the pre-political merely human 
identity signified by the child that the texts seek to maintain and prolong.  
In the previous chapter I argued that human rights discourse is characterized by 
a tension between the idea that rights can be possessed on the basis of mere humanness 
and the idea that national citizenship is essential for the realization of rights. Here I 
show that child soldier narratives employ the nationalist form of the Bildungsroman but 
do so in such a way as to delay its final moment of social incorporation. I argue that, in 
this way, they make the tension between the two models of rights possession apparent.  
I also suggest that they show why this tension is a limit-point for the discourse of 
human rights. The maintenance of childlike identity in the child soldier narrative is 
related to wider practices of decontextualization in human rights writing, and towards 
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the end of the chapter I discuss the uses to which such decontextualizing strategies are 
put. This leads me to argue that the human depicted through decontextualized writing 
bears a striking resemblance to Arendt’s descriptions of the utterly rightless subject. 
That is, there is a risk of the violation, and the subsequent non-possession of rights, 
being repeated by the discourse which sets out to oppose it.    
Human Rights and Narrative  
It has been widely argued that story-telling is a crucial dimension of the practice 
of human rights NGOs; it is through the writing and disseminating of narrative that 
human rights organizations seek to halt human rights violations. For example, Hurst 
Hannum lists a number of possible NGO strategies for ‘address[ing] a serious human 
rights concern’, and it is notable how many of them use writing.2 These include ‘sending 
letters to the country in which the violations are taking place’, ‘contacting the media 
with information regarding the human rights violations that have occurred or are 
threatened’ and ‘issuing a report on the human rights situation in question based on an 
on-site investigation or, where that is not feasible, on other means of fact-finding’.3 
Stanley Cohen notes Amnesty International’s use of full-page newspaper 
advertisements, and discusses the effort expended on their style:   
[t]he driving emotional message is ‘a quiet rage’. The advertising 
agency described its brief as converting ‘outrage into action’. The 
Amnesty promotions officer noted that the copy-writers of an Iraq 
advertisement ‘are continually striking a nerve – it uses rage, but it is 
controlled and directed rage.’4 
Moreover, as Kay Schaffer and Sidonie Smith have argued, ‘over the last twenty 
years, life narratives have become one of the most potent vehicles for advancing human 
rights claims’.5 They argue that life narratives and human rights campaigns should be 
understood  
as multidimensional domains that merge and intersect at critical 
points, unfolding within and enfolding one another in an ethical 
                                                 
2 Hurst Hannum, Guide to International Human Rights Practice, 3rd edn (Ardsley, NY: Transnational 
Publishers, 1999), p.35. 
3 Hannum, p.35.  
4 Stanley Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), p.201.  
5 Kay Schaffer and Sidonie Smith, Human Rights and Narrated Lives: The Ethics of Recognition (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p.1.  
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relationship that is similarly productive of claims for social justice and 
problematic for the furtherance of this goal.6 
James Dawes goes further, and expresses an increasingly popular view, when he writes 
that ‘[a]fter years spent interacting with human rights and humanitarian fieldworkers, I 
have come to believe that human rights work is, at its heart, a matter of storytelling.’7 He 
suggests not only that there is a mutual interaction between narrative and the work of 
human rights organizations, but that human rights work itself can be understood as the 
production and utilization of narrative, the attempt to tell a story in such a way that it 
induces people to take particular types of action.  
Child Soldier Narratives 
The children who are the focus of child soldier narratives tend to be 
characterized by human rights campaigns as ‘child soldiers’ though, as the non-binding 
Paris Principles on the issue make clear, involvement in fighting is only one role which 
children have played in armed conflict: 
‘[a] child associated with an armed force or armed group’ refers to any 
person below 18 years of age who is, or has been recruited or used by 
an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not 
limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, 
messengers, spies, or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a 
child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities.8 
Although NGOs had been attempting to raise awareness of the problem for 
some time, the significant change in the international consensus on the issue during the 
1990s can be measured by the fact that the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(which entered into force in 1990)9 allows children above the age of 15 to participate in 
armed conflict, despite strong opposition to this low minimum age from NGOs.10 By 
                                                 
6 Schaffer and Smith, p.2.  
7 James Dawes, ‘Human Rights in Literary Studies’, Human Rights Quarterly, 31.2 (2009), 394-409 (p.394).  
8 UNICEF, ‘The Paris Principles: Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces 
or Armed Groups’ (2007) <http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/ParisPrinciples310107English.pdf> 
[accessed 24 August 2014] p.7.  
9 Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 
1990) 1577 UN Treaty Series 3 (CRC), available at: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx> [accessed 24 August 2014]. 
10 See Claire Breen, ‘The Role of NGOs in the Formulation and Compliance with the Optional Protocol 
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict’, Human 
Rights Quarterly, 25.2 (2003), 453-481 (pp.460-1).  
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2000, however, an Optional Protocol which, inter alia, requires states to prevent children 
under 18 from joining state armies or other armed groups was opened for signature.11  
In the period between these treaties, the issue had received a great deal of public 
attention, in large part due to focused and sustained NGO campaigning; the Coalition to 
Stop the Use of Child Soldiers – a joint initiative between a number of large human 
rights organizations, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and World 
Vision – was, for example, formed in 1998.12 The growing interest in this issue led to the 
creation of many narratives concerning child soldiers, ranging from the full-length non-
fiction texts published by generalist commercial publishers, mostly located in Europe 
and North America, to novels and short films.13 
The books published during the 1990s and 2000s which took child soldiers as 
principal subjects fall into three major groups. In the first category are the first person 
accounts written by a former child soldier who has typically left his or her home country 
– usually through the intervention of the UN or a non-governmental organization – and 
now lives in the US, Canada or Europe. A Ugandan example is China Keitetsi’s memoir 
Child Soldier, which was first published in Denmark in 2002 and focuses on her 
                                                 
11 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement  
of children in armed conflict, UN General Assembly Resolution 54/263 (adopted 25 May 2000, entered 
into force 12 February 2002) U.N. Doc. A/54/49, available at: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPACCRC.aspx> [accessed 24 August 2014].  
The CRC is the international system’s most widely ratified human rights treaty; famously, or infamously, 
only 3 states have not ratified it: South Sudan, the newest state in the world, Somalia – which does not 
have a functioning government, and the United States – which has not ratified the convention even 
though it signed in 1995. As of 24 August 2014, 156 states are party to the Optional Protocol on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict. For the status of the CRC, including current number of 
ratifications, see the UN Treaty Collection, available at: 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en> [accessed 24 
August 2014]. For the status of the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in 
armed conflict, see: <https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=ind&mtdsg_no=iv-11-
b&chapter=4&lang=en> [accessed 24 August 2014].  
12 It later changed its name to Child Soldiers International. See Child Soldiers International, ‘Our History’,  
< http://www.child-soldiers.org/our_history.php> [accessed 24 August 2014].  
13
 As Eleni Coundouriotis remarks, ‘[t]he recent proliferation of African child soldier narratives largely 
reﬂects’ a ‘new shape of African literature, written and marketed outside Africa’. Eleni Coundouriotis, 
‘The Child Soldier Narrative and the Problem of Arrested Historicization’, Journal of Human Rights, 9.2 
(2010), 191-206 (p. 192). 
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participation in the National Resistance Army, led by Yoweri Museveni.14 In some cases 
the writing of the memoir has been recommended as part of a therapeutic process of 
recovery; sometimes these books are written with the assistance of ghost-writers.15 A 
number of the memoirs have attracted significant publicity; the UK edition of Child 
Soldier features photographs of Keitetsi with Nelson Mandela, Bill Clinton, Whoopi 
Goldberg and Harrison Ford.16 Ishmael Beah’s memoir A Long Way Gone,17 set in Sierra 
Leone, was for a time sold in US branches of Starbucks.18 
In the second broad category, someone who has never been a child soldier – 
usually a European or American writer – compiles the stories of a number of child 
soldiers, sometimes in a particular army or country, sometimes more generally. This 
category includes books like Romeo Dallaire’s book They Fight Like Soldiers, They Die 
Like Children and, centred on Uganda, Donald Dunson’s Child, Victim, Soldier: The Loss of 
Innocence in Uganda and Peter Eichstaedt’s First Kill Your Family: Child Soldiers of Uganda 
and the Lord’s Resistance Army.19 The latter two texts combine sections of testimony from 
a number of different child soldiers with explanations of the history and context of the 
LRA. Additionally, there were some novels published in the 2000s which took child 
soldiers as subjects: these include Delia Jarrett-Macaulay’s Moses, Citizen and Me (set in 
Sierra Leone) and Uzodinma Iweala’s Beasts of No Nation (set in an unspecified country), 
                                                 
14 China Keitetsi, Child Soldier: Fighting for My Life (London: Souvenir Press, 2004). This memoir is unusual, 
among the texts which deal with Uganda, because it is centred on this earlier conflict (Keitetsi claims to 
have been involved between 1984 and 1995) and not on child soldiers’ involvement in the Lord’s 
Resistance Army. 
15 For a discussion of co-writers in child soldier memoirs and the ways they are acknowledged in the texts 
see Maureen Moynagh, ‘Human Rights, Child Soldier Narratives, and the Problem of Form’, Research in 
African Literatures, 42.4 (2011), 39-59 (p.47).  
16 Keitetsi, between p.178 and p.179.  
17 Ishmael Beah, A Long Way Gone: Memoirs of a Boy Soldier (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007).  
18 Julie Bosman, ‘Disturbing Memoir Outsells Literary Comfort Food at Starbucks’, New York Times (10 
March 2007) <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/10/books/10star.html> [accessed 5 September 2014].  
19 Romeo Dallaire, They Fight Like Soldiers, They Die Like Children (London: Hutchinson, 2010). Donald H. 
Dunson, Child, Victim, Soldier: The Loss of Innocence in Uganda (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2008). Peter 
Eichstaedt, First Kill Your Family: Child Soldiers of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army (Chicago: Lawrence 
Hill Books, 2009).  
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both published in 2005 and Ahmadou Kourouma’s Allah is Not Obliged, first translated 
into English (from the original French) in 2007, and set in Liberia and Sierra Leone.20  
History and Trauma in Girl Soldier 
The primary focus of this chapter is Girl Soldier, subtitled A Story of Hope for 
Northern Uganda’s Children. The book was co-authored by Grace Akallo and Faith 
McDonnell and published in 2007 by American Christian publishers Chosen Books. 
Grace Akallo was one of one hundred and thirty nine schoolgirls who were abducted on 
9 October 1996 from a Catholic boarding school called St Mary’s College in Aboke, in 
Lira District, northern Uganda, by the LRA. The rebels were chased by three of the 
school’s teachers (including an Italian nun, Sister Rachele) who managed to negotiate 
the release of one hundred and nine students; thirty remained with the LRA. These 
thirty became known internationally as the Aboke girls. Five of the thirty were killed 
whilst with the group and by 2006 – when the LRA had moved outside of Uganda – 
twenty three of the others had escaped, Grace Akallo among them. She was abducted 
for seven months in total.  
 The Aboke girls received significant media attention.21 Moreover, in addition to 
Girl Soldier, there are two other books which focus on them in particular – Els de 
Temmerman’s Aboke Girls: Children Abducted in Northern Uganda and Kathy Cook’s Stolen 
Angels: The Kidnapped Girls of Uganda.22 In Girl Soldier, Akallo explicitly addresses the 
media interest their abduction generated, writing that, while she was in captivity, a 
senior LRA commander said to her ‘[y]ou should be killed, and we will see why you are 
                                                 
20 Delia Jarrett-Macaulay, Moses, Citizen and Me (London: Granta, 2005). Uzodinma Iweala, Beasts of No 
Nation  (London: John Murray, 2005). Ahmadou Kourouma, Allah is Not Obliged (London: Vintage, 2007).  
21 See for example Jesper Strudsholm, ‘Abducted in the Name of the Lord’, The Independent, 7 June 1998 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/abducted-in-the-name-of-the-lord-1163464.html> [accessed 3 
September 2014].  
Bamuturaki Musinguzi, ‘Recollections of the Aboke Girls Abduction’, The Observer, 31 January 2013 
<http://observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=23472:recollections-of-the-
aboke-girls-abduction> [accessed 3 September 2014].  
22 Els de Temmerman, Aboke Girls (Kampala: Fountain, 2001). Kathy Cook, Stolen Angels: The Kidnapped 
Girls of Uganda (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2007).  
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more important than the others. Why are they after you and not the other children? 
Does it mean that the other children are not important?’23 Akallo writes: 
[w]hy were the Aboke girls singled out? It was because of Sister 
Rachele, who publicized our abduction. We were talked about on the 
radio all the time […] People could not understand the thousands of 
missing children. It was too much to comprehend. But they could 
identity with thirty schoolgirls.24 
For Maureen Moynagh, there are other reasons that this group of children became a 
symbol for the wider crisis in texts about child soldiers. She writes that  
[i]t is not surprising that there has been so much interest in the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda, and especially in the 
‘Aboke girls,’ […] These works appeal to a particular kind of 
readership, one whose sensibilities can be gleaned in the focus on a 
group of girls who are well-educated, independent minded, and 
Christian. That is to say, they are much like many North American 
and European readers; the distance sympathy must leap is not too 
great in their case.25 
 Moynagh begins her analysis of Girl Soldier by arguing that it is problematic ‘[i]f, 
in the place of a properly historicized analysis of the political situation, the 
circumstances of the suffering, one finds instead a communitarian narrative that 
summons the indignation of readers already constituted as a group (of Christians, of 
“Westerners”)’.26 But though the emphasis the text places on the Christianity of the 
Aboke girls is certainly troubling for this reason, what Moynagh does not discuss is the 
type of ‘historicizing’ Girl Soldier does perform. It is not really the case in Girl Soldier that 
a ‘communitarian narrative’ replaces ‘historicized analysis of the political situation’.27 
There is such analysis in the text, but the way this analysis is used is interesting and 
distinctive. It is this aspect of the text – the way it uses and positions historical context 
and political information – that I concentrate on here.  
In the introduction– which is just one of the book’s three prefatory sections; the 
others are a foreword by Dan Haseltine, who is the singer in a Christian rock band 
                                                 
23 McDonnell and Akallo, p.138.  
24 McDonnell and Akallo, p.139.  
25 Moynagh, p.44.  
26 Moynagh, p.43.  
27 Moynagh, p.43.  
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called Jars of Clay and a preface by Henry Orombi, an archbishop in the Anglican 
church of Uganda – Faith McDonnell writes:  
Grace’s story and the story of Uganda are told in two voices in the 
coming pages. One voice is that of Faith McDonnell, an American 
researcher and writer who gives the historical context for the current 
crisis in Uganda […] The other voice is that of Grace Akallo, who 
tells her own story of sinking into the abyss of hopelessness as an 
unwilling soldier […] and finding her way back through a miraculous 
and dangerous escape.28 
As McDonnell explains, then, the text’s authors write separate, alternate chapters: 
Akallo describes her ‘own story’; McDonnell provides ‘the historical context’.29 
McDonnell’s history of Uganda is in some ways an unusual one. In particular, 
she tends to emphasize the activities of the Christian church in the country, and to read 
it as evidence of an underlying spiritual trajectory; this tends to result in a distinctive 
articulation of the meaning of history. ‘The Christian community is on the cutting edge 
of history that is being written today’ she writes. ‘It is the history of how God’s people 
are answering his call to save the children of northern Uganda.’30 There are also 
moments of lurid description which reduce the complexities of the political situation to 
stark, somewhat Conradian, terms: 
[a] raw and savage grief fills the air in Uganda. The sadness in that grief 
is overlaid with an evil so irrational and unfiltered that it seems like the 
stuff of folk tales. It belongs to a nether world of ogres, monsters and 
demons of the night that come in the dark to snatch the innocent.31  
McDonnell also shows in some detail how the LRA’s insurgency is rooted in Ugandan 
politics and history.32 Though, as I’ve mentioned, the account places a great deal of 
stress on the church’s actions in Uganda, and though it is not scholarly in tone, 
McDonnell’s account does locate the LRA’s uprising in its political context. 
                                                 
28 McDonnell and Akallo, p.22.  
29 McDonnell and Akallo, p.22.  
30 McDonnell and Akallo, p.26.  
31 McDonnell and Akallo, p.30.  
32 For a discussion on the various ways that ‘African trauma literature’, including child soldier memoirs, 
present and incorporate historical material see Robert Eaglestone, ‘“You would not add to my suffering if 
you knew what I had seen”: Holocaust Testimony and Contemporary African Trauma Literature’, Studies 
in the Novel, 40.1-2 (2008), 72-85 (pp.79-80).  
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For example, in Uganda as elsewhere, the mechanisms of colonial governance, 
particularly the differential treatment of ethnic groups, continued to exert significant 
influence on the post-colonial state. According to Adam Branch, for example, the 
groups the British designated as distinct ‘tribes’ became ‘the administrative units of 
indirect rule’33 and in this way, Blanton, Mason and Athow argue, ‘the British structured 
ethnic conflict into their system.’34 What McDonnell traces in her sections of Girl Soldier 
is the process by which, as Branch argues, ethnic divisions which were integral to the 
system of indirect rule continued to play an important role in postcolonial politics as 
they ‘changed from a category of colonial administration to a category of political 
identity and action’ through which claims to national political representation were 
made.35  
McDonnell locates the emergence of the LRA in the fluctuating position of the 
Acholi, the ethnic group to which Joseph Kony belongs, on the national stage, 
describing how members of the group were conscripted into the army in large numbers 
under colonial rule and during Milton Obote’s first presidency, and how Acholi soldiers 
were then massacred by Amin on the basis of perceived loyalty to Obote. During 
Obote’s second presidency (1980-85), she writes:  
Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA) began a guerrilla 
war against Obote in southern and northwest Uganda. They 
established bases in the Luwero Triangle, an area north of Kampala. 
Obote countered the resistance with brutality […] During this conflict 
[…] Obote’s troops, mostly Acholi and Lango, another northern 
Nilotic ethnic group, massacred as many as three thousand civilians 
[…] Many Acholi believe that their troubles now stem from the 
Museveni government’s continuing bitterness toward them.36 
After the coup against Obote in 1985, led by the Acholi army officers Tito Okello 
Lutwa and Basilio Olara Okello, and thought to be motivated by the promotion of a 
Langi officer over an Acholi, there was a struggle for power between the NRA, Obote 
and Okello. McDonnell writes: ‘After their defeat by the NRA, Okello’s Acholi UNLA 
                                                 
33 Adam Branch, ‘Exploring the Roots of LRA Violence: Political Crisis and Ethnic Politics in 
Acholiland’, in The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. by Tim Allen and Koen Vlassenroot 
(London: Zed Books, 2010), pp.25-44 (p.26). 
34Robert Blanton, T. David Mason and Brian Athow, ‘Colonial Style and Post-Colonial Ethnic Conflict in 
Africa’, Journal of Peace Research, 38.4 (2001), 473-491 (p.480). 
35Branch, p.26. 
36 McDonnell and Akallo, p.73-74.  
80 
 
forces fled back to the north with their guns.’37 From this point, a number of northern 
insurgencies began against Museveni’s government, including that of the LRA.  
McDonnell situates the rise of the LRA in the context of the politicization of 
ethnic identity and in the competition for power in the state between the various groups 
produced by this politicization. Her account is not incontestable: she maintains, for 
example, that the LRA has no political cause underlying its actions, quoting an 
International Crisis Group report which states that ‘the LRA is not motivated by any 
identifiable political agenda, and its military strategy and tactics reflect this.’38 Academic 
work on the conflict, by contrast, has sought to combat the perceived inexplicability of 
the LRA; Sverker Finnström draws attention to the LRA’s manifestos, and the way 
these relate to the experiences of those living in the north of the country, who have 
both historically and under Museveni had less access to governmental resources and 
power.39 Nonetheless, without wishing to claim that McDonnell’s account is 
comprehensive, free from bias or in any way a model for the historiography of an 
African country, I do suggest that it offers an historicization of the conflict.  
In contrast, Akallo’s first chapter begins: ‘[t]he soil has become my blanket. 
Where am I? Maybe home? No, this is not home.’40 In this, the opening section to the 
book proper, she has been buried alive; she is in the dark, confused, and utterly 
disorientated. Even in the sections which recount her life before she was abducted into 
the LRA, this tone dominates: ‘“Grace, where are you?” My mother called. I jumped 
out of bed and ran outside with my eyes closed. I suddenly was so scared that I could 
not even answer her.’41 In fact, Akallo’s first three chapters all begin with her waking up 
suddenly. This is the opening of Chapter Three:  
‘[w]ake up! It’s time to go!’ a voice screams. Yes, the day has begun in 
the usual tedious manner […] When will this end, and why did I come back 
from that grave? The only interesting thing in this life is the pain.42 
                                                 
37 McDonnell and Akallo, p.75.  
38 Quoted in McDonnell and Akallo, p.116.  
39 Sverker Finnström, ‘An African Hell of Colonial Imagination? The Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, 
Another Story’, in The Lord’s Resistance Army: Myth and Reality, ed. by Tim Allen and Koen Vlassenroot 
(London: Zed Books, 2010), pp.74-89.  
40 McDonnell and Akallo, p.27.  
41 McDonnell and Akallo, p.63.  
42 McDonnell and Akallo, p.35, italics original.  
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This creates an effective narrative patterning, which contrasts the horror of waking up 
to the LRA with her life in her family. But it also continually positions her as surprised 
and emerging from the vulnerability and disorientation of sleep, to the experience of 
being shocked.  
In the structure of the book historical context and traumatic experience are 
rigidly separated from each other, ‘in two voices’, as McDonnell writes, and it is the 
white American writer who voices context.43 Akallo is, through the way the text is 
organized, separated from the political history of her own country and the history of the 
rebel group which abducted her. While historical context and explanation do appear in 
Girl Soldier, they appear not through integration but through splitting: Akallo’s narrative 
recounts ‘the abyss of hopelessness’ where McDonnell’s chapters locate this distress 
historically.44 In Girl Soldier, the effect of this is to split Akallo from the political factors 
underlying the LRA’s insurgency and its place in Uganda’s history.  
I argue that this is a crucial way in which Girl Soldier distinguishes itself from the 
conventions of the Bildungsroman. Slaughter suggests that the incorporation of the 
political identity of citizen into the nation-state is the envisaged conclusion of 
Bildungsromane. Even when it does not occur, or is problematized, the expectation of 
this resolution shapes the text. But Girl Soldier repeatedly frustrates this envisaged 
conclusion, even as a possibility. For example, girl soldiers have tended to be 
represented in child soldier narratives primarily and predominately as the victims of 
sexual violence, rather than as the victims or the perpetrators of other types of abuse. 
Myriam Denov argues that girl child soldiers were at first marginal to representations of 
child soldiers and that ‘when girls with armed groups are discussed […] there has been a 
tendency for them to be portrayed predominately as silent victims particularly as 
“wives”, in tangential supporting roles, and as victims of sexual slavery’.45  
Throughout Girl Soldier, as throughout almost all of the literature on child 
soldiers, including this quote from Denov, the term ‘wives’ in quotation marks is 
ubiquitous – it is the conventional way of suggesting the pseudo-family structure of 
                                                 
43 McDonnell and Akallo, p.22.  
44 McDonnell and Akallo, p.22.  
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organized sexual violence against girls in armies and armed groups. For example, 
McDonnell writes: 
Amnesty International adds that one of the main reasons for which the 
LRA takes girls is to use them for forced ‘marriage’ to the senior LRA 
soldiers and commanders. Good soldiers and top leaders are rewarded 
with ‘wives.’ Amnesty International says that the number of ‘wives’ a 
rebel has is a source of prestige.46 
The quotation marks multiply here. They are supposed to indicate the dislocation of the 
words ‘wife’ and ‘marriage’ from their standard meanings; the children aren’t really 
wives because they are children, because they have not freely entered into the 
relationships in question, because to be a wife in this context means simply to be the 
victim of sexual violence. The persistent use of these words evokes the idea of 
developed adult life, a life with socially recognized ties, only to deny it by the distancing 
of the quote marks.  
There is not an adequate word in English for what these girls were and are 
forced to endure. The girl soldier described as a ‘wife’ is placed in the vicinity of a 
socially recognized adult identity, only to be somehow stranded by the term’s ironic or 
provisional usage. She is a wife who is not quite a wife, and a soldier who is not quite a 
soldier and there is therefore a sense of suspension before adult social roles. This is a 
consequence of the rights violation that she suffers. But this sense of suspension is then 
repeated in the structure of the text itself, where contextualizing historical information 
is offered, but is distinguished from the first-person account of suffering.  
An explanation for this lies in the symbolic value the child has for human rights 
discourse, and the meanings the discourse attaches to childhood. R. Charli Carpenter 
writes that for human rights discourse ‘the  symbolic victim  must  be  seen  as entirely  
lacking agency; s/he must be both unable to help her/himself  and  an  unequivocal  
non-participant in the political events from which his/her misery results […] the victim 
must be unambiguously  "innocent."’47  Carpenter suggests here that innocence within 
the human rights frame is seen to be incompatible with participation in political events 
– it is not merely a more generalized form of passivity or lack of knowledge. Erica 
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Burman argues that children in particular function for human rights discourse ‘as 
indices of vulnerability and need that transcend culture and politics’.48 The child, that is, 
has a symbolic value within the human rights imagination which relies upon her non-
politicization. 
A clear example of this assumption about childhood can be observed in Els de 
Temmerman’s book Aboke Girls. The text is an account of the same abduction as Girl 
Soldier and is based on interviews with a number of those involved, including the girls 
themselves, a male child soldier in the LRA at the same time as them, and the teachers 
at St Mary’s College. The text incorporates the material gathered through these 
interviews into a novelistic narrative, in which the reader is invited to view events from 
the characters’ perspectives, and there is no way of determining to what extent de 
Temmerman has invented or expanded details.  
After the girls have been abducted and Sister Rachele has been attempting to 
raise as much awareness of their situation as possible, she is invited to speak to 
President Museveni on the phone. She tells him  
I have to find a way to get to Kony […] [m]aybe through his 
spokesman in Nairobi. I also would like to meet the President of 
Sudan. There are rumours that our children are being taken to 
Sudan.49  
Museveni replies that he will arrange a trip to Nairobi, to meet the head of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, who might be able to help her meet Joseph 
Kony’s representative.  
[Sister Rachele] took another breath as she looked at the airport 
looming in the distance. There was so much she didn’t understand. 
There were so many actors involved whose motives she didn’t know. 
But maybe she didn’t need to know them. She was not to play politics 
or to take sides. Her task was to campaign for the release of her girls 
and all the abducted children. For there was one thing she knew for 
sure: it was terribly wrong to involve children in war. Whatever reasons 
adults might have to fight, children should at all times be left out!50  
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Note the way that children function here as a type of defence against the political. The 
complexities of international politics – Museveni has just told her that she must meet 
with the Libyan ambassador because ‘[w]e have no direct relations with the government 
of Sudan […] [t]he Libyan envoy is our go-between’51 – can legitimately be left out of 
the discussion because of the moral certainty that children should not be involved in 
war. This is a familiar argument, but it is not necessarily an obvious one: it is 
conceivable that the horror of forcing children to fight in wars, separating them from 
their families and from their education, demands – precisely because of its very severity 
– a more developed understanding of politics. (Why is the government of Sudan 
involved, we might ask).52 But the fact that the victims are children is presented here as 
the reason Sister Rachele may not need to know about the political actors’ motives.  
Children are understood to be outside or beyond politics. Girl Soldier may 
certainly be read as an attempt to reify this version of childhood: Akallo’s narrative is 
interspersed with political detail but the two stories cannot be integrated, and in this 
way the qualities of innocence – which is constructed as not-knowing as much as not 
being corrupted by violence – are performed and maintained. Of course, the 
presentation of Akallo as a child in this sense is based on a contradiction. The definition 
of childhood in international law is dependent only on age; the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child says that a child is anyone below the age of eighteen years.53 
Meanwhile, the definition of the child soldier from the Paris Principles says that a child 
soldier is ‘[a]ny person below 18 years of age who is, or has been recruited or used by an 
armed force or armed group in any capacity’.54 That is, a person under the age of 
eighteen years old who ‘has been’55 but is no longer involved in an armed group is still a 
child soldier, but once older than eighteen years, becomes someone else, undefined. The 
CRC’s reliance on the age of eighteen as an automatic, fixed dividing line between 
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childhood and adulthood has been criticized for being mechanistic and Western-
oriented,56 but it pictures childhood as a state which passes at a certain point in time.  
Child soldier narratives draw their particular power and resonance from ideas 
associated with the condition and experience of childhood but almost all of them are 
actually written by adults. Michael Freeman says of the Covenant on the Rights of the 
Child that ‘[t]here is not a little irony in having a Convention which emphasises 
participatory rights […] whilst foreclosing the participation of children in the 
formulation of the rights to be encoded’; if we wanted to know how children 
understand their rights, or what a child understood by the notion of rights, then we 
wouldn’t turn to the Convention on the Rights of the Child because it is entirely an 
adult construction.57 There is a similar irony at work in a text like Girl Soldier. This is 
demonstrated rather vividly by the front cover of the book, which has a big picture of a 
young girl looking scared, but this is not a picture of Grace Akallo (the photo credit 
simply reads ‘cover photo of girl’). Akallo was an adult when she wrote the book, and is 
pictured, as an adult, (in a much smaller photograph) on the back cover. 
Kony 2012 
In March 2012 Invisible Children released a thirty-minute film called Kony 2012 
in which its co-founder, Jason Russell, is shown travelling to Uganda to meet a former 
child soldier called Jacob Acaye. 58 In response to hearing about the murder of Acaye’s 
brother by the LRA, and about the wider destruction and insecurity caused by the army, 
Russell pledges to bring Joseph Kony to the attention of the international community 
and to justice at the International Criminal Court. The ICC had issued a warrant for 
Kony’s arrest in 2005. The dissemination of the film through social media was 
successful to an unprecedented degree (it had over ninety nine million views on 
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YouTube by June 2014) and the film’s popularity provoked an equally intense backlash, 
with numerous journalists and bloggers pointing out the film’s inaccuracies (notably, 
that the LRA had not been active in northern Uganda for six years), simplistic and 
patronising framing and its focus on the dichotomy between American saviour and 
African ‘bad guy’, with comparatively little attention to the victims of the conflict.59 
The front cover of Girl Soldier has ‘a girl’ standing in for Grace Akallo and in 
Kony 2012, I suggest, the filmmaker Jason Russell’s own small son, Gavin, acts as a 
similar kind of surrogate for the child soldier at the centre of the film, Jacob Acaye. 
Acaye is shown briefly in the film taking part in Invisible Children’s advocacy efforts 
and in footage from some years earlier, when he was a night commuter (a child who 
travelled from rural areas into the towns to avoid being abducted by the LRA). He is 
also shown at a zoo with Russell and being scared by a dolphin, with Russell reassuring 
him that dolphins ‘are different than sharks’. Here, Jacob is in a child’s role, being 
educated by Russell.  
However, it is Gavin who is on screen first, and Gavin who features in the film 
far more prominently. After Gavin – a blonde child who is about four years old – is 
introduced to the viewer, Russell links Gavin to Jacob by saying that his life had been 
changed years before by ‘another boy’ – Jacob – and  that if his ‘son were kidnapped 
and forced to kill it would be all over the news.’ This establishes them as parallel in 
some way. But where there is very little information in the film about Jacob’s life after 
his time in the LRA and no details are given about his interests, Russell says that his son 
‘loves playing the on the trampoline, being a ninja and dancing’ and the viewer is shown 
footage of Gavin doing all of these things.  The crucial point of these seemingly 
irrelevant details seems to be that the activities are quintessentially childish. Gavin is 
onscreen much more than Jacob – there seems little reason for this, except that he 
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performs a certain version of childhood sweetness and charm, that he embodies 
childishness in a way that Jacob cannot as he has, inevitably, grown up.  
But in Kony 2012, the attempt to suspend or prolong childhood becomes even 
more pervasive than in Girl Soldier; Russell told the New York Times that Invisible 
Children see themselves as ‘the Pixar of human rights stories,’60 an analogy which 
seems, among other things, to position the likely audience for its productions as children 
or as child-like. Correspondingly, there is a suggestion throughout the film that its 
viewers are, or should want to be like, children – here it is not just the child soldier who 
is kept in a state of childhood; to engage with the film as a viewer is also to take up this 
position to some extent. This is another function played by Gavin in the film. Nine 
minutes in – after upsetting footage of Jacob, the former child soldier, describing his 
experiences, and crying, Russell says that he is going to explain to his son what his job 
is. He says: ‘He [Gavin] doesn’t know what the war’s about or who Joseph Kony is, so 
I’m going to explain it to him for the first time.’ Again, the child soldier’s traumatic 
experience is presented separately from – and, here, prior to – the explanation of ‘what 
the war’s about.’ This is one of the only explanations of the conflict in the film and it is 
very brief and non-specific; the assumption seems to be that an explanation of a 
protracted conflict suitable for a small child can also function as an explanation for a 
global audience. 
Moreover, Gavin’s way of conceptualizing the conflict ends up shaping the way 
it is portrayed in the film; Gavin is asked what his Dad does for a living and he replies, 
‘you stop the bad guys being mean’. Russell asks who ‘the bad guys’ are and Gavin 
replies ‘Star Wars people’. Then Russell shows him a picture of Joseph Kony and says 
‘this is the bad guy’.  The childish language Gavin uses – ‘bad guys’ – is taken up and 
applied to Kony by Russell. Similarly, Luis Moreno Ocampo, the Chief Prosecutor at 
the International Criminal Court until mid-2012, is shown in the film saying that the 
way to stop Kony is to have him arrested. The film immediately switches back to Gavin 
who says that ‘we should stop Kony’. Then photographs of Moreno Ocampo and 
Gavin are shown next to each other, before the picture moves outwards to show a wall 
of other photographs. The implication seems to be that the opinions of the child and 
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the opinions of the prosecutor are essentially interchangeable. Finally, one of the most 
oddly troubling things about the film is the parallel it draws between the problem it is 
setting out to solve – the problem of children affected by conflict – and way it 
articulates its methods of solving them: it describes its early campaign efforts as ‘funded 
by an army of young people’. It is ‘youth’ which unites both the child soldiers and those 
who seek to help them, in the film’s imagery.  
Child Soldier Narratives and the Bildungsroman 
As Eleni Coundouriotis argues, therefore: 
[c]hild soldier narratives are symptomatic of an arrested historicization 
in part because they become trapped in a rhetorical effort to restore 
the childhood innocence of their narrator and, as a result, produce a 
metaphor of African childhood that is politically limiting as a 
characterization of the historical agency of the continent’s peoples.61  
One of the ways in which these narratives attempt to ‘restore the childhood innocence 
of their narrator’,62 in her account, is through the way they adopt the form of the 
Bildungsroman.   
In child soldier memoirs, she argues, the child soldier initially believes herself to 
be guilty and irreparably damaged by her role in armed conflict but the plot of the text 
is the growing realization, facilitated NGOs, teachers and so on, that in fact the child 
soldier is herself a victim. ‘The recovery narrative sets the stage for the substitution of 
the perpetrator identity by the victim identity’, Coundouriotis writes, and in this way the 
ethical problem becomes a motor for the movement of the story and is resolved by it.63  
Such narratives allow ‘for the problem of responsibility in the war to be shifted 
onto the task of recovery itself.’64 The memoirs tend, therefore, to be ‘easily assimilable 
to the novel of education’65 because they are structured around the replacement of one 
identity – perpetrator – with another – victim – where the movement between these 
identities gives ‘the impression of a linear, progressive narrative’.66 The focus of the 
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memoirs, moreover, is on the drama of the individual’s recovery, self-realization and 
development, and not on the wider social and political forces which create the wars the 
children participate in.  
 She argues that the Bildungsroman is put to work for an individualist purpose in 
the child soldier narrative. The story of an individual’s development is brought to the 
foreground at the expense of social factors. She suggests that: 
[f]ramed as a human rights literature, the child soldier narrative is too 
often sentimentalized and co-opted by ideas of the self that serve its 
accommodation with a largely first world, distant reader. The 
complexity of the historical, political, cultural, as well as individual 
circumstances of child soldiers requires the deployment of a less 
literal, more ironic and even allegorical method of narrative 
representation, similar to what we find already in motion in the 
broader literary convention of the war novel in Africa.67 
That is, she suggests, when the Bildungsroman form is echoed in the child soldier 
narrative, it stresses the self, rather than the self’s place in the social order. This is, of 
course, very different to Slaughter’s model of the human rights-Bildungsroman model, 
which links the discourse and the form on the basis of their shared goal of the 
individual’s incorporation into society.  
For Slaughter, the reason that human rights and the Bildungsroman can exist in 
a close relationship is the way in which the Bildungsroman models the relationship 
between the individual and society. This of course does not mean that Bildungsromane 
need to include historical detail, only that they are predicated on the idea that the 
individual’s life means more when it is not solely theirs, that an individual should seek 
to become incorporated into society and to take on a socially significant role. In 
suggesting that ‘arrested historicization’68 is performed through the memoirs’ adoption of 
the Bildungsroman form, Counouriotis underlines what unusual Bildungsromane these 
are.  
On the other hand, she argues, novels (rather than memoirs) about child 
soldiers tend to treat such notions of individualized progressive development ironically. 
Allah is Not Obliged, for example, has a circular narrative: John Walsh has described this 
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novel as a ‘deformation of the African Bildungsroman in French’69 and Coundouriotis 
argues that: 
[i]f the Bildungsroman traditionally ends in compromise and the 
hero’s acceptance of limits on his nonconformity, it also creates a 
momentum to move forward, albeit on a conventional path. The 
obsessive repetition of the story of childhood that Kourouma sets up 
inhibits such moving forward and performs the arrested 
historicization of the child soldier narrative, drawing critical attention 
to it.70 
This novel is thus able to emphasize the troubling ‘arrested historicization’ which is a 
feature of child soldier texts.71  
Maureen Moynagh argues that human rights narratives are typically dependent 
on a clear distinction between victim and perpetrator and pay little attention to potential 
moral ambiguities. Where sympathy is perceived to be dependent upon the rigorous 
policing of the division between the good and innocent, and the bad and culpable, the 
child soldier problematizes the very foundations of the human rights narrative’s 
conventions because she is at one and the same time a victim who has suffered and an 
agent of the suffering of others.  
Moynagh discusses the way child soldier narratives navigate the division 
between the victim and the persecutor, the innocent and the guilty; the division which 
is, as she sees it, the very grounds on which human rights narrative itself is built. She 
argues that the child soldier narrative complicates the genre of writing it belongs to at 
the same time as it must reference its tropes and typologies; the child soldier narrative 
must conform to generic conventions (particularly relating to the presentation of 
innocence) in order to be recognized as a human rights narrative and to circulate as 
such, but, at the same time, the figure of the child soldier seems to stretch some of 
these conventions to breaking point.  
For her, it is because the child soldier narrative poses a difficulty to the 
conventions of writing about human rights issues that the form of the Bildungsroman is 
subject to being stretched. ‘Given the ways the child-soldier figure tests the limits of 
human rights discourse, it is not surprising that the memoirs […] invoke the trope of 
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Bildung apparently in order to challenge its forward-looking developmental thrust.’72 
The Bildungsroman is typically concerned with development but, Moynagh argues, 
‘[t]he meaning of these memoirs ultimately centres less on “normal” development than 
on its “interruption,” that is to say, on the exceptional experience of being a child 
soldier.’73 The experience of being a child soldier represents something which cannot be 
absorbed into the traditional structures of growing-up narratives and so, she writes: 
Bildung in this case is confined to the beginning and the end of the 
narrative; the considerable narrative durée in between has to be 
understood, since it can hardly be ignored, as an error, an 
interruption, an experience to be disavowed so that the process of 
Bildung can continue apace.74  
The child soldier narratives engage ambivalently with the conventions of the 
Bildungsroman, replacing linear development with interruption and suspension. 
Moynagh suggests that what becomes readable through such ambivalence is the way the 
figure of the child soldier challenges human rights discourse. Moynagh associates 
human rights with the Bildungsroman. Therefore, in the differences between the child 
soldier memoir and the conventions of the Bildungsroman, she suggests that we can 
read the difficulties human rights discourse has when faced with complex questions of 
guilt and innocence. She suggests that: 
the kinds of wars that produce child soldiers pose a resolute challenge 
to the impulse toward Bildung in human rights discourse, which 
depends on relative social stability to confirm childhood innocence 
[…] The memoirs dwell instead on a kind of arrested development, 
and make it the basis both of their appeal for justice and a more 
unsettling account of identity and belonging forged through 
violence.75 
Like Moynagh, I understand child soldier narratives to be characterized by an 
arresting of development. But I read such interruptions differently. Instead of seeing 
human rights discourse at its limits in the attempt to deal with the problematic agency 
of the child soldier, I argue that through the child soldier narratives’ use of form we can 
identify a tension which is integral to the discourse itself. In my account, it is not that 
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‘arrested development’76 reveals something with which human rights cannot cope. It is 
that this halting of the Bildungsroman, is produced by human rights discourse itself.  
It is of course not surprising that texts centrally concerned with childhood 
would feature children but what is important is the way ideas to do with childhood are 
manipulated, and the effects these manipulations have; the narratives’ attempts to 
maintain and prolong childhood, partially through the distancing of the child from 
issues of historical and political context or social role. This suspended child-like state is 
a textually constructed identity, and this is crucial to understanding it. To be a victim of 
human rights abuse might well result in a purely given existence. But this type of 
existence is consciously and explicitly maintained in the texts. It could therefore be 
suggested that the violation the book is written to oppose is actually repeated and re-
enacted by the text itself. I argue that this is not incidental, and nor is it a consequence 
of challenge posed to the simple moral frames of human rights discourse by the wars in 
which child soldiers fight, as Moynagh argues. Rather, the variations on the form of the 
Bildungsroman I have been discussing, in which the child is required to remain a child, 
are the consequence of the way human rights discourse operates. I will make this case 
through a wider consideration of human rights’ narrative practices.  
‘Personal Stories’ and the Human Rights Movement 
Amnesty International began as the ‘Appeal for Amnesty’ in 1961. Peter 
Benenson, a British lawyer, had read a newspaper article about two Portuguese students 
imprisoned for drinking a toast to freedom in a restaurant. (In line with the general 
obscurity of human rights’ origins, this newspaper article has never been identified).77 In 
response to this article and to his earlier experience observing trials internationally he 
organized a campaign to draw public attention to those in prison around the world for 
their political or religious views alone. On 28th May 1961 the Observer published a front-
page article called ‘The Forgotten Prisoners’ in which Benenson explained the Appeal: 
[o]pen your newspaper any day of the week and you will find a report 
from somewhere in the world of someone being imprisoned, tortured or 
executed because his opinions or religion are unacceptable to his 
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government. There are several million such people in prison - by no 
means all of them behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains - and their 
numbers are growing. The newspaper reader feels a sickening sense of 
impotence. Yet if these feelings of disgust all over the world could be 
united into common action, something effective could be done.78 
It is ‘feelings of disgust’ which are presented as potential motors of change; if these 
feelings are united and transformed into ‘common action’, Benenson suggests, 
‘something effective could be done’.79 This places the emphasis on feelings – rather 
than, say, clear understanding or analysis.  
Benenson went on to note that the UDHR guaranteed the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, and the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 
and announced the founding of an office in London to investigate those individuals the 
Appeal designated as ‘Prisoners of Conscience’.80 A Prisoner of Conscience was to be 
defined as 
[a]ny person who is physically restrained (by imprisonment or otherwise) 
from expressing (in any form of words or symbols) an opinion which he 
honestly holds and which does not advocate or condone personal 
violence.81  
The aim of the campaign was, Benenson wrote, ‘to mobilise public opinion quickly and 
widely’ because ‘governments are by no means insensitive to the pressure of outside 
opinion. And when world opinion is concentrated on one weak spot, it can sometimes 
succeed in making a government relent.’82 To this end Benenson announced that: ‘a 
Penguin Special called Persecution 1961 will be published as part of our Amnesty 
Campaign. In it are stories of nine men and women from varying political and religious 
outlooks, who have been suffering imprisonment for expressing their opinions’83 
Benenson suggested that ‘[t]he technique of publicising the personal stories of a 
number of prisoners of contrasting politics is a new one’ and that it had ‘been adopted 
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to avoid the fate of previous amnesty campaigns, which so often have become more 
concerned with publicising the political views of the imprisoned than with humanitarian 
purposes.’84 As Slaughter notes, ‘[i]n Benenson’s formulation, the “personal story” of 
the religious or political “non-conformist” is not itself a political story; that is, the 
“personal story” is something worth defending in its own right.’85  
Tom Buchanan argues that in its early days Amnesty was distinctive and 
attractive because it was able to reframe the public discussion of political prisoners in 
Britain. He suggests that earlier, in the 1950s, various left-wing organizations had been 
aware of and interested in individuals imprisoned by right-wing governments. But, he 
writes,  
such campaigns had always been seen as a part of the political struggle 
–  hence, a victory for the campaign in the form of a released prisoner 
would automatically be seen as a defeat for the regime that had held 
them.86  
Consequently, ‘British communists refused to acknowledge the existence of political 
prisoners under Soviet-bloc regimes, and support for prisoners in Eastern Europe was 
typically left to Catholic or rightwing organizations.’87 Amnesty, on the other hand, had 
a ‘simple moral message that offered to transcend the Cold War.’88  
For Buchanan, the key point is not that Amnesty was able to infuse political 
debates with moral considerations but rather that it placed the predicament of the 
unfairly prisoned within an entirely different and separate narrative from the political. 
Amnesty’s campaigning on behalf of individual prisoners of conscience was not to be 
based on agreeing with their political views – Benenson’s Observer article quotes Voltaire: 
‘I detest your views, but am prepared to die for your right to express them’ – but rather 
on the issue of the imprisonment itself.89 
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The new technique Benenson was inaugurating in his Observer article implied 
that the ‘political views’ which had led to imprisonment – and the place these views 
occupied in the politics of the country in question – could be split off and considered 
separately from the fact of imprisonment, to be described in a ‘personal story’.90 This 
division of the individual from her context was underlined by the way in which, when 
Amnesty supporters groups were first formed, all of them were focused on three 
prisoners each: one prisoner from each of what were then known as the first, second 
and third worlds.91 The priority was the reality that the individual was in prison, rather 
than the competing social forces, movements or events which led to imprisonment in 
the first place; for this reason very different prisoners holding very different views in 
different kinds of political situation could be understood as a group with something in 
common. 
‘Personal stories’ have remained of central importance to the work of human 
rights NGOs; Slaughter writes that ‘[p]ersonal stories are the contemporary currency of 
human rights projects’.92 Such ‘personal stories’ still tend towards an emphasis on the 
fact of the human rights violation rather than the situation of that violation in its 
political context. Consider Elaine Scarry’s description of reading a letter from Amnesty 
International: 
Amnesty International’s ability to bring about the cessation of torture 
depends centrally on its ability to communicate the reality of physical 
pain to those who are not themselves in pain. When, for example, one 
receives a letter from Amnesty in the mail, the words of that letter 
must somehow convey to the reader the abrasiveness being 
experienced inside the body of someone whose country is far away, 
whose name can barely be pronounced, and whose ordinary life is 
unknown except that it is known that ordinary life has ceased to 
exist.93 
Scarry stresses Amnesty’s vivid representation of pain and the way this is thought to 
spur a certain imaginative response, an imaginative link between two geographically 
distant people. But victims of torture, the people in pain, are those with difficult to 
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pronounce names who live in far away, undifferentiated countries. The letter as it is 
recalled here, does not provide any insight into the conditions of existence for the 
torture victim, their ‘ordinary life’94 is unknown, and the difficult-to-pronounce names 
are an indistinguishable blur – all that need be communicated is the pain. 
Theories of Human Rights and Vulnerability  
This is not an unconsidered or un-theorized aspect of human rights discourse. 
As quoted in the Introduction, when Michael Ignatieff summarizes his ideas about 
human rights he states that:  
[w]e may not be able to create democracies or constitutions. Liberal 
freedom may be some way off. But we could do more than we do to 
stop unmerited suffering and gross physical cruelty. That I take to be 
the elemental priority of all human rights activism: to stop torture, 
beatings, killings, rape, and assault and to improve, as best we can, the 
security of ordinary people.95 
Here the project of human rights is defined negatively, in relation to what it opposes. 
What become central in this articulation are the crimes which lead to bodily suffering: it 
is stopping ‘torture, beatings, killings, rape, assault’ which become the focus, and in fact 
come to define what human rights are all about.96   
Because Ignatieff refuses to make human rights a maximalist ideology, because it 
is a ‘“thin” theory of what is right’, his sense of human rights becomes preoccupied not 
with the development of personality (as in Slaughter’s account) but instead with ‘a 
definition of the minimum conditions for any kind of life at all.’97 ‘[A]ny kind of life at 
all’98 is, of course, a long way from the incorporated human person with a place in 
society. In its minimalist emphasis on a lowest common denominator human existence, 
this phrase seems instead to suggest the natural, individual givenness which is both the 
person’s opposite and its foundation. 
Ignatieff makes this more explicit elsewhere in the same book when he argues that 
it is only the experience of suffering that can provide a sufficiently universal foundation 
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for human rights, because ‘what is pain and humiliation for you is bound to be pain and 
humiliation for me.’99 Bryan S. Turner goes further, arguing that vulnerability to pain is 
the irreducible universal core of human nature itself: ‘human happiness is diverse, but 
misery is common and uniform’.100 Turner argues that humans are bodily vulnerable 
(where vulnerability is ‘the condition of sentient, embodied creatures who are open to the 
dangers of their environment and are conscious of their precarious circumstances’)101 that 
we depend on each other, that life in society is governed by mutuality and that the 
institutions which govern social life are fragile.102 In such a context, the one universal we 
can identify in human nature, he argues, is the human body’s vulnerability to suffering, the 
vulnerability that society’s institutions try and sometimes fail to protect, and that makes 
mutual dependence necessary.103 Turner seeks to ground human rights in a theory of the 
core of human existence. But where for Aristotle in Arendt’s account the human ‘has 
been defined as a being commanding the power of speech and thought’ and as the 
‘political animal’104 Turner’s definition of human existence puts the emphasis on what 
Parekh describes as the human’s ‘givenness, her existence as a human being.105  
Decontextualization 
The human rights report is a particular type of NGO writing, typically produced 
for the UN and other NGOs rather than the general public in which agencies 
comprehensively document human rights abuses in a particular area or under a specific 
thematic heading. The anthropologist Richard A. Wilson has argued that these reports 
are characterized by ‘an unflinching realism which bluntly recounts one fact after 
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another in an unmitigated and relentless barrage of short case summaries’; the writing is 
said to employ no ‘tropes, metaphors’ or ‘figurative elements.’106  
Customarily, the reports do not have an attributed author and Wilson suggests 
that ‘[a]uthor-evacuated texts, whether human rights reports, scientific texts or legal 
contracts, are an established literary strategy to convey value-free information devoid of 
individuality and opinion.’107 There is no sense of an implied author in the texts 
themselves; they appear to have simply emerged – Wilson calls this their ‘Olympian 
view from nowhere’.108 Where a distinct, particular voice is present (and Wilson argues 
that this is more common in fundraising documents) emotive, subjective experience is 
clearly attributed to victims, rather than to the author of the report or to the ‘voice’ of 
the NGO. 
As I mentioned in the Introduction, the International Commission of Jurists 
made five submissions on Uganda to the UN between 1974 and 1976. The first of these 
offers an example of Wilson’s argument. Its introduction states:  
[i]t is understandable, perhaps, that many of the witnesses, especially 
among the Ugandan exiles, should seek to place personal responsibility 
for many of the violations which have occurred upon General Idi 
Amin. This study is concerned rather with describing the events than 
with apportioning blame. Clearly, as head of state and as Commander 
in Chief of the Armed Forces, the ultimate responsibility for any 
violation of human rights must fall upon General Amin.109 
The introduction thus takes a distancing tone; it presents the communication as 
a ‘study’, implying a scholarly rigour, and it presents its task as neutral ‘description’, 
explicitly excluding the attribution of personal blame.110 Similarly, the introduction to 
the first communication, written by Niall MacDermott, Secretary General of the ICJ, 
states that the ICJ’s ‘studies have earned it a reputation for objectivity and 
impartiality.’111 However, while the parts of the report written by the ICJ are indeed 
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neutral, non-emotive and straight-forwardly descriptive, they are juxtaposed with long 
passages written by witnesses to atrocities and by members of Amin’s government who 
have defected. These are written in a very different style. 
For example, the second report, sent to the UN in June 1976, begins by 
reproducing a memorandum written by E.B. Rugumayo, whom it describes as: 
Minister of Education in Amin’s government from soon after the 25th 
January 1971, coup d’état which deposed President Milton Obote 
until his resignation in early 1973 […] one of the able young 
technocrats introduced to the Cabinet by Amin after the coup 
d’état.112 
The document had been sent by Mr Rugumayo to ‘African Heads of State and 
Governments in early 1973.’113 The Report argues that ‘[a]lthough it covers ground 
which has been outlined before in previous communications’ Rugumayo’s communique 
‘summarises the position with the authority of a signed statement by a prominent 
Ugandan in a position to know what had been happening in the country.’114 
Rugumayo’s memorandum states that: 
General Amin is an illiterate soldier who is now the President of a 
modern state of Uganda […] General Amin is of very low intelligence 
[…] He is a racist and a fascist; a murderer and a blasphemer; a tribalist 
and a dictator. […] General Amin has no principles, no moral standards 
and scruples. […] He will kill, or cause to kill, anyone without hesitation 
as long as it serves his interests […] He is an incorrigible liar.115 
An emotional, subjective response is allowed to those directly affected by Amin’s 
violence, but the ICJ retains for its own account a self-consciously objective, distanced, 
merely descriptive approach. This works to distance the report’s tone from that of the 
directly-involved witness who is quoted. In contrast to the deep outrage of Rugumayo, 
the voice of the report is seemingly objective, focused purely on the outline of facts 
rather than commentary on them.  
Wilson argues that the result of these rhetorical moves is a strategy of 
decontextualisation in which the human rights violation is constructed as a particular 
instance of a universal injury, removed from contextual and social meanings, and voided 
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of the doubt, confusion, fear and multiplicity of viewpoints any traumatic event creates. 
Wilson writes that 
[i]f meanings can only be understood in terms of surrounding 
narratives, then many human rights reports impede the interpretation 
of meaning by their radical acts of exclusion. Instead of narratives […] 
what the reader gets is a pared-down and frozen stream of action.116 
The effect of human rights reporting, Wilson argues, is to put the violation front and 
centre, isolating it from the social currents and meanings which constitute it and 
producing truncated understandings of the social situations in which violations occur.  
Stephen Hopgood has described a contentious and ongoing battle within 
Amnesty International about this very issue, though in broader terms than the human 
rights report alone. He details a dispute between a reforming faction within Amnesty 
International which has called for – amongst other measures – greater context in the 
reports and documents it produces, to enable it to develop what Hopgood calls political 
authority. The traditionalists consider the organization to possess ‘moral authority’ and 
consequently want to preserve reports’ conventional lack of context. Hopgood 
describes the difference between these types of authority in this way:  
[i]f moral authority is enhanced, classically, when the speaker does not 
possess marks of belonging (he or she is seen as an honest broker who 
has no interest and therefore acts morally), political authority is only 
possible when someone possesses those very marks.117  
Political authority thus ‘refers to both the right to speak as a legitimate representative of 
an interest or identity [...] and the competitive process of establishing that right.’118  
The traditionalists suggest that the absence of contextual information in NGO 
publications allows some very particular imaginative work to occur. Think, Hopgood 
writes, of the famous image from Tiananmen Square – the man standing in front of 
advancing tanks. If we think about context, if we think about the meaning the photo 
had for the Chinese government (for whom, he says, it represented the restraint of the 
military) or if we think about the same image transplanted into another context, we are, 
he writes,  
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explaining, categorizing, politicizing. Isn’t there a moment before that, 
perhaps fleeting, but real nonetheless, of recognition […] The most 
potent bare facts concern death – its occurrence, imminence, possibility 
– all without context, and all saturated with the presumption of 
innocence.119  
Here, where ‘politicization’ explains, context-less depictions of human vulnerability to 
death and suffering might be able to produce a particular type of reading, in which a 
shared vulnerable humanness can be felt.  
It is only without context, he argues, that we can 
hope to make plausible the claim that there is a normative space 
somehow beyond politics, with all of its conflicts of interest and 
identity. The bare facts are like fleeting glimpses of this sphere, a place 
where we see our true vulnerability both as individuals and as a species 
[…] The more purely descriptive the words, the nearer we approximate 
pure recognition.120  
The rationale is that in reading such texts, we can feel or imagine ourselves to be like 
suffering others. Political context distances readers by reminding us of difference – of 
religion, of wealth, of lifestyle – but facts about atrocity without context allow us to 
recognize our own vulnerability to harm in the suffering of others; to feel, even if 
momentarily, like them.  
  For Arendt, as I discussed in Chapter One, the ‘fundamental deprivation of 
human rights is manifested first and above all in the deprivation of a place in the world 
which makes opinions significant and actions effective’.121 For Slaughter, contemporary 
human rights law is embarked on the project of developing abstract human personality. 
But the type of human existence that Hopgood values, and wants human rights 
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narratives to create ‘glimpses of’, is a form of human existence distinguished explicitly 
from the political.122 It is a human existence characterized by a shared ‘vulnerability’ and, 
in particular, vulnerability to death – and it is therefore human existence defined 
through mere corporeal existence rather than through speech or action.123  The type of 
human existence brought into being through the ‘bare facts’ is, therefore, akin to 
Arendt’s notion of given humanness.124  
Arendt argues that ‘modern practices and forms of government […] by means 
of arbitrary terror, liquidate the very possibility of human activity.’125 She writes that ‘in 
the extermination camps Jews were murdered […] regardless of what they had done or 
omitted to do, regardless of vice or virtue’ and notes ‘that complete and inhuman 
innocence which so strikingly characterizes victims of modern terror’.126 This is an 
‘inhuman innocence’127 for Arendt in the sense of Aristotle’s definition of what it is to be 
human; the human defined as a ‘being commanding the power of speech and thought’ 
and as the ‘“political animal,” that is one who by definition lives in a community’,128 
with ‘a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective’.129 The 
innocence of the death camps’ victims is ‘inhuman’130 because it is mere given existence 
without these features. 
Jews in the death camps, like the stateless, had only their humanness to rely on 
because the undiscriminating slaughter paid no heed to action or speech as it 
‘liquidate[d] the very possibility of human activity’.131 When Hopgood suggests that the 
bare facts are ‘saturated with the presumption of innocence’132 and that effective NGO 
writing should avoid ‘explaining, categorizing, politicizing’ and instead aim to create a 
‘moment […] of recognition’ based on context-less death, a deeply uncomfortable echo 
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of Arendt’s description of the victims of totalitarian terror is suggested. The Jews in the 
death camps were killed in such a way that nothing they had ever done or said mattered. 
The bare facts Hopgood describes seek to remove any sense of activity, emphasizing 
instead ‘our true vulnerability’.133 
It could very well be argued that the reason Hopgood places so much emphasis 
on mere human life is that he is concerned with the terrible consequences of rights 
abuse – that is to say that human rights narratives seek to document the damage that is 
suffered when a person is reduced to mere givenness. There is an overlap between his 
discussion and Arendt’s because sheer human existence is a consequence of rights 
abuse, for the victims of the death camps as much as for contemporary victims: if 
human rights writing presents victims as vulnerable and merely human, this is because 
they are made vulnerable and merely human by the types of oppression they are faced 
with. There are two reasons for rejecting this argument. First, it is very clear in 
Hopgood’s account as it is in Wilson’s that the representation of contextless human life 
is not inevitable – instead it is the consequence of decision making about narrative 
approach. As Brown argues more generally, ‘there is no such thing as mere reduction of 
suffering or protection from abuse, the nature of the reduction or protection is itself 
productive of political subjects and political possibilities.’134 The advocative nature of 
Hopgood’s argument underlines this; he is making a case for writing in certain way in 
order to produce certain effects, rather than claiming that NGO narratives simply 
mimetically represent the suffering victim of rights abuse. 
 Secondly, mere human life does not just characterize the victim of rights abuse, 
in Hopgood’s account. Rather it is thought to be the condition for the creation of a link 
between the victim and the reader.  Just as Ignatieff argues that ‘what is pain and 
humiliation for you is bound to be pain and humiliation for me’,135 Hopgood suggests 
that vulnerability might be what unites the victim of human rights abuse depicted in the 
NGO narrative and the reader of the narrative – it is a type of human existence which 
both share. In this way, vulnerability is presented not only as the consequence of rights 
abuse but also as a more generally shared quality, and one which should be emphasized 
and acknowledged to a greater extent.  
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The awareness of this mutual mere humanness is understood to be something 
which can be facilitated by a particular kind of writing: ‘[t]he more purely descriptive the 
words, the nearer we approximate pure recognition.’136 The NGO narrative is here 
understood as a mechanism for creating ‘pure recognition’ through the stripping of 
context; through its use of ‘purely descriptive words’ – words which don’t ‘explain, 
categorize or politicize’ – the narrative binds represented victim and reader together in 
their shared humanness, a humanness which has nothing to do with speech or activity 
but rather vulnerability to death and suffering.137   
The child soldier narrative resembles the Bildungsroman in some ways, but 
differs from it to the extent that where the Bildungsroman typically builds towards a 
climax of social integration, in Girl Soldier a child-like identity is maintained. In this 
chapter, I have suggested that this is part of a wider trend in human rights narrative 
towards the minimization of contextual information in order to emphasize individual 
vulnerability to harm.  
Slaughter argues that human rights are realized through the nation-state and 
work to replace mere humanness with abstract personality. I suggest however that, in 
the way child soldier narrative employ the Bildungsroman form, something more 
troubling can be discerned. These narratives emphasize vulnerability and they make it 
the basis for identification and involvement. In literary terms, this is manifested as the 
maintenance of childhood in the place of the coming-of-age narrative. In the tension 
between the conventions of the literary form and the way it is put to use, we can 
identify the tension which characterizes human rights discourse: the tension between 
the human and the citizen, the problem of possession. The child soldier memoir also 
shows why this tension is a limit-point for the discourse. Suspended development seeks 
to maintain (rather than picture the development beyond) the idealized, non-political 
vulnerability of the human rights childhood – and thus it centres and maintains a 
human figure who resembles Arendt’s utterly rightless subject. In the next chapter I will 
consider why this should be the case.  
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Chapter Three: The Family in Goretti 
Kyomuhendo’s Bildungsromane 
 
This chapter focuses on three novels and a short story by the Ugandan writer 
Goretti Kyomuhendo: The First Daughter (1996), Secrets No More (1999), Waiting: A Novel 
of Uganda at War (2007) and ‘Do You Remember?’ (2003).1 All of these texts might be 
considered ‘dissensual’ Bildungsromane in Slaughter’s terms: they evoke and yet 
frustrate the conventions of the Bildungsroman.2 However, more specifically, it is the 
language and symbol of the family which disrupts the typical narrative arc of the form in 
these texts. In a conventional Bildungsroman the protagonist must at a certain point 
leave the family behind in order to embark on his or her journey towards social 
incorporation. Kyomuhendo’s characters, on the other hand, find themselves unable to 
escape family life. Either they are drawn back into the family sphere through events in 
the plot, or the language and imagery associated with the family resurface in unexpected 
ways.   
In the previous chapter we saw that when child soldier narratives deviate from 
the Bildungsroman form, they do so in such a way as to prolong their protagonists’ 
childhoods and, therefore, their pre-political identities. The family operates in 
Kyomuhendo’s texts in a related, though more ambivalent, way. As feminist critics 
including Carole Pateman have argued, the family does symbolize extra-political private 
life in conventional theorizations of the political sphere. However, it is also used to 
suggest abstract political identity – as, for example, in the notion of fraternity.  
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For Slaughter the Bildungsroman is a metaphor and ‘cultural surrogate’3 for 
international human rights law because the form plots the process of social 
incorporation and, he argues, the task of human rights is to fix the split Arendt identifies 
between man and citizen. In this chapter I consider what might be suggested about 
human rights discourse by the way the family operates as a symbol in Kyomuhendo’s 
Bildungsromane. The conventional Bildungsroman relies on the movement from the 
family to the political sphere and thus embodies, in literary form, the personality-
development model of human rights possession. How, therefore, might the challenge to 
the Bildungsroman’s conventions represented by the inescapability of family imagery in 
these texts be interpreted? In particular, what does it suggest about the possession of 
human rights?  
‘Dissensual’ Bildungsromane 
To reiterate, for Slaughter the dissensual Bildungsroman, unlike the traditional 
version of the form, does not portray ‘the imperatives of modernization, socialization, 
and human personality development […] as an idealist process of consensual 
harmonization’.4 
[B]ut neither does it discount such concordance as an absolute, abstract 
impossibility […] it neither accepts the grossly compromised terms of 
enfranchisement […] nor rejects them outright; instead, it holds onto 
the ideal of harmonious integration even as it narrates the unfulfilment 
of the promises of human rights and the idealist Bildung.5 
For Slaughter this is important because ‘the struggle for human rights occurs in the 
space between the world that law and discourse (including the idealist Bildungsroman) 
imagine and the one that they address in fact.’6 The dissensual Bildungsroman, 
analogously, creates a contrast between the conventional expectations readers have of 
the literary form and the way it is put into use in the particular example.   
In a congruent way, critics have stressed Kyomuhendo’s texts’ complicated 
interactions with the Bildungsroman. Andrew H. Armstrong, for example – discussing 
Secrets No More and ‘Do You Remember’ – argues that:  
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[b]y inserting her female protagonists within the decidedly masculinist 
politics of the Bildungsroman form, with its emphasis on the 
development of individual consciousness linked to wider socio-political 
concerns, and then showing the constant disruptions of the young girls’ 
stories (the suspension of the bildung), Kyomuhendo both participates 
in and writes against the simple novelization of women’s lives in 
situations of extreme violence […] [she] writes against such simple re-
telling of the events through her inclusion of traumatic memory, elliptical 
re-telling and forgetting.7 
He describes these texts as ‘interrupted or suspended Bildungsromans of […] young 
lives in a crisis-filled situation as they attempt to live “normally” or be routine in a 
situation of crisis.’8  
Waiting, Kyomuhendo’s third novel, was published in 2007 but is set 28 years 
earlier, in 1979. A note which precedes the novel clearly establishes this setting: ‘[t]he 
year is 1979. Ugandan exiles and the Tanzanian army, known simply as “the Liberators,” 
combine to oust Uganda’s dictator-ruler, Idi Amin, whose murderous regime has 
exterminated half a million people through state-sponsored violence.’9 This precision 
about the context into which the novel’s events are imagined is continued in the 
narrative proper. The novel has twenty brief chapters, and in Chapter Two its narrator, a 
teenage girl called Alinda, says: 
[w]e had learned about the details of the war a month before when Father 
returned from the city where he had worked at the Main Post Office […] 
[The Liberators] were advancing quickly, heading for Kampala from the 
southwestern border that Uganda shared with Tanzania. The districts along 
that route were already in the hands of the Liberators. Amin’s soldiers were 
looting shops, hospitals, banks and private homes in the city […] Some 
were fleeing towards the West Nile and Northern Ugandan regions, their 
home areas […] Our district was situated on one of the highways that led, 
via Lake Albert, to the West Nile and northern regions, and so, Amin’s 
soldiers were using it as their exit route.10  
The novel is thus located precisely in geographical terms and at an important 
political moment in Uganda’s history. As I stated in the Introduction, the Tanzanian 
invasion forced Amin into exile and began a period of extreme political uncertainty. 
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Kyomuhendo’s Fiction’, Journal of International Women’s Studies, 10.4 (2009), 259-275 (p.261).  
8 Armstrong, p.264.  
9 Waiting, n.p. 
10 Waiting, p.11.  
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Setting the novel in 1979 locates it an important transitional moment, albeit a transition 
between two periods of political oppression.  
Waiting is therefore specific about its location – temporally, geographically – and 
about the significance of these factors in the period’s political history. Because of this, it 
might be expected that one of the things the characters are, in the novel’s title’s word, 
waiting for, is the arrival of the Liberators. But when the Liberators do arrive at Alinda’s 
village, this is not described in narrative time, or on the novel’s story level. Two weeks 
pass between chapters thirteen and fourteen, during which time Alinda is very ill and in 
bed. Then she says: ‘[t]wo weeks later, I was still bedridden. The Liberators had 
arrived.’11 A few days later, when she is getting better she asks her sister, Maya, and her 
best friend, Jungu, where they have been and they say they’ve been to ‘visit our friends’; 
the friends turn out to be the Liberators.12 Jungu tells Alinda that: 
[w]hen they first arrived, they stayed here, in your compound, for a few 
days, but your father complained to their commander that they were 
harassing Maya and me […] it’s a long story. I tried to explain to your father 
that this soldier was just my friend, and that his other friend was interested 
in making Maya his friend. Anyway, your father became very angry and 
chased them away.13  
Because the Tanzanian invasion represented a moment of transition on the 
national political stage, and as the novel’s note so explicitly ties the text to that political 
situation, the arrival of the Liberators would seem to be one of the events around which 
Waiting is hinged. But, instead, it is missing from the narrative time. Alinda’s brief 
statement ‘the Liberators had arrived’14 and Jungu’s précis of the ‘long story’15 are all the 
information in the novel about the events surrounding the arrival of the Liberators; after 
this the arrival of the soldiers into the village is never discussed explicitly again, even 
though they set up camp nearby for some time. Alinda doesn’t reflect on what she hears, 
except to say ‘I could not believe I had missed all that.’16 In this way, the political event 
which seems as if it will be central in fact forms a conspicuous gap. 
M.J. Daymond argues: 
                                                 
11 Waiting, p.73.  
12 Waiting, p.77.  
13 Waiting, p.79.  
14 Waiting, p.73.  
15 Waiting, p.79.  
16 Waiting, p.78.  
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one of the most striking features of Waiting is that it has no plot in the 
Aristotelian sense […] The agent here is war, and what is required of 
Kyomuhendo’s characters, men as well as women, is that they survive as 
best they can […] the novel’s title and its narrative point of view […] 
remind us that it is Alinda’s emergence into the adult world that has been 
halted by the arrival of soldiers in her village. Kyomuhendo’s lyrical art is 
such that we, rather than Alinda, feel this loss or denial at every turn. 
Waiting is thus a bildungsroman that has yet to happen.17 
When Daymond discusses the novel’s absence of plot, she means the way in 
which narrative events in the novel which seem to be significant almost never are.  For 
example, towards the end of the novel, tensions begin to emerge between the Liberators 
and the villagers because the soldiers eat all of the available food, offering money which 
is worthless because there’s nowhere to buy anything. But before these tensions reach 
the climax towards which they seem to be building, suddenly, in the middle of the night, 
the soldiers are gone: Uncle Kembo says ‘[i]t is astonishing! They must have started 
packing soon after we went to bed. The whole place is cleared out. Nothing remains, 
only the empty cans of meat.’18 Alinda’s father replies: ‘I still can’t believe they could just 
leave like that’.19 This sudden, shocking absence in the new order of life in the village 
also exacts a personal cost, as Alinda’s brother Tendo leaves with the soldiers too. Jungu 
is devastated because her friend, the soldier Bahati, has also left, despite the promises 
they had made to each other. So the next day, she too leaves in the middle of the night 
and never returns. Bahati, it is subsequently revealed, had not left at all – he’d wanted to 
stay with Jungu and had been hiding.  
This revelation is followed by a gap of about a month before chapter nineteen. It 
gradually emerges over the course of this chapter that Bahati had made an attempt to 
follow Jungu but whilst on a lorry, ‘the driver thought he saw soldiers who looked like 
Amin’s. He panicked and jumped out of the running lorry. Bahati managed to escape 
with minor injuries, but two people died in that accident.’20 Bahati tries to follow the 
departed Jungu, is thrown off course and thwarted by what turns out to be merely a 
hallucination or imagined threat, and then returns. But in the next and final chapter, 
neither Jungu nor Tendo is mentioned and what happens to them is never described; the 
family unit closes up or is reborn despite the losses it has suffered. Alinda’s father goes 
                                                 
17 M.J Daymond, ‘Afterword’, in Waiting: A Novel of Uganda at War, pp.113-30 (p.129).  
18 Waiting, p.96.  
19 Waiting, p.96.  
20 Waiting, p.108.  
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back to the city and ‘said jokingly to us, “[n]ow, I’m confident that you won’t be washed 
away by the rains. You have a man who can take of you,” he said, patting Bahati’s 
shoulder.’21 Father says he will return at the beginning of the school term when not only 
Maya and Alinda, but also Bahati, will be able to return to school.  
At the end of the novel, then, Father is preparing to return to the city and he 
tells the children that they will go back to school, but these interactions, which might 
suggest the social sphere and the beginning of the Bildungsroman, remain outside the 
narrated events, only existing as promises for the future. The narrative conventions of 
the Bildungsroman are therefore problematized through difficulties and suspensions. A 
final moment of social incorporation – going to school – is promised, but it does not 
occur in the text. As in Slaughter’s dissensual Bildungsroman concept, this draws 
attention to the difficulties of individual-social integration which face the central 
characters as young and economically-disadvantaged citizens of postcolonial nation-
states during the crisis of war.  
After Tendu and Jungu leave the space of the compound they leave the 
narrative; similarly, Bahati’s attempt to chase Jungu is not described in the narrative, but 
recalled later, after it has already failed and he has returned. Although Bahati appears to 
be incorporated into the reassembled family, as a kind of substitute at the end of the 
novel, it is worth noting that the relating of the story of his attempt to rescue Jungu 
comes when, after the Liberators shelters are washed away by the rain, Nyinabaongo 
remarks that ‘now we have nothing left to remind us of that painful period’, and Alinda’s 
father remarks ‘[e]xcept Bahati.’22 His status is thus ambiguous: not only is he the 
reminder, the left-over from what has gone before in the reconstituted group, his 
presence cannot – mathematically at least – make up for the gap which is left by the two 
who leave. The solution is lopsided and the book’s ending – with no explanation and 
very little speculation on what has become of Jungu and Tendo, two of its major 
characters – abrupt. 
In the novel in general, missing events become central to the way the structure 
works. Throughout, there are gaps in the narrative, in which what seems as if it is going 
to be important to the plot is dropped out of it almost completely. For example, there 
                                                 
21 Waiting, p.110.  
22 Waiting, p.107.  
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are a number of small discrete stories about people in the village set into the narrative. 
Alinda finds out that a character referred to only as ‘the old man’ was released from 
prison in 1971, when Idi Amin released certain prisoners on the condition that they 
convert to Islam; it is revealed through a conversation late in the novel that he had been 
in prison for murdering his wife, cutting her into pieces and taking the pieces to her 
parents’ house in a bag. Before this story is told, the old man has stepped on a landmine 
and is seriously injured: as she tells the story of the murder of his wife, Nyinabarongo, a 
woman living in the village, says ‘[n]ow God is punishing him. He will die a terrible 
death, just like his wife.’23 But the old man doesn’t die, he makes a good recovery and 
there is no final, balancing justice for the murder of the wife. The story of the murder is 
never mentioned again, and the old man goes on living in the village.  
A story about Nyinabarongo is also told in the novel; she has a daughter with 
her, but she had also had a son. Her husband had told her, when she left him, that she 
could only take the daughter because ‘[h]e believes boys are more important than girls.’24 
She had been forced to marry this man when her sister, the husband’s first wife, died 
very suddenly only a year after her marriage; Nyinabarongo says of her sister’s death 
‘[w]e never got to know what really happened.’25 These stories about the past 
experiences of two of the novel’s characters both take absence, and the missing, as a 
theme; when the old man steps on a landmine he loses a leg, and thereafter feels 
phantom pains in the missing foot, there is a missing son, there are parallel dead wives, 
one unquestionably killed by her husband, the other (especially if these stories are read 
as commenting on each other) perhaps killed in the same way.  
But these narratives have little significance in the plot; they are told, and then 
they disappear, and what is revealed by them doesn’t shape Alinda’s future reflection on 
the characters involved, or point towards any future action. What appears to be a case of 
divine justice for the old man turns out not to be, and although Nyinabarongo ‘always 
lamented about how much she missed her son, wondering if he was well, or if he had 
eaten’26 the son is never sought or found and is thus missed (in both senses of the word) 
in the narrative. In the Bildungsroman, the narrated incidents occur along a progressive 
                                                 
23 Waiting, p.76  
24 Waiting, p.65  
25 Waiting, p.65 
26 Waiting, p.9 
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path to future self-realization for the central character. By contrast, it is characteristic of 
Waiting includes a number of discrete stories with little significance for the plot.  
The Family  
However I propose that if, as Slaughter argues, the Bildungsroman is an 
analogue of, and support to, human rights norms, we need to pay attention not just to 
the interruption of the Bildungsroman but also to the particular textual features which 
disrupt and unsettle the form’s conventions. In Kyomuhendo’s texts, what stops the 
Bildungsroman from progressing on its traditional path is the inescapability of the family 
sphere signalled by an excessive and overwhelming familial language and symbol.  
The First Daughter 
For example, in The First Daughter the central character, Kasemiire, is born to a 
poor family in a rural village. Her father is strict and violent, but despite this and despite 
the criticisms of his friends (‘[a] woman’s place is in the kitchen […] Give them 
education and they will rebel’27) he sends Kasemiire to secondary school: 
[h]e was a man who abided strictly by his principles, one of which was 
sending all his children to school. It was true that he had a low 
opinion of women and that he never fussed over his children. If 
anything, he ruled them with an iron hand, but this could not prevent 
him from sending his daughters to school.28 
When she goes to school Kasemiire moves from her home and from the village and is 
‘separated from her dear family’ for ‘the first time in fifteen years.’29 In the new location 
of the school, she is at first mocked and beaten by the other students and wishes ‘she 
was at home with her family.’30 She also encounters entirely unfamiliar wealth: ‘[f]rom 
senior one, Kasemiire had learnt never to associate with the rich girls, for she always felt 
an inferiority complex with them. She had learnt to find her own level and always stayed 
with them.’31 But her social world then expands as she shares a room with Anita, a rich 
girl with ‘countless pairs of shoes and dresses’32, and as she falls in love with a boy called 
                                                 
27 The First Daughter, p.8.  
28The First Daughter, p.8.  
29The First Daughter, p.29.  
30The First Daughter, p.33.  
31The First Daughter, p.39.  
32The First Daughter, p.39.  
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Steven – ‘a very smart, rich boy in senior four […] a star in the school football team.’33 
She becomes happy at the school and, in the end, ‘[s]he could not believe that she had 
spent three months in Duhaga Secondary School. It seemed like a few months ago 
when she had been a newcomer!’34 
 But then she becomes pregnant and is (seemingly) abandoned by Steven. The 
pregnancy ends her formal education – ‘it meant that she would no longer go back to 
school to sit for her long awaited exams’35 – and it means her return from school to the 
village. Not only this, but all of her sisters are also removed from education as a result 
of the pregnancy; her father is so angry that ‘Kenyange, who was in primary seven, and 
about to do her exams, was denied the chance, and Katuntu in primary five was also 
told to stop going to school.’36 The closure of formal education as an option for the 
girls in the novel is emphatic. 
However, when Kasemiire returns to the village her education begins again, but 
in a different way. During the period she spends at home, she listens to her 
grandmother’s stories:  
‘My husband used to work inside the palace, he was a murusura,’ 
[…] 
‘A murusura?’ 
‘Yes, my dear, the king’s soldiers were known as abarusura,’ she 
explained. ‘My husband was one of them; he fought bravely during 
the Nyangire rebellion.’ 
It was the topic they had been doing before she left school and so she 
begged her grandmother to tell her more about it.37 
The Nyangire rebellion in 1907 was an uprising of the people of Bunyoro-
Kitara, the ethnic group to which Kasemiire belongs, against British colonial rule and its 
preferential treatment of the Baganda.38 In this way, one of the topics Kasemiire had 
                                                 
33The First Daughter, p.41.  
34The First Daughter, p.39.  
35The First Daughter, p.52.  
36The First Daughter, p.57. 
37The First Daughter, p.58.  
38 GN Uzoigwe writes that ‘Baganda leaders who first came into contact with the British by this period 
were quick to realize the advantages to be derived by cooperating with the invaders. The British, too, used 
Baganda chiefs as political agents for administering the conquered kingdoms of southern Uganda […] 
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been learning about at school is picked up again, and her education, interrupted by her 
pregnancy, continues with her grandmother. This is education of a vastly different kind, 
though. It is structured by Kasemiire’s interventions, her grandmother’s angry responses 
to these, which often have the effect of halting her stories altogether, and by the 
grandmother’s non-standard names and terms.  
Her grandmother’s narrative is repeatedly described as broken-up in this way. 
For example: 
‘I said Msiri and please do not interrupt my narration any more, 
otherwise I will stop!’ Mukaaka was now really angry. 
‘I know, Msiri, Mukaaka, it is now called Egypt, but the man whom 
they had sent to persuade Kabalega to accept their protection?’ 
‘Baka’ she snapped and looked as if she would hit her. Kasemiire 
swore not to interrupt her any more.39 
A little later, Kasemiire guesses who her grandmother has been referring to: ‘Mukaaka 
had been talking but Kasemiire had not heard a word. She had finally figured out who 
Baka must have been. Sir Samuel Baker.’40 Delays and breaks thus characterize the 
communication of information.  
The history she learns is also shaped by her grandmother’s prejudice against the 
Baganda. 
She got up, abruptly ending her narration. Kasemiire knew that it 
would be useless to plead with her. She was in a bad mood after 
talking about the hated Baganda […] But most of what Mukaaka said 
was, of course, false. It was a mentality held by the elder generation of 
Banyoro and nothing could change that.41 
                                                                                                                                          
Not unnaturally, Buganda’s neighbors became jealous of the Baganda and resented particularly the idea of 
the colonial administration using Baganda chiefs as sub-imperialists. No kingdom was more distressed by 
this turn of events than Bunyoro-Kitara, the major loser in the struggle for mastery.’ GN Uzoigwe, 
‘Bunyoro-Kitara Revisited: A Reevaluation of the Decline and Diminishment of an African Kingdom’, 
Journal of Asian and African Studies, 48 (2012), 16-34 (pp.16-17). For the present-day debates over the 
position of the Baganda in the Ugandan polity, see Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, ‘Settling the Buganda 
Question: a Peek into the Future’, Transition, 106 (2011), 10-25.  
39The First Daughter, p.60.  
40 The First Daughter, p.61.  
41The First Daughter, p.63.  
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When at one point in the story Kasemiire says ‘That is not true Mukaaka, is it?’ 
Mukaaka responds: ‘[i]f you don’t believe what I’m saying, why do you sit here and 
listen to me?’42  
 Kasemiire is learning about history, and this history is clearly established as a 
continuation of what she had been learning at school, before her pregnancy meant she 
had to leave. But though the subject is the same, the process by which she learns is 
depicted as disrupted. A grandparent as the transmitter of knowledge about the 
community is a common trope, but here the communication of information is not 
straightforward. Kasemiire has to work some things out for herself (who her 
grandmother is referring to as ‘Baka’),43 and she has to take into account the distorting 
effects of her grandmother’s hatred of the Baganda. What is presented as interrupted, 
therefore, is Kasemiire’s understanding of history. 
The beginning of the novel evokes the traditional Bildungsroman: Kasemiire 
leaves for school, beginning to ‘seek self-realization in a new and often 
unaccommodating environment’, as in Buckley’s description of the form.44 The novel 
thus establishes certain formal conventions but then frustrates them when Kasemiire 
has to leave school before both her formal education and her ‘self-realization’ have been 
completed.45 In this way the process of social becoming, central to the Bildungsroman, 
is interrupted. She then has to return home – back to the village (reversing the symbolic 
journey of social becoming she has undertaken) – and back to her family. Though her 
education carries on, it does so through the family: she is taught by her grandmother in 
an elaborately disrupted and fragmented way.  
Secrets No More 
Kyomuhendo’s second novel is also reminiscent of the Bildungsroman, and yet, 
in a slightly different way, the traditional narrative arc of the form is again interrupted 
by the family. The central character in Secrets No More is Marina, a refugee who comes to 
Uganda from Rwanda after her family are killed, and her mother is raped and killed. The 
novel’s first major event is the dramatic and terrifying attack on Marina’s house. Then 
Marina finds her way to an orphanage in Uganda through the intervention of Father 
                                                 
42The First Daughter, p.64.  
43 The First Daughter, p.60.  
44 Buckley, p.95.  
45 Buckley, p.95.  
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Marcel, an Italian priest. At the orphanage Marina is raped by Father Marcel’s assistant 
Matayo and becomes pregnant. When Marina has the baby, Rosaria, she has no 
maternal feelings for her, so Rosaria stays at the orphanage and Marina moves to the 
city into the home of a married couple, the Magezis. Here she encounters George, a 
fraudulent businessman. She and George marry but are unhappy. 
  However, she then meets George’s friend Dee, who first catches her attention 
because of the passion with which he talks about the failures to stop the Rwandan 
genocide. Dee is another Rwandan refugee and ‘[t]he only topic which seemed to 
stimulate Dee was when the men discussed the Rwandan genocide. Only then would his 
face show some interest and he would argue vehemently until the other men gave up’.46 
Dee says of the UN, for example, ‘You think it is not aware of the amount of violence 
taking place? […] But what are they doing to stop it?’47  
She and Dee begin an affair but this turns out to be an attempt on Dee’s part to 
avenge the death of his sister Lisa, a former girlfriend of George’s who died in 
mysterious and never fully explained circumstances.  Dee plans that when George finds 
out about the affair he will attack Dee and Dee will be able to kill him in self-defence. 
However, when George does indeed find out, he crashes his car and is seriously injured. 
Marina ends her affair with Dee to be with George in hospital. Dee leaves, George dies 
and so does Mrs Magezi; in the final chapter Marina is happily married to Mr Magezi 
and reunited with Rosaria.  
Marie Kruger writes that ‘Secrets No More […] recounts the rape of women during 
the Rwandan genocide and also in the seemingly protected space of domestic 
relations.’48 However, Marina is not raped in her family environment; what Kruger 
describes as the ‘protected space of domestic relations’49 is actually the more ambiguous 
quasi-family sphere of the orphanage. The orphanage adds an extra, uneasy level in the 
development from home to the social world, as described in the Bildungsroman, 
because it is like, but never quite, a family.  
                                                 
46 Secrets No More, p.134.  
47 Secrets No More, p.134. 
48 Marie Kruger, Women’s Literature in Kenya and Uganda: The Trouble with Modernity (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), pp.5-6.  
49 Kruger, p.6.  
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What this produces in the novel is, perhaps paradoxically, an overabundance of 
familial language. For example, Marina acquires two surrogate fathers at the orphanage, 
explicitly described as such. First is Father Marcel:  
[Mrs Magezi] remembered the old nun telling them what Marina had 
gone through in Rwanda and how Father Marcel had found her and 
given her a new life at the orphanage. ‘He is like a father to all of 
them, especially Marina, whom he has a special attachment to,’ the 
nun had told them. And now Father Marcel’s health was poor, and 
Marina was going to be deprived of yet another ‘father’.50  
Matayo, too, is described as like a father both before and after he rapes Marina: ‘Matayo 
was a jolly person with a wonderful sense of humour. He treated the girls in the 
orphanage like his daughters.’51 After he has raped her, Marina thinks: ‘Matayo had 
betrayed her trust. She had begun to believe in him and confide in him. In a funny way, 
he had reminded her of her dead father.’52  
The orphanage is Catholic and both Matayo and Father Marcel joined the 
church despite their fathers’ opposition. When Father Marcel tries to persuade Matayo 
to return to his home, the language of the family dizzily multiplies: ‘“You have to listen 
to your father, Matayo,” Father Marcel said quietly […] "But, Father, I want to go back 
with you now. I want to learn the catechism.’53 Matayo cannot become a priest but he 
‘could join the vocation of brotherhood since permission from one’s parents was not a 
prerequisite for becoming a brother.’54 The nun who runs the orphanage tells Marina 
‘God is like a parent…he only gives you what he thinks is best for you’.55 Within the 
orphanage, ‘[b]ig sisters were the bigger girls assigned to the smaller children to look 
after them until they reached an age when they could be able to look after themselves’56 
and ‘Rosaria was pampered by everyone. The other orphans referred to her as ‘our 
baby.’57 However, Rosaria is of course not another orphan – her parents are Matayo and 
Marina.  
                                                 
50 Secrets No More, p.79.  
51 Secrets No More, p.44.  
52 Secrets No More, p.59.  
53 Secrets No More, p.30.  
54 Secrets No More, p.34.  
55 Secrets No More, p.75.  
56 Secrets No More, p.119.  
57 Secrets No More, p.119.  
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Even when Marina moves to the city (and thus, in the terms of the 
Bildungsroman, towards social, and away from family, identity) the familial language 
persists. When Sister Bernadette encourages the Magezis to look after Marina, she says: 
‘[a]nd…I didn’t mean for Marina to be a housemaid, I would prefer her to be more of 
a…I mean I want a safe place for her so that she can be given the chance to start life 
anew,’58 and, again: ‘she did not want to give Marina away as a housemaid. She needed 
her to stay with a family which would offer her the security and protection she needed 
to start a new life.’59  When she moves in with the couple Marina wonders ‘about their 
own children. How would they take to another “child” coming to their home. But she 
had been surprised to find the house devoid of children.’60 When George and Marina 
plan to marry, Mr Magezi thinks: ‘His wife was behaving like a typical mother afraid of 
losing her last born to a man.’61 
Similarly, even at those moments in the text which most strongly suggest 
adulthood, Marina is frequently described as being childlike. After Rosaria is born, she 
and Sister Bernadette have a conversation in which the nun encourages her to try to 
build a new future: 
‘what matters is that I managed to put the past behind me and start a 
new life. And that is what you need to do now, start a new life.’ 
‘But I want to be happy,’ Marina said, her voice taking on a childish 
edge. 
‘I know, Marina, it’s very important, but it’s more important to put 
everything behind you,’ Sister Bernadette answered, knowing she was 
talking to the ‘child’ in Marina.62 
Father Marcel sees her in a similar way; when he comes to visit the new mother and her 
baby he thinks that Rosaria is ‘big, far too big to have been delivered by Marina who 
was just a child herself.’63 And when she first meets George, who she will marry, he 
                                                 
58 Secrets No More, p.78. 
59 Secrets No More, p.77.  
60 Secrets No More, p.117.  
61 Secrets No More, p.129.  
62 Secrets No More, p.76.  
63 Secrets No More, p.67.  
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wants to ‘know more about this child-woman […] he knew she was a mere child of less 
than twenty years.’64 
‘Do You Remember?’ 
There is a similar multiplication of the language of the family in the short story 
‘Do You Remember?’. Daymond, as we have seen, argues that ‘Waiting is […] a 
bildungsroman that has yet to happen.’65 The conventions of the coming of age 
narrative are disturbed further in ‘Do You Remember?’: this story is a replacement for a 
Bildungsroman which should have happened. The central character is a teenager called 
Maliza. When she was a child, during a period of conflict, she was taken away from her 
home: ‘the soldier dug me out from the heaps of dead bodies, flung me on his soldiers, 
and carried me to his home, which was a military barracks with many children.’66 None 
of the armed forces mentioned in the story are named, and there are no dates. The 
solider who takes Maliza away was fighting for the ‘rebels’.67 These ‘rebels’ then become 
the government and a new group of rebels emerges. According to Maliza:  
these rebels also raided homes, and took away children who they 
turned into child-soldiers. And cut off peoples lips and ears, and 
removed their eyes as punishment for telling on them to the 
government soldiers […] they burnt houses and cooked people alive 
and fed them to the other villagers who had not yet been killed.68 
In ‘Do You Remember?’ it is Maliza’s ability to narrate her story at all which is 
drawn into question by her abduction:  
[i]f only I could remember everything that happened before the raid, I 
would say to you today. Now. “Sit down and let me tell you a story.” 
The story of my life. Or, what could have been the story of my life.69 
The Bildungsroman is the story of an individual’s life and development. Here, though 
Maliza does tell a story, it has the status of a replacement, a grossly insufficient 
                                                 
64 Secrets No More, p.115.  
65 Daymond, p.129.  
66 ‘Do You Remember?’, p.175.  
67 ‘Do You Remember?’, p.176.  
68 ‘Do You Remember?’, p.177.  
69 ‘Do You Remember?’, p.175.  
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replacement, for the story she would have told – ‘what could have been the story of my 
life’.70 
Maliza describes the soldier who ‘flung [her] on his soldiers’ as ‘[t]he one who 
took the place of my real father, Mahoro […] his wife took the place of my real mother, 
“wife of Mahoro.”’71 But even though at the beginning of the story Maliza says that the 
soldier is not her ‘real father’, as it progresses, she simply refers to him as ‘father’. For 
example, ‘[w]e left the barracks and went to live in a camp for displaced people because 
my father said the village was unsafe.’72 As in Secrets No More, there is a replacement of 
the original family with a more provisional family.  
This might be read as a positive development. Of all the things that could 
happen to a child abducted by a solider, the recreation of a family unit seems like one of 
the most positive. But in the absence of narrated expression of traumatic experience, it 
is the ambiguity of Maliza’s relationship with her family which tends to indicate the 
terrible impact of what she has endured. For example, she and her (new) family have to 
go and live in a camp for displaced people because of the activities of the second group 
of rebels. In the camp,  
[t]he World Food Programme supplied us with food […] it was easier 
for girls my age to obtain bigger food rations from the World Food 
Programme men who gave out food, because they liked to fondle our 
tits in the process.73  
One day when this happens, her ‘brother’ Barnabas intervenes, attacks one of 
the men and ‘beat him up real bad.’74 
He was so jealous! I felt good but this meant we did not get any food 
for that day. Or the next. Barnabas was put in a small room where he 
was beaten every day, and denied any food or water for a week. Me and 
mother and the twins were given food only once a day. As a result, one 
of the twins died. My mother cried a lot.75 
Here emotion is unsettlingly distributed: Barnabas’ jealousy – which, we might expect, 
should itself be unsettling, as, in the new family which she has joined, he is her brother 
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– is the only event which provokes the narrator to describe a feeling: ‘I felt good’.76 
Meanwhile, what the World Food Programme men do to her, and the death of the 
baby, produce no described emotion.  
Though the abduction by the soldier provides her with a new family, this is a 
problematic and disturbing one. She and her ‘brother’ Barnabas begin a sexual 
relationship: 
I asked Barnabas if we should tell father and mother about the night he 
came to me. But Barnabas said no. We had to keep it as out secret. 
Why? Because it was not exactly right. He had done it because of the 
physical urge.77 
In the conventional coming-of-age novel, of course, romantic and sexual relationships 
often symbolize the development into adulthood. Here, despite the fact that Maliza 
describes being happy – ‘I loved Barnabas very much’78 – her sexual experiences 
become uncomfortably associated with the family; not quite incestuous but almost. As 
Barnabas tells her, ‘it was not exactly right.’79  
 The story is about a young girl caught up in the terror of war. But though 
surrounding events are mentioned, for example the rebels who ‘cut off peoples lips and 
ears, and removed their eyes as punishment for telling on them to the government 
soldiers’,80 it is notable that the trauma of war is registered and represented through the 
family. When she is abducted, she is absorbed into a surrogate family, and yet this 
family proves abusive. The coming-of-age tale she would have been able to tell were it 
not for the war, ‘what could have been the story of my life’,81 is replaced by one in 
which the familial language multiplies, as in Secrets No More, as she finds a substitute 
father and mother. Moreover this is one in which the family does not produce safety or 
security, but rather a new kind of threat. Matayo, who rapes Marina in Secrets No More 
‘treated the girls in the orphanage like his daughters.’82 Barnabas in this text is a kind of 
brother.  
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Waiting 
Finally, we can here return to reconsider Waiting. At the beginning of the novel 
Alina’s mother is pregnant and the baby is due imminently. As they wait for the baby to 
be born, they are also waiting to see if Amin’s soldiers will arrive; the soldiers have been 
looting local villages and terrorizing the inhabitants. In the end, the arrival of the 
soldiers and the birth of the baby coincide, and Kaaka is killed after beginning to deliver 
the baby. Then  
Father rushed forward into the yard, something like a groan escaping 
from his lips. Kaaka was covered in blood. He bent over her. I was 
still clutching the plastic bag that contained the baby’s things when I 
ran inside the house to find Mother.83  
This scene has a close parallel later in the novel, after the old man steps on a 
landmine:  
[i]t did not look like a leg at all! From the knee downwards it was just 
a mass of red meat from which small pieces of white bone protruded 
[…] Still holding the baby tightly in my arms, I started walking away, 
placing one foot in front of the other, slowly at first, then more 
quickly, until I had put a distance between my weary body and the 
scene of blood.84  
The murder of Kaaka and the landmine are the two most explicit scenes of political 
violence in the novel and in both cases, Alinda makes an escape from an overwhelming 
‘scene of blood’85 whilst holding tightly to something – in the first, the baby’s things, in 
the second the baby himself. The baby, or the suggestion of the baby, is present on 
both occasions.   
In fact, the baby’s birth itself is another ‘scene of blood.’86 When Alina rushes to 
her mother, it is the presence of blood which is emphasized:  
I could not see the cord. I feared to look at the jellied blood next to the 
baby [...] Then I saw something like a fleshy string, coiling out of the 
bloody mess and winding its way to the baby’s stomach.87  
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This sense of similarity between childbirth and political violence is also suggested by the 
fear of blood which Alinda develops: she will not eat meat because she says that it 
‘reminds me of blood – Mother’s afterbirth, and the old man’s leg’.88 Kaaka is not 
mentioned; the afterbirth is here equivalent to the landmine. The experience of seeing 
the afterbirth establishes its own pattern of imagery which repeats through the novel. 
She says: ‘I tried to get hold of the afterbirth, but it slipped through my fingers and fell 
back towards the baby. It danced around in the pool of blood seeping from Mother’s 
womb, swimming like an egg yolk.’89 Later, during the rains, she says that: 
I dreamed that the roof of our house had flown off, and that water 
was soaking my bed. I was swimming in a puddle of water, and I was 
going to drown and die! I woke up in a cold sweat and did not fall 
asleep again until daybreak.90  
The dream repeats the language concerning the threat of seeping and of liquidity 
associated with the afterbirth, and suggests its traumatic impact.  
Kaaka’s death is itself linked to maternity. The soldiers kick Kaaka twice in the 
stomach and then shoot her: ‘he fired again, aiming at her stomach.’91 Kaaka’s stomach 
has been, from the beginning of the novel, established as a key aspect of the 
descriptions of her: ‘[h]er big stomach was visible through the long, loose dress she was 
wearing, and she seemed to be pushing it in front of her as she walked.’92 This isn’t 
explained until chapter eleven; when she was young she was pregnant without being 
married, her mother took her to a medicine man to make the pregnancy invisible but  
[a]fter about a year of marriage Kaaka came back to tell her mother that 
she had failed to deliver the baby and that her stomach was still 
swollen. They went back to the medicine man, but unfortunately, he 
had long since died. Kaaka’s stomach remained swollen since that 
time.93  
When Kaaka is killed and the mother dies in childbirth there are three graves 
and ‘[t]he smallest was for the baby that was said to have been discovered in Kaaka’s 
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stomach.’94 Where in Mother’s pregnancy the child lives but she dies, here the mother 
lives for years literally carrying around her dead child, until she is shot in her stomach by 
Amin’s soldiers. This, along with the presence of the baby (or the suggestion of the 
presence of the baby) at scenes of blood, and with the way Alina’s fear of blood, and 
descriptions of blood, are concentrated on her mother’s afterbirth much more than on 
Kaaka’s death or the landmine, suggests that political violence is entwined in the novel 
with a wider, more complicated, more unexpected anxiety.  
In part, what Kyomuhendo is doing here is drawing attention to conventional 
hierarchies of violence, and then upending them. That Secrets No More depicts rape 
during the genocide as well as in during Marina’s everyday life illustrates that, for 
women, and particularly for black, poor women, violence is not an exceptional event, 
but written into the conditions of normal existence. Similarly in Waiting, the political 
violence and childbirth are characterized similarly, and this links them together, refusing 
again to characterize the violence visited on the female characters as solely the result of 
the unstable political situation and rather making what seems unexceptional – the 
dangers of motherhood, patriarchal social norms, and childbirth – vivid and terrifying. 
Catherine MacKinnon has asked ‘why is torture on the basis of sex – for example, in 
the form of rape, battering, and pornography – not seen as a violation of human 
rights?’95  She goes on to write that  
[w]hen the abuse is sexual and intimate, especially when it is sexual and 
inflicted by an intimate, it is gendered, hence not considered a human 
rights violation. Torture is regarded as politically motivated; states are 
generally required to be involved in it. What needs asking is why the 
torture of women by men is not seen as torture, specifically why it is 
not seen as political, and just what the role of the state in it is.96  
Kyomuhendo’s texts ask a similar question, refusing any sense of a boundary between 
the violence of war and the violence of the everyday experience of women.  
At the same time, however, the type of violence with which Kyomuhendo is 
concerned in these texts also has important symbolic dimensions when thinking about 
the nation-state. According to Elleke Boehmer, ‘it is virtually a literary and socio-
political given that mother symbols cement national feeling, and that, worldwide, the 
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cognate-metaphors of soil, earth, home and family buttress the process of making 
national claims, or invoking the modern nation into being.’97 But in Kyomuhendo’s 
fiction, as Kruger writes, this link is made unsettling:   
[s]ignifiers for the dystopia of the nation and its patriarchal epistemology, 
the bodies of women are visibly marked not only by war and 
displacement but also by the unrelenting violence of human 
reproduction. Childbirth no longer affirms national and familial 
continuity, and instead transforms into a site of death, blood, and 
carnage.98 
If, as Boehmer suggests ‘soil, earth, home and family buttress the process of making 
national claims’,99 then the way these symbols turn, in Kruger’s words, into ‘site[s] of 
death blood and carnage’100 can surely be read to indicate a crisis facing the nation. Yet, 
on the other hand, as we have seen, the Bildungsroman premises its vision of national-
individual incorporation on the movement away from the family. Yet Kyomuhendo’s 
texts problematize this too, making the family both corrupted and inescapable. It is this 
duality of the family’s symbolic value in her work which, I suggest, is revealing about a 
wider ambiguity, and which has consequences for our understanding of human rights.   
Human Rights and the Human Family  
The first sentence of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights describes 
humanity as a family: it says that ‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, 
justice and peace in the world.’101 The family re-emerges in Article 1 by which time the 
familial language has become more particular: ‘[a]ll human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should 
act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’102 As Jacqueline Bhabha has argued, 
although the Declaration thus ‘invokes the family metaphor’103, it moves – between the 
preamble and the first article – from positing humanity as a family to insisting on 
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(‘should act’)104  a spirit of brotherhood, in particular. Brotherhood is just one specific 
mode or type of family relation and as Bhabha writes, the Declaration thus presents a 
‘disjunction between inclusive membership and partial perspective.’105  
Both the family and the more specific notion of fraternity are long-established 
ways of understanding the political community of the democratic nation-state. 
According to Jacques Derrida, ‘[t]he concept of politics rarely announces itself without 
some sort of adherence of the State to the family.’106 But this is an intensely complicated 
relationship. Fratenité is the third term in the French revolutionary slogan – liberté, 
equalité, fraternité. Feminist political philosopher Carole Pateman argues that though 
the term fraternity is understood simply as a way of describing political community,  this 
disguises the extent to which that community is based upon the exclusion of women; 
fraternity, Pateman writes, ‘means exactly what it says: brotherhood’.107  
She argues that traditional patriarchal political theory saw the relationship 
between the king and his subjects as resembling that of a father and his sons; 
subordination to the king was understood to be natural, a matter of birth. Social 
contract theory of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, on the other hand, presents 
the basis for rule as an agreement made between equals who, once the agreement is 
made, become individuals under the law.  
Although, as she writes, ‘Freud’s account of the murder of the primal father by 
his sons is not usually considered in discussions of the social contract’, Freud’s Moses and 
Monotheism does describe ‘the pact made by the brothers after their dreadful deed as “a 
sort of social contract.”’108 Moses and Monotheism is useful for her purposes because it 
makes explicit something which is implicit in other theorizations of social contract, she 
argues. In Freud’s text, the sons overthrow the exclusive power of the father and create 
a new order between themselves (just as in traditional social contract theory) but in 
Freud the reasons for this overthrow are made clear. Pateman writes that: 
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the motive for the brothers’ collective act is not merely to claim their 
natural liberty and right of self-government, but to gain access to 
women […] The parricide eliminates the father’s political right, and 
also his exclusive sexual right.109   
In this way she argues that patriarchal rule had two dimensions: one relates to 
sons and another to wives. Social contract theory changes the first, but leaves the second 
in place: ‘[t]he social contract is a modern patriarchal pact that establishes men’s sex 
right over women’.110 ‘Fraternity’ has an invisibility or naturalness in political discourse; 
there is, Pateman writes, a ‘general acceptance that “fraternity” is no more than a way of 
talking about the bonds of community.’111 Such a neutral reading ignores that fraternity 
implies a community of men: ‘[t]he father is dead and the participants in civil society 
have left kinship behind them, but as civil individuals they still share an ascriptive bond 
– a bond as men.’112 
Traditional patriarchal theory analogizes the family and the polity; there is 
thought to be a parallel between an effective sovereign and a fair father. But social 
contract theory opposes them: the fraternal public civil sphere is understood as 
everything the family is not: 
[the] new, modern patriarchal order […] is presented as divided into 
two spheres: civil society or the universal sphere of freedom, equality, 
individualism, reason, contract and impartial law – the realm of men 
or ‘individuals’; and the private world of particularity, natural 
subjection, ties of blood, emotion, love and sexual passion – the 
world of women, in which men also rule.113 
This means that ‘[t]he fundamental distinction between the traditional patriarchy of the 
father and modern patriarchy is […] that the latter is created in separation from, and 
opposition to, the familial sphere.’114 Moreover, ‘political life has been conceptualized in 
opposition to the mundane world of necessity, the body, the sexual passions and 
birth.’115 
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 The use of the family metaphor that Pateman tracks, however, evinces a peculiar 
contradiction. On the one hand, the political community brought into being through 
the social contract is understood as a fraternity; on the other hand the same political 
community is ‘created in separation from, and opposition to, the familial sphere.’116 
Fraternity, a word which means a particular type of family bond, is used in such a way 
that it symbolizes the opposite of the bonds of family. The equals who make the new 
social contract are described as brothers, but fraternity is not understood as a familial 
language. Pateman writes:  
as recent accounts of fraternity make clear, the concept covers much 
more than bonds of kinship. ‘Individuals’ can be part of a fraternity or 
a brotherhood – a ‘community’ – even though they are not brothers 
(sons of a father or kin). The father is dead and the participants in 
civil society have left kinship behind them.117 
There is something strange about this: a word which signifies familial bonds, fraternity, 
comes to characterize political community at the same time as political community is 
defined against the family and what it signifies. 
But if what is being signified is that ‘the participants in civil society have left 
kinship behind them’,118 why use a word – fraternity – which actually means kinship – 
that is, which means precisely what it does not mean? Derrida asks this question, 
drawing attention to the following passage from Jean-Luc Nancy’s The Experience of 
Freedom:  
fraternity, aside from every sentimental connotation (but not aside 
from the possibilities of passion it conceals, from hatred to glory by 
way of honor, love competition for excellence, etc.), is not the relation 
of those united by a same family but the relation of those whose 
Father, or common substance, has disappeared, delivering them to their 
freedom and to the equality of this freedom. Such are, in Freud, the 
sons of the inhuman Father of the horde: becoming brothers in the 
sharing of his dismembered body. Fraternity is equality in the sharing of 
the incommensurable.119 
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Thus, as I have been arguing, fraternity is understood to mean ‘not the relation of those 
united by a same family’ (my italics) but a ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ which comes after, 
and distinguishes itself from, the family.120  
Derrida asks of Nancy, however,  
why not simply abandon the word fraternity as well, now that it has been 
stripped of all its recognizable attributes? What does fraternity still name 
when it has no relationship to birth, death, the father, the mother, sons 
and brothers? If the link to the traditional word and concept is so 
arbitrary that one can abandon it, then why say nothing of the daughter 
and the sister – or the wife? Where have they gone?121 
Derrida suggests that the word ‘fraternity’ tends to be used as if does not imply the 
series of associations the brother customarily carries. But the persistence of the word, 
its recurrence across so many theorizations of the democratic state, is suggestive. He 
suggests that in retaining the word fraternity ‘to designate a fraternity beyond fraternity, 
a fraternity without fraternity (literal, strict, genealogical, masculine, etc.) one never 
renounces that which one claims to renounce – and which returns in myriad ways, 
through symptoms and disavowals’.122  
In Derrida’s reading what underlies this privileging of the brother, this idea that 
there can be ‘fraternity without fraternity,’ is the question of sameness and difference in 
the democratic order: 
democracy has always wanted by turns and at the same time two 
incompatible things: it has wanted, on the one hand, to welcome only 
men, and on the condition that they be citizens, brothers, and 
compeers [semblables], excluding all the others, in particular bad 
citizens, rogues, noncitizens, and all sorts of unlike and 
unrecognizable others, and, on the other hand, at the same time or by 
turns, it has wanted to open itself up, to offer hospitality, to all those 
excluded.123 
As Derrida points out it ‘was never explained why one wished to hold on to and 
privilege this figure [of the brother] rather than that of the sister, the female cousin, the 
daughter, the wife or the stranger, or the figure of anyone or whoever.’124 We speak of 
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the brother because the democratic community has always desired sameness; partly, as 
Pateman also argues, this is a question of maleness: democracy is figured as masculine. 
Derrida writes: ‘[l]et us not forget this overwhelming and therefore terribly blinding fact: 
the brother of which one speaks is always a man’.125 
A democratic community based around likeness also suggests the exclusivity of 
ethno-nationalism. Here we can return to Arendt: 
[t]he reason why highly developed political communities, such as the 
ancient city-states or modern nation-states, so often insist on ethnic 
homogeneity is that they hope to eliminate as far as possible those 
natural and always present differences and differentiations which by 
themselves arouse dumb hatred, mistrust, and discrimination because 
they indicate all too clearly those spheres where men cannot act and 
change at will, i.e., the limitations of the human artifice.126  
Brotherhood indicates likeness, and the drive to ‘eliminate […] differences’127 is closely 
associated with the desire for the community to be based around the similarities of 
masculinity and ethnic resemblance.  
But if the family stands for similarity – and thus for exclusions from the nation-
state based on ethnicity and gender – there is also a sense in which the family also, 
contradictorily, stands for difference. This can be seen through a consideration of the 
metaphors of birth which abound within the political sphere. Pateman writes: 
[t]he social contract is the point of origin, or birth, of civil society, and 
simultaneously its separation from the (private) sphere of real birth and 
the disorder of women. The brothers give birth to an artificial body, the 
body politic of civil society; they create Hobbes’s ‘Artificial Man, we call 
a Commonwealth,’ or Rousseau’s ‘artificial and collective body’, or the 
‘one Body’ or Locke’s ‘Body Politick’. The ‘birth’ of the civil body politic, 
however, is an act of reason; there is no analogue to a bodily act of 
procreation.128  
In the story of the social contract, the participants are thought to make a conscious and 
free decision to join – this suggests that the links between the members of the 
community are constructed, invented and brought into being.  
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 Physical birth is the opposite of this artificial birth. This is because the artificial 
political community is based around formal equality, where physical birth is associated 
with difference – that is, with the bonds which cannot be constructed. As Arendt 
writes: 
mere existence, that is, all that which is mysteriously given us by birth 
and which includes the shape of our bodies and talents of our minds, 
can be dealt with only by the unpredictable hazards of friendship and 
sympathy, or by the great and incalculable grace of love, which says 
with Augustine, ‘Volo ut sis (I want you to be,’ without being able to 
give any reason for such supreme and unsurpassable affirmation.129  
It is because the human who is merely human – and thus removed from political 
community – is associated with difference that she is so alarming: 
[t]he ‘alien’ is a frightening symbol of the fact of difference as such, and 
indicates those realms in which man cannot change and cannot act and 
in which, therefore, he has a distinct tendency to destroy.130  
Exactly as the fraternity beyond fraternity is thought to designate relationship 
outside kinship but uses a term associated with kinship, the metaphor of birth is used to 
mean what it does not mean. When the metaphor of birth is used within social contract 
theory, for Pateman, it is used to suggest the artificiality of the political community and 
its constructed equality. But, to describe the coming into being of such a community, a 
term – birth – is used, which actually signifies everything to which the artificiality of the 
political sphere is opposed. Physical birth signals ‘mere existence,’ givenness, ‘difference 
as such’.131  
Derrida, as I quoted earlier, states that ‘[t]he concept of politics rarely announces 
itself without some sort of adherence of the State to the family.’132 But, as we have seen, 
this adherence is contradictory. On the one hand fraternity and birth symbolize the 
formal equality and similarity of the political sphere – and thus the desire for the 
reduction of difference which can produce exclusions based on gender and race. On the 
other hand, the family is understood to symbolize the difference of birth, the given 
identity which the constructed equality of the political sphere opposes itself to, the 
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‘realms in which man cannot change and cannot act and in which, therefore, he has a 
distinct tendency to destroy.’133  
Derrida argues that the family stands for democracy’s simultaneous desire for 
similarity and for difference. This contradiction is an irresolvable one, Derrida argues, 
integral to democracy itself. So when the conventions of the form of the Bildungsroman 
are disrupted by the imagery of the family – that is, when the progressive development 
towards abstract public identity is thrown off course by the bloodiness of birth or the 
inescapability of family ties – what is manifested in the form of the Bildungsroman is the 
deep ambivalence of the national-democratic structures with which the literary form is 
so closely linked.134  
What, though, does this have to say about human rights? Slaughter draws a link 
between the Bildungsroman and human rights discourse because both suggest that the 
development of the personality means incorporation in the nation-state. I have 
suggested that Kyomuhendo’s Bildungsromane are more complex than the texts he 
describes as dissensual examples of the genre, because they are characterized not only by 
interruption but by a specific form of interruption, produced by familial imagery. For 
Slaughter, human rights discourse proposes that rights are possessed through the 
development of the personality. This positions citizenship in the nation-state as the 
solution for the rightlessness associated with merely human identity. But the way these 
texts insist on familial imagery within the context of the Bildungsroman suggests a 
problem with this.  
Human rights discourse cannot propose that the possession of human rights through 
the development of abstract personality in the nation-state is the solution for the 
vulnerability of mere human existence. Mere humanness cannot be transcended by 
citizenship, because, even in the context of the nation-state, the abstract political 
identity of the person is haunted by, and difficult to separate convincingly from, mere 
humanness. Though the fraternal seeks to set itself up in opposition from the merely 
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given, it finds itself embroiled in what it had tried to evade. If rights are to be possessed 
through the development of the personality, and if mere humanness indicates 
rightlessness, the ambivalence of the family symbol thus suggests the difficulty of ever 
fully possessing human rights in this sense. 
 Finally, it is apparent when reading these texts that the familial language they use 
is excessive. It is the strangeness of the literary – rather than its ability to logically reflect 
human rights discourse – which I will turn to in the next two chapters I argue that 
literature’s ambiguities are crucially important for understanding the crisis of possession 
which characterizes human rights discourse. 
 .
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Chapter Four: Quasi-Legality, Human Rights 
and South Africa’s TRC 
The law is centrally implicated in the crisis of human rights possession I have 
been discussing over the last three chapters. To reiterate, the human rights theorist Jack 
Donnelly argues that: 
[o]ne can – and usually does – go very far before human rights 
arguments become necessary. An appeal to human rights usually 
testifies to the absence of enforceable positive (legal) rights and 
suggests that everything else has been tried and failed, leaving one with 
nothing else (except perhaps violence) […] Legal rights ground legal 
claims to protect already established legal entitlements. Human rights 
ground moral claims to strengthen or add to existing legal entitlements. 
That does not make human rights stronger or weaker, just different. 
They are human (rather than legal) rights. If they did not function 
differently, there would be no need for them.1 
It is where human rights are not protected by law that they are most important. When 
they are protected by law they become less urgent, and the defining characteristic of the 
human rights claim – its intervention in a situation of extreme vulnerability where all 
other hope has been lost – becomes less marked.  
Consequently, human rights have an ambivalent relationship with the possibility 
of their legal enforcement. The replacement of a human right by an enforceable legal 
right is the logical end-point of human rights discourse in two ways: it is what the 
invocation of human rights talk aims at, but it is also the moment at which the 
distinctiveness of human rights discourse is least apparent. Costas Douzinas suggests: 
[i]n a strange, almost metaphysical way, human rights ‘exist’, even 
when they have not been legislated […] The absence of legislative 
approval, often the legislator’s opposition to the new claims, is their 
structural characteristic. In this sense, human rights have a certain 
independence in relation to the context of their appearance. Legal 
procedures, political traditions and historical contingencies may be 
part of their constitution, but human rights retain a critical distance 
from law and stretch its boundaries and limits.2  
                                                 
1 Donnelly, pp.12-13.  
2 The End of Human Rights, p.344.  
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In this chapter, I argue that human rights are ambivalent about the law and 
stand in an ambiguous relationship to it. I demonstrate this through a specific case 
study: South Africa’s transition to democracy. The discourse of human rights was 
crucial to the transition and it was used in multiple ways for a number of different 
strategic purposes. On the one hand, human rights were used in fully legal projects such 
as the drafting of the interim and final Constitutions. In these contexts, international 
human rights discourse was encoded in national law. For example, the first case that the 
newly established Constitutional Court heard was on the death penalty. In abolishing 
capital punishment, the Court explicitly argued that post-apartheid South Africa was 
supposed to be a nation built upon respect for human rights, as demonstrated in the 
Constitution’s provisions on the right to life. It therefore outlawed the practice. In so 
doing, it made a binding, legally enforceable principle of national law by arguing that it 
was responding to the demands of international human rights discourse.  
But it is important to note that this is not the only way that human rights 
discourse featured in the transition. It was also crucial to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC). The TRC was a nation-building project too, but it had a much 
more complex relationship with legality: it was a quasi-legal body, both related to and 
not quite of the law, which used human rights discourse to distinguish itself from fully 
legal mechanisms and structures. For the TRC, the nature of past human rights 
violations was thought to require something beyond the law, something the law could 
not provide. I argue that the uses of human rights discourse in the transition illustrate 
the complex relationship between the discourse and the law: it was used both to found 
legal rights in the national context and to theorize a space for justice beyond the law.  
  The ambivalence of human rights discourse in relation to the law has significant 
consequences for thinking about the connections between literature and human rights. 3 
                                                 
3 My discussion in this chapter intersects with the broader study of literature and the law: there is an 
extensive body of scholarship which seeks to locate the connections between the two. For a useful 
summary of the various approaches, see Julie Stone Peters, ‘Law, Literature and the Vanishing Real’, 
PMLA, 102.2 (2005), 442-453. Of particular relevance to this thesis, see Ravit Reichman, The Affective Life 
of Law: Legal Modernism and the Literary Imagination (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009) and Mark 
Antaki, ‘Genre, Critique and Human Rights’, University of Toronto Quarterly, 82.4 (2013), 974-996. For an 
interesting counterpoint to debates on legality, literature and the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, see Rosanne Kennedy, ‘Australian Trials of Trauma: The Stolen Generations in Human 
Rights, Law and Literature’, Comparative Literature Studies, 48.3 (2011), 333-355. I will engage primarily with 
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Though I have drawn attention to this only briefly in the previous chapters, the 
ambiguity surrounding the legal enforceability of human rights has been implied in the 
models of literary interpretation I have referred to so far. For Joseph Slaughter, the 
Bildungsroman becomes so important because international law is weak and because 
there is a mismatch between the goals of the international human rights movement and 
the rights actually guaranteed by citizenship in the nation-state.  
Literature is thought to compensate for the insufficiency of international law 
and to help to imaginatively translate belonging to the nation-state into possessing 
human rights, to make them seem equivalent. For Slaughter, it is the Bildungsroman 
which helps to bridge the gap between the legal rights guaranteed by the nation-state 
and the ambitions of international human rights discourse: 
[t]he Bildungsroman has acted as a cultural surrogate for the missing 
executive authority of international human rights law, expanding its 
purview by projecting the social and cultural conditions out of which 
human rights might be recognised as commonsensical.4 
This is to suggest that human rights’ ambivalence in relation to the law is a limit 
(‘the missing executive authority of international human rights law’5) and to suggest that 
literature can function in such a way as to compensate for this limit.  
What does such a model of reading imply about literary texts? Does it assume 
that literature operates in the place of the law, taking on some of its roles? If this is the 
case, what is it about literature which enables it to be law-like? On the other hand, 
perhaps it is the case that literature is able to do something the law cannot – that it 
makes up for the limits of the human rights law not by being law-like but by being 
different from the law. Stated like this, these questions are somewhat abstract. But the 
South African transition provides a specific example through which they can be posed 
in a more concrete and practical way: the Foreword to the TRC’s Report, where 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu uses a literary text – Ariel Dorfman’s play Death and the 
                                                                                                                                          
Mark Sanders’ Ambiguities of Witnessing: Law and Literature in the Time of a Truth Commission (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2007).  
4 Human Rights, Inc., p.29. 
5 Human Rights, Inc., p.29.  
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Maiden – to explain and defend the Commission’s procedures.6 In particular, Tutu uses 
the play to justify the quasi-legality of the Commission.  
In an example of its ambivalent relation to the law, the TRC did not put 
perpetrators of apartheid crimes on trial. Instead, it offered them amnesty if they would 
tell the truth about their past actions. The concept of truth therefore became crucial to 
the Commission. Instead of punishment or revenge, what South Africans were offered 
was truth. In the Report, it was the importance of truth, and the Commission’s superior 
ability to provide access to it, that justified its quasi-legality. The Report suggested that in 
order for individuals and the nation properly to recover after, and move on from, gross 
violations of human rights, a form of truth was required that the law could not provide. 
In order to make exactly this point, Tutu turns to a literary text: Death and the Maiden. 
Tutu suggests that the play shows how truth is restorative. Implicitly, then, the play thus 
becomes associated with the truth which compensates for the law’s inadequacies. This 
move is an example of a more generalized model of the relationship between literature 
and the limits of human rights: literature is seen to have special relevance where 
standard legal practices are insufficient. 
Human Rights Discourse and the South African Transition: The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission 
 During the 1990s the phrase ‘transitional justice’ became an increasingly 
prominent way of describing the particular challenges faced by states in which 
authoritarian regimes had collapsed, and democracy was to be developed. This was the 
case, in a relatively short period of time, in, amongst others, Brazil, Chile, the former 
Soviet Union, and South Africa. While transitional justice means more than simply 
truth commissions, truth commissions have been a significant focus of academic work 
on the concept of transitional justice.7 One of the first studies on the topic, Ruth G. 
Teitel’s Transitional Justice, argues that  
                                                 
6 Ariel Dorfman, Death and the Maiden, in Ariel Dorfman, The Resistance Trilogy (London: Nick Hern Books, 
1998), pp.87-143.  
7 For an outline of the origins of the concept of transitional justice in the 1990s and an account of its 
subsequent development, see Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘The New Landscape of Transitional Justice’, in 
Transitional Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth Versus Justice, ed. by Naomi Roht-Arriaza and 
Javier Mariezcurrena (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp.1-17.  
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wherever states made delicate transitions out of brutal military 
rule and eschewed the prior regime’s punishment, the burning 
question was whether past wrongs would simply be forgotten. 
The truth commission emerged as impunity’s antidote and 
amnesty’s analogue.’8 
South Africa was, therefore, not the only country to have created a truth 
commission. In her study of the practice, Priscilla B. Hayner counts at least twenty one 
across the globe between 1974 and 2002.9 The South African TRC was the focus of 
unprecedented national and international attention, however, and was exceptionally 
well-resourced: Hayner notes that ‘[w]ith a staff of three hundred, a budget of some 
$18 million each year for two-and-a-half years, and four large offices around the 
country, the commission dwarfed previous truth commissions in its size and reach.’10 
As Melissa S. Williams and Rosemary Nagy observe,  
[t]he South African TRC set a new standard for the aspirations of 
transitional institutions as resources not only for redressing past 
injustices but also as laying the foundation for forward-looking or 
restorative justice in a renewed democratic community.11 
The Commission was comprised of seventeen commissioners who were 
nominated by members of the public as well as by groups and organisations. Public 
hearings at which the nominees were invited to appear were used to create a shortlist, 
                                                 
8 Ruth G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.79.  
9 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions (London: Routledge, 
2002), p.8. Though numerous critiques of the South African TRC have been made (some of which will be 
discussed further below) the extent of its success in meeting its objectives, its ability and willingness to 
strongly critique the ANC, and the financial support it received should be underlined, as these successes 
have not characterized all truth commissions. For example, there were two truth commissions in Uganda. 
One was created by Idi Amin in 1974 and focused on disappearances in the period after 1971, when 
Amin seized power. The second was established by Yoweri Museveni in 1986 and ‘was charged with 
investigating human rights violations by state forces that occurred from Uganda’s independence in 1962 
up to January 1986, when Museveni came to power (though excluding any abuses by Museveni’s rebel 
force).’ (Hayner, p.56). The first was largely forgotten; the second faced repeated funding crises and its 
report was not made widely available. Hayner discusses these commissions on p.51-2 and 56-7 
respectively. See also Joanna Quinn, ‘Constraints: The Un-Doing of the Ugandan Truth Commission’, 
Human Rights Quarterly, 26.2 (2004), 401-427 and Makau Mutua, ‘Beyond Juba: Does Uganda Need a 
National Truth and Reconciliation Process?’, Buffalo Human Rights Law Review, 13 (2007), 19-32. 
10 Hayner, p.41.  
11 Melissa S. Williams and Rosemary Nagy, ‘Introduction’ in Melissa S. Williams, Rosemary Nagy, and Jon 
Elster, Transitional Justice (London: New York University Press, 2012), pp.1-30 (p.3).  
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and President Nelson Mandela picked the seventeen from this list. The Commission 
was chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the deputy chair was Dr Alex Boraine, and 
it was split into three committees – the Human Rights Violations committee, the 
Reparation and Rehabilitation committee and Amnesty committee.  
The Commission collected over 20,000 written statements12 and held public 
hearings. There were a number of different types of hearing, including victim hearings, 
at which selected victims could give testimony about their experiences and event 
hearings, which focused on ‘“window cases”[…] [which] aimed to provide detailed 
insights into particular incidents that were representative of broader patterns of 
abuse’13, such as the Soweto revolt in 1976 and the Pondoland Rebellion in 1960. 
There were also Special Hearings focusing on women, children and the issue of 
compulsory national service, Institutional Hearings focusing on the role of important 
social institutions in contributing to a society in which extreme human rights violations 
were on-going, and Political Party hearings, giving the various political groupings an 
opportunity to outline their perspectives on the past. These hearings were all held by 
the Human Rights Violations Committee; the Amnesty Committee also held public 
hearings at which it heard each application for amnesty. 
 The Quasi-Legality of the TRC 
Critical work on truth commissions emphasizes the extent to which human 
rights violations have lasting effects on victims and victims’ families, damage social 
bonds and the respect of citizens for the government and the police, and warp the 
telling of national history if these effects are not acknowledged. These factors are often 
used to suggest that human rights violations require something the law cannot provide. 
Consequently, the approach of truth commissions tends to be defined in contrast to 
that of courts. For example, Hayner states that  
partly due to the limited reach of the courts, and partly out of a 
recognition that even successful prosecutions do not resolve the 
conflict and pain associated with past abuses […] transitional 
                                                 
12 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report [TRC Report], vol.1, available at 
<http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/> [accessed 2 September 2014] p.142.  
13 TRC Report, vol.1, p.147.  
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authorities have increasingly turned to official truth-seeking as a central 
component in their strategies to respond to past atrocities.14 
According to Catherine M. Cole: 
transitional justice departs from international law by suggesting that 
traditional jurisprudence has limited value when faced with crimes 
against humanity […] Resulting from a convergence of the human 
rights movement and international law, transitional justice not only 
formulates a relationship between political transition and the law, it also 
addresses the unique challenges that a history of state-sponsored 
atrocity presents to the law.15  
She goes on to argue that crimes against humanity ‘require new means of redress, a 
mechanism that records hidden histories of atrocity, didactically promotes collective 
memory and gives victims a place of respect, dignity, and agency in the process. Such 
purposes are not well-served by traditional jurisprudence’.16  
The TRC’s Report carefully distinguishes the Commission’s own approach to 
dealing with past crimes to that modelled by the International Military Tribunals at 
Nuremberg (IMT) – the trial of twenty four prominent Nazis at the end of the Second 
World War, conducted by the Allies. The Report gives a number of reasons for the 
avoidance of an approach based on Nuremberg including the absence of a military 
victor in South Africa and the practical implications (‘our country simply could not 
afford the resources in time, money and personnel that we would have had to invest in 
such an operation.’)17 Moreover, the Report states, 
[t]here is no doubt that members of the security establishment would 
have scuppered the negotiated settlement had they thought they were 
going to run the gauntlet of trials for their involvement in past 
violations. It is certain that we would not, in such circumstances, have 
experienced a reasonably peaceful transition from repression to 
democracy.18  
In order to give a full sense of what the TRC was defining itself against, it is 
necessary to give a brief account of the significance of the IMT.  
                                                 
14 Hayner, p.14.  
15 Catherine M. Cole, Performing South Africa’s Truth Commission: Stages of Transition (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 2010), p.2.  
16 Cole, p.3.  
17 TRC Report, vol. 1, p.5.  
18 TRC Report, vol.1, p.5.  
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Crimes Against Humanity and International Criminal Law 
The London Charter, which established the IMT, the Tribunal itself, and the 
subsequent Nuremberg Principles have come to be seen as the first major stage in the 
evolution of International Criminal Law (ICL). As a body of law, ICL is distinct from 
the international law of human rights, though the two areas have significant links: 
Gerhard Werle writes that ‘[i]nternational criminal law is, among other things, an 
instrument to protect human rights’19 and Antonio Cassese notes that ‘ICL is an 
essentially hybrid branch of law: it is public international law impregnated with 
notions, principles and legal constructs derived from national criminal law, IHL 
[international humanitarian law] as well as human rights law.’20 The most important 
difference between ICL and international human rights law in this context is that that 
ICL makes individuals criminally liable for certain actions. International human rights 
law, on the other hand, makes states responsible for actions or failures to act which 
result in violations of rights for those people under their jurisdictions. 
Cassese argues that the Nuremberg trials were ‘a turning point’ because ‘until 
1945 […] senior state officials had never been held personally responsible for their 
wrongdoings’, but at the IMT they ‘were no longer protected by state sovereignty.’21 
The Nuremberg judgement stated that ‘[c]rimes against international law are 
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who 
commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.’22  
But it became apparent that the standards which already existed were not 
sufficient to deal with Nazi crimes. Madoka Futamura states that  
[t]raditionally, a state’s acts against its own citizens […] did not 
constitute war crimes; they had simply been ignored under 
international law […] There was a common understanding that the 
                                                 
19 Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law (The Hague, the Netherlands: T.M.C Asser Press, 
2005), p.40-41.  
20 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.7. 
International humanitarian law is the law of war; its key instruments are the Geneva Conventions.  
21 Cassese, p.30-31.  
22 ‘International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgement of 1 October 1946’, p.55, available at: 
<http://crimeofaggression.info/documents/6/1946_Nuremberg_Judgement.pdf> [accessed 5 
September 2014].  
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crimes committed by the Nazis were unprecedented both in scale and 
character and thus could not be treated with the then existing law.23  
In order to make such acts criminal under international law, the Allies had to create 
new categories of prosecutable crime. The existing laws of war did not outlaw some of 
the Nazi actions which were most morally repugnant, including the mass murder of 
German Jews. Crimes against humanity thus first appeared in international law as a 
concept created to fill a gap in existing legal provisions. 
Therefore, while the term ‘crimes against humanity’ had been used before 
1945,24 it was in that year during the discussions culminating in the drafting of the 
London Charter that it first entered the international legal lexicon to describe a crime 
which could realistically be prosecuted. The rather ad hoc development of the concept 
was troubling for some observers. Hannah Arendt writes that the definitions of crimes 
against humanity which developed through the Nuremberg tribunals were ‘fumbling’, 
and that ‘there was no other crime in the face of which the Nuremberg judges felt so 
uncomfortable, and which they left in a more tantalizing state of ambiguity.’25  
The Charter defined crimes against humanity as ‘murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against civilian 
populations, before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious 
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
                                                 
23 Madoka Futamura, War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice: The Tokyo Trial and the Nuremberg Legacy 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), pp.33-4. This was problematic because it required trying individuals for 
crimes which were not crimes when they were committed – ex post facto law. See Futamura p.32-5.  
24 For example, Gerhard Werle writes that the so-called ‘Martens clause’ in the Hague Conventions of 
1899 and 1907, which dealt with the conduct of war, ‘obligated the belligerent parties to obey the “laws of 
humanity.”’ (Werle, pp.288-9.) He also shows that the UK, Russia and France used the phrase ‘crimes 
against humanity’ to refer to the Armenian genocide in 1915-16, and that ‘[a]fter World War I, there was 
talk of prosecuting “offences against humanity”, but this was never accomplished.’ (Werle, p.289). 
Norman Geras has also shown that the phrase ‘crimes against humanity’ can be found in newspaper 
reports and politicians’ remarks – particularly describing the actions of the Nazis – in the years leading up 
to 1945. (Norman Geras, Crimes Against Humanity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011) pp.1-
13.) Although M. Cherif Bassiouni argues that the idea underlying the crimes against humanity concept, 
and ‘the notion of protecting civilians in times of war’, ‘was not new’, he nonetheless notes that the 
Charter ‘was the first instance in positive international criminal law in which the specific term “crimes 
against humanity” was identified and defined.’ (M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in 
International Criminal Law, 2nd rev’d edn (London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1999), p.1.)  
25 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (London: Penguin, 1977), p.257.  
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Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated.’26  
 
Today the Charter of the International Criminal Court states that crimes 
against humanity have occurred when any of a list of acts – including murder, rape, 
deportation, enforced disappearance and apartheid – has been committed ‘as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack.’27 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree writes that: 
[a] crime against humanity is a crime against “humaneness” that 
offends certain principles of law and which becomes the concern 
of the international community. It has repercussions beyond 
international frontiers or exceeds in magnitude or savagery any 
limits tolerated by modern civilisation.28    
Apartheid as a Crime Against Humanity 
Crimes against humanity, first prosecuted at Nuremberg, are significant for this 
chapter because in 1966 the General Assembly of the United Nations (GA) declared 
apartheid to be a crime against humanity for the first time.29 Though such a term seems 
                                                 
26 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (1945), art. 6(c), available at: 
<https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/350?OpenDocument> [accessed 1 September 2014]. However, 
while the Charter offered a definition of crimes against humanity for the first time, the definition set out 
did not have legal force outside of the Tribunal. 
27 The full list of acts is ‘(a) Murder; (b) Extermination; (c) Enslavement; (d) Deportation or forcible 
transfer of population; (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of 
fundamental rules of international law; (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) 
Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, gender…or other grounds (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of apartheid; (k) 
Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body 
or to mental or physical health.’ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art.7 (adopted 17 July 
1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UN Treaty Series 90 (Rome Statute), available at: 
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-
0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf> [accessed 23 August 2014].  
28 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.85.  
29 ‘The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa’ (adopted 16 December 
1966), UN General Assembly Resolution 2202 A (XXI), available at <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/005/05/IMG/NR000505.pdf?OpenElement> [accessed 2 
September 2014].  
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to have an obvious moral weightiness, the legal consequences of its application to the 
situation in South Africa were not clear-cut. The first reason for this is that resolutions 
of the GA do not directly create binding international law, even though over time they 
may contribute to the development of custom or general principles. What is most 
significant about GA resolutions is that, gradually and in concert, they contribute to 
shifts in understanding of underlying issues in international law.30  
This resolution, together with the focused and sustained attention many UN 
bodies paid to racial discrimination in South Africa, did contribute to the growing 
international opprobrium facing the South African government and convey a sense of 
moral outrage.  But in describing apartheid as, specifically, a crime against humanity, 
the GA was also trying to place it – and, crucially, those individuals who organized and 
maintained it – within the reach of the nascent framework of ICL and, at the same 
time, push the development of that framework itself in new directions. 
However after the IMT the development of ICL occurred in fits and starts. 
Gerhard Werle, for example, argues that there have been three significant moments in 
its evolution. After the writing of the Nuremberg Principles, the next significant events 
he identifies are the founding of the international criminal tribunals in Yugoslavia 
(ICTY, created in 1993) and Rwanda (ICTR, created in 1994), and then the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court by the Rome Statute (ICC, 2002).31 
There is a long gap in this account between Nuremberg and the ICTY, a gap which 
encompasses the entire duration of apartheid in South Africa. Cassese argues that even 
the statutes of the ICTR, ICTY and ICC have ‘not proved sufficient to build a 
coherent legal system’32 so it is unsurprising then that the UN’s much earlier attempts 
to use ICL in relation to apartheid were deeply hindered by the lacunae that resulted 
from this stop-start development; they did not occur against a background of sustained 
international commitment to the building of international criminal law standards.   
When in 1966 the GA declared that apartheid was a crime against humanity it 
was seeking to extend the definition of the term ‘crimes against humanity’ set out in 
                                                 
30 See Blaine Sloan, ‘General Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years Later)’, British Yearbook of 
International Law, 58.1 (1987), 39-150 
31 Werle, p.3.  
32 Cassese, p.5.  
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the London Charter by promoting an understanding of apartheid using the framework 
that the Allies had used to punish Nazi leaders. Because GA Resolutions do not 
directly create law, the effects of this were mostly rhetorical. However in 1976 the 1973 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, which 
made apartheid a crime against humanity with binding legal effect entered into force.33 
The Apartheid Convention sought to criminalize apartheid and make it, in theory, 
possible for individuals to be prosecuted for committing it. However, one of the 
                                                 
33 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, UN General 
Assembly Resolution 3068 (XXVIII) (adopted 30 November 1973, entered into force 18 July 1976) 1015 
UN Treaty Series. 243, available at: <http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cspca/cspca.html> [accessed 2 
September 2014].  
Defining what the Convention understands by the term apartheid, Article 2 states that ‘for the purpose of 
the present Convention’ apartheid, ‘which shall include similar policies and practices of racial segregation 
and discrimination as practised in southern Africa, shall apply to the following inhuman acts committed 
for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other 
racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them:  
(a) Denial to a member or members of a racial group or groups of the right to life and liberty of person: 
(i) By murder of members of a racial group or groups; 
(ii) By the infliction upon the members of a racial group or groups of serious bodily or mental harm, by 
the infringement of their freedom or dignity, or by subjecting them to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment; 
(iii) By arbitrary arrest and illegal imprisonment of the members of a racial group or groups; 
(b) Deliberate imposition on a racial group or groups of living conditions calculated to cause its or their 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(c) Any legislative measures and other measures calculated to prevent a racial group or groups from 
participation in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the country and the deliberate creation 
of conditions preventing the full development of such a group or groups, in particular by denying to 
members of a racial group or groups basic human rights and freedoms, including the right to work, the 
right to form recognized trade unions, the right to education, the right to leave and to return to their 
country, the right to a nationality, the right to freedom of movement and residence, the right to freedom 
of opinion and expression, and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association; 
d) Any measures including legislative measures, designed to divide the population along racial lines by the 
creation of separate reserves and ghettos for the members of a racial group or groups, the prohibition of 
mixed marriages among members of various racial groups, the expropriation of landed property 
belonging to a racial group or groups or to members thereof; 
(e) Exploitation of the labour of the members of a racial group or groups, in particular by submitting 
them to forced labour; 
(f) Persecution of organizations and persons, by depriving them of fundamental rights and freedoms, 
because they oppose apartheid. 
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distinctive features of the Nuremberg Trials did not obtain in this case: there was no 
effective court to try alleged offenders. In 1976 no international criminal court yet 
existed, and so none could try those accused of apartheid. Moreover, no dedicated 
court (such as at Nuremberg or like the international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia 
or Rwanda) was set up, despite discussions of both of these options.34  
The mechanism by which perpetrators could potentially be tried was extremely 
weak and ineffectual; as John Dugard states 
it was left to States to enact legislation to enable them to prosecute 
apartheid criminals on the basis of a form of universal jurisdiction. The 
Apartheid Convention allows State parties to prosecute non-nationals 
for a crime committed in the territory of a non-State party where the 
accused is physically within the jurisdiction of a State party.35  
This would require someone accused of the crime of apartheid to travel to the 
jurisdiction of a state which had both signed the treaty and also established its own, 
separate domestic legislation to try individuals for the crime of apartheid. 
Unsurprisingly, no international criminal prosecutions for the crime of apartheid were 
ever attempted.  
Such prosecutions became even less likely because of the lukewarm 
international reaction to the Apartheid Convention. Cassesse observes that ‘the 101 
states party to the Convention do not include any western country’ and this means that 
‘only two major segments of the international community (developing and eastern 
European countries) have agreed to label apartheid as an international crime, whereas 
another grouping, that of western states, has refused to do so.’36 Four states voted 
against the adoption of the Convention: South Africa, Portugal, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. The varying global ratification of the Convention has 
consequences for the legal status of apartheid as international treaties only bind those 
states which have signed them. International custom, another potential source of 
international law, can only develop where there has not been consistent opposition to 
the development of a concept. As so many states have not signed and ratified the 
Convention making apartheid a crime against humanity, Casssese argues that ‘[t]here is 
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therefore a case for maintaining that under customary international law apartheid, 
although probably prohibited as a state delinquency, is not, however, regarded as a 
crime entailing the criminal liability of individuals.’37  
By 1984, UK and US opinion on the issue had shifted, and the Security Council 
issued its own resolution describing apartheid as a crime against humanity.38 In 1998 the 
Rome Statute, creating the International Criminal Court, also included apartheid in the 
list of crimes against humanity it has jurisdiction over and Cassese argues that this 
suggests an international customary prohibition of apartheid as a crime against 
humanity, entailing individual criminal responsibility, might be developing. However, by 
1998, of course, apartheid in South Africa had been dismantled, and the prosecution of 
individuals for international crimes against humanity played no role at all in its 
conclusion. The description of apartheid as a crime against humanity was therefore a – 
completely unsuccessful – attempt to hold individuals legally responsible under the law 
for the development and maintenance of the apartheid system.  
Crimes Against Humanity in the TRC Report 
The TRC Report’s use of the description of apartheid as a crime against humanity 
is a clear example of the ambivalent way in which the Commission relates itself to legal 
structures and concepts, and of the key role human rights discourse plays in this 
ambivalence. Tutu writes in his Chairperson’s Foreword that  
the international community, and not just the Communist bloc, has 
already declared apartheid to be a crime against humanity. For the 
international community, indeed, this is no longer a point of debate 
[…] The world would indeed be surprised if the Commission had not 
found apartheid to be a crime against humanity.39  
He says this in the context of defending the Commission against imagined critics who 
might, Tutu imagines, ‘say “What did we tell you; what did you expect from such a 
skewed Commission packed with ‘struggle’ types”’.40 That is, Tutu situates the 
Commission’s description of apartheid as a crime against humanity in the context of 
(what he presents as) international consensus on the matter. The Commission’s 
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judgement, he argues, cannot be described as politically motivated or biased because 
the international repugnance at apartheid is such that it has united nations across the 
conventional political East-West divide. For the international community he argues, 
the question has been firmly settled – it is ‘no longer a point of debate.’41 
Then, in an appendix to the section of the first volume of the TRC Report dealing 
with the Commission’s mandate, it is again reiterated that ‘there is almost total 
unanimity within the international community that apartheid as a form of systematic 
racial discrimination constituted a crime against humanity’42 and that ‘the Commission 
- as part of the international human rights community - affirms [the international 
community’s] judgement.’43 This ‘recognition of apartheid as a crime against humanity’, 
the Report says ‘remains a fundamental starting point for reconciliation in South 
Africa.’44  
However, the appendix then states that  
[t]his sharing of the international community’s basic moral and legal 
position on apartheid should not be understood as a call for 
international criminal prosecution of those who formulated and 
implemented apartheid policies. Indeed, such a course would militate 
against the very principles on which this Commission was 
established.45  
International legal standards are evoked, but their relevance for the Commission is 
downplayed. As Mahmood Mamdani notes, ‘this is the last the Commission Report 
speaks of apartheid as a “crime against humanity,”’.46 Despite the way the UN had 
attempted to understand apartheid as a crime against humanity, the concept does not 
play much more of a conceptual or analytical role in the Report. It is set up as a certain 
kind of international standard, and yet it is discussed very briefly. The key defining 
feature of ICL – that it makes the prosecution of individuals possible under 
international law – is specifically dismissed.  
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There are two reasons for this; the first, as Mamdani points out, is a 
consequence of the way in which the Commission interprets its mandate and, in 
particular, how it defines and delimits the type of human rights abuses it is concerned 
with.47 The second has to do with the way the TRC fits into the wider project of 
national reconciliation, and, most importantly, the amnesty provisions. I will consider 
these reasons for the invocation and swift disappearance of apartheid as a crime 
against humanity, in turn. ICL holds individuals legally accountable. By considering the 
limited way in which crimes against humanity feature as an analytic framework in the 
TRC Report, what becomes apparent is the ambiguous relationship with international 
legal standards which characterizes the TRC, and the extent to which this is elaborated 
through human rights discourse.  
Defining ‘gross violations of human rights’ 
The TRC was established by the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act 34, 1995. The Act uses the concept of ‘gross violations of human 
rights’ to define what the Commission is tasked to investigate. Summarising that Act, 
the TRC’s Report says that  
Briefly stated, the Commission was given four major tasks in order to 
achieve the overall objectives of promoting national unity and 
reconciliation. These were:  
a) analysing and describing the ‘causes, nature and extent’ of gross 
violations of human rights that occurred between 1 March 1960 and 
10 May 1994, including the identification of the individuals and 
organisations responsible for such violations;  
b) making recommendations to the President on measures to prevent 
future violations of human rights; 
c) the restoration of the human and civil dignity of victims of gross 
human rights violations through testimony and recommendations to 
the President concerning reparations for victims; 
d) granting amnesty to persons who made full disclosure of relevant 
facts relating to acts associated with a political objective.48  
It might seem obvious or natural to characterize some of the horrifying events 
in South Africa during apartheid as ‘gross violations of human rights’. But there is 
nothing natural or given about this category, and it is not self-evident; tracing the way 
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in which the Report used it provides insight into the specificity of the concept. The 
centring of gross violations of human rights had consequences for the Commission’s 
work and for the way it characterized the history of apartheid. In particular, it led to a 
focus on egregious acts of violence committed against individuals – the structure of 
apartheid itself was, crucially, not understood as a gross violation in the Act’s terms. In 
Chapter Two I argued that decontextualization in human rights reports emphasizes 
individual suffering rather than the wider causes of violations. The TRC Report is 
careful to contextualize the gross violations of human rights it describes. But it 
nonetheless understands gross violations of human rights as violations of individual 
persons – apartheid itself is not understood as a gross violation of human rights.  
The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act defines the ‘gross 
violations of human rights’ the Commission is to ‘analyze and describe’, stating that the 
term means:  
the violation of human rights through- (a) the killing, abduction, torture 
or severe ill-treatment of any person; or (b) any attempt, conspiracy, 
incitement, instigation, command or procurement to commit an act 
referred to in paragraph (a), which emanated from conflicts of the past 
and which was committed during the period 1 March 1960 to the cut-off 
date within or outside the Republic, and the commission of which was 
carried out, advised, planned, directed, commanded or ordered, by any 
person acting with a political motive.49 
In this way, the Act delimited the scope of the violations of human rights the 
Commission was investigating in three key ways: it was to focus on ‘killing, torture or 
severe ill-treatment’ in a specified time limit50 and committed ‘with a political motive’.51  
The Act caused a number of difficulties for the Commission. As the Report says:  
[t]he Act used neutral concepts or terms to describe the various acts that 
constituted a gross violation of human rights. For example, ‘killing’ and 
‘abduction’ were used rather than murder or kidnapping. Clearly, the 
intention was to try to avoid introducing concepts with a particular 
content in terms of the applicable domestic criminal law. This was to 
avoid equating what was essentially a commission of enquiry with a court 
of law. If the full array of legal technicalities and nuances had been 
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introduced into the work and decision-making functions of the 
Commission, its task would have been rendered immensely complex and 
time-consuming.52 
In defining ‘gross violations of human rights’ the Act eschewed legal terms and 
concepts and instead chose ‘neutral’ ones.53 This introduces a problem which recurs 
throughout the Report. On the one hand the Commission was not a ‘court of law’ and 
so it had to distinguish its practices and, in this case, terms, from those associated with 
legal process.54 Gross violations of human rights were defined in ‘neutral’ terms, and 
not in legal ones.55 However, the suggestion that the ‘full array of legal technicalities 
and nuances’ (my italics) were not to be ‘introduced’ into the Commission suggests 
that certain of them had been.56 This implies that the Commission was forced to 
occupy an unusual space outside of the law proper, but in relationship to it.  
A particular difficulty arose over the definition of ‘severe ill-treatment’.57 The 
Report suggested that killing, abduction and torture are relatively simple to define, but 
that ‘severe ill-treatment’ is vaguer, potentially encompasses a wide range of violations 
and ‘is not a term that is recognised either in South African or in international law.’58 
The Report acknowledges that ‘[t]he ordinary meaning of “severe ill treatment” suggests 
that all those whose rights had been violated during the conflicts of the past were 
covered by this definition and fell, therefore, within the mandate of the Commission’.59 
That is, severe ill-treatment on the broader definition might have encompassed the 
forms and structures of apartheid itself, and the violations of rights that necessarily 
stemmed from them, just as the Apartheid Convention had defined the structure of 
apartheid itself as a crime against humanity. The Report noted that such a definition of 
‘severe ill-treatment’ had in fact been proposed by ‘a number of organisations and 
groups representing, for example, victims of forced removals and Bantu education.’60 
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The Commission ultimately rejected this wider definition of ‘severe ill-
treatment’. Although it ‘recognised that large-scale human rights violations were 
committed through legislation designed to enforce apartheid, through security 
legislation designed to criminalise resistance to the state, and through similar legislation 
passed by governments in the homelands’ it decided that such violations were not what 
the Act meant by ‘gross violations of human rights.’61 Instead, ‘the Commission 
resolved that its mandate was to give attention to human rights violations committed 
as specific acts, resulting in severe physical and/or mental injury.’62 By this it meant 
‘[a]cts or omissions that deliberately and directly inflict severe mental or physical 
suffering on a victim, taking into account the context and nature of the act or omission 
and the nature of the victim.’63  
The Report created an ‘illustrative’64 list of such acts, which included rape and 
sexual assault, ‘physical beating resulting in serious injuries’, ‘mutilation (including 
amputation of body parts, breaking of bones, pulling out of nails, hair, or teeth or 
scalping)’, ‘punitive solitary confinement’; shootings and injuries during 
demonstrations, burnings, ‘injury by poison, drugs or other chemicals’; ‘detention 
without charge or trial’; ‘banning or banishment’ ‘deliberate withholding of food and 
water to someone in custody’ , ‘deliberate failure to provide medical attention to ill or 
injured persons in custody and ‘the destruction of a person’s house through arson or 
other attacks which made it impossible for the person to live there again.’65 
While the Report acknowledged that the system of apartheid itself, the racial 
discrimination it was based on, and the kinds of deprivation it imposed on black South 
Africans were violations of human rights, it crucially did not consider these to be the 
gross violations of human rights it was required to describe and analyse. It focused 
instead on the extremes of violence committed within and against the apartheid 
system, not apartheid itself. As Richard Wilson writes, this ‘surprised observers who 
expected that the Report would put “apartheid on trial”’.66 As with decontextualization 
in Chapter Two then, human rights are associated with particular violations committed 
                                                 
61 TRC Report, vol.1, p.65.  
62 TRC Report, vol.1, p.64.  
63 TRC Report, vol.1, p.80.  
64 TRC Report, vol. 1, p.82.  
65 TRC Report, vo.1, p.81 
66 Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa, p.51.  
153 
 
against individuals, especially where these are spectacular and extreme, rather than with 
structural violence.   
This is why, Mamdani argues, the concept of apartheid as a crime against 
humanity has little practical application or use in the TRC Report; the focus in the Report 
was not on apartheid itself, but rather on the murders, torture, abductions and severe 
mental and physical injury which resulted from the attempts to either maintain or 
destroy the system. It is these and only these which the Commission defines as gross 
violations of human rights. For the Commission, Mamdani writes, ‘injustice is no 
longer the injustice of apartheid: forced removals, pass laws, broken families. Instead, 
the definition of injustice has come to be limited to abuses within the legal framework 
of apartheid: detention, torture, murder.’67 It is not quite accurate to say that this is 
what the Commission understood by injustice. It clearly acknowledges how unjust the 
system of apartheid was. What is at stake is not injustice but, instead, the definition of 
‘gross violations of human rights: it is human rights which require the ‘neutral’68 words, 
and which are used to avoid defining apartheid as a crime against humanity.  
Amnesty and the TRC 
 In the context of discussing apartheid as a crime against humanity, the Report 
stated: 
[the] sharing of the international community’s basic moral and legal 
position on apartheid should not be understood as a call for 
international criminal prosecution of those who formulated and 
implemented apartheid policies. Indeed, such a course would militate 
against the very principles on which this Commission was 
established.69  
Prosecution – national or international – was not at the centre of the national attempts 
to deal with the past, although some domestic trials did take place. Instead, an amnesty 
procedure for perpetrators of human rights violations was implemented.  
This focus on the part of the TRC on amnesty underlines again its quasi-legality 
– its ambiguous positioning in relation to full legality. For example, the Report states 
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that a ‘middle path was required, something that lay between a Nuremberg option and 
total amnesia. The choice, ultimately, was for amnesty with a considerable degree of 
accountability built into it.’70 This ‘middle path’,71 which aimed at the completion of 
some of the functions normally associated with trials and their legal process, but which 
was nonetheless distinct in important ways, was associated with and articulated 
through human rights discourse. 
The provisions for amnesty were a significant point of contention during the 
transition. As Paul van Zyl writes: 
amnesty became the final obstacle to transition to democracy: only a 
few months before the scheduled elections, generals in command of 
the South African police delivered a veiled warning to the ANC that 
they would not support or safeguard the electoral process if it led to 
the establishment of a government that intended to prosecute and 
imprison members of the police force.72  
A measure of the difficulty of coming to an agreement on the question of amnesty is 
indicated by the fact that, as van Zyl writes, ‘[t]he amnesty agreement occurred so late 
in the process that it had to be added onto the end of the interim Constitution in the 
form of a “Postamble”’.73  
According to the TRC Report, it was ‘settled relatively early’ that ‘there would be 
no Nuremberg-type trials for the many human rights violations legally committed in 
the course of implementing apartheid.74 Furthermore, it was agreed that there would be 
some form of amnesty for politically-motivated offences committed in the past.’75 But 
the main source of controversy was the form this amnesty would take. The TRC Report 
states that ‘[t]he government insisted on a form of blanket amnesty, while most other 
parties demanded that amnesty should be linked to some form of truth commission 
process.’76  
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 The solution chosen in the end was a process whereby individuals were required 
to apply for amnesty. This was a unique development, not something which had been 
previously attempted in other truth commissions; as the Report says  
[t]he most important difference between the South African 
Commission and others was that it was the first to be given the power 
to grant amnesty to individual perpetrators. No other state had 
combined this quasi-judicial power with the investigative tasks of a 
truth-seeking body.77  
As Paul Gready notes ‘amnesty for specific acts was made conditional on full 
disclosure and political motive’.78 The TRC did not provide a general, blanket amnesty; 
instead, it would consider applications for amnesty for particular individuals in 
exchange for their telling the truth about their acts, where those acts were committed 
for a political purpose. 
The Report acknowledges when it describes the amnesty procedures as ‘quasi-
judicial’ that this unprecedented requirement to dispense amnesty for individuals 
meant that the TRC had to adopt legalistic mechanisms and pay careful attention to 
due process.79 Gready for example argues that when other truth commissions have 
named perpetrators, the process constituted ‘a finding of moral and political 
responsibility, not a legal judgement of guilt […] it is generally agreed that the lesser 
punishment of naming, possibly bringing with it a degree of public shaming and 
stigma, requires fewer due process protections.’80 However, the TRC’s case was very 
different; it didn’t just name perpetrators in its Report, ‘it combined hearings with both 
the making of findings in its report and an amnesty process.’81  
Because of this more complicated context for the naming of perpetrators, he 
argues, ‘the hearings and the final Report became bogged down in a hugely time- and 
resource-intensive exercise of providing those to be named with reasonable prior 
notice and sufficient information to enable them to make representations and 
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respond.’82 Indeed Tutu’s foreword discusses the Commission’s ‘dual responsibility’ in 
these terms: ‘[i]t had to provide the space within which victims could share the story of 
their trauma with the nation’ but it also ‘had to recognise the importance of the due 
process of law that ensures the rights of alleged perpetrators. Several court rulings 
emphasised the importance of the latter.’83 
Amnesty and its legal consequences thus became entangled with the process of 
naming perpetrators and bringing to light what happened in the past. For this reason, 
due process, and other features associated with the legal system became increasingly 
important. For example, legal scholar Alison Bisset observes that: 
the TRC was not a truly non-judicial body. It was involved in legalistic 
proceedings that gave it a judicial aura. The sole purpose of the high-
profile Amnesty Committee was to adjudicate on individual involvement 
in politically motivated crimes and delicts. Its proceedings followed an 
adversarial process. Committee members had legal training and panels 
were chaired by active or retired judges.84 
Richard A. Wilson has argued that because the TRC was ‘required […] to fill the legal 
vacuum (for example, in naming perpetrators) left by the amnesty provisions’85 it 
adopted an ‘over-legalistic perspective’.86 Such an approach, he argues, meant that the 
TRC ‘ended up on the terrain of the courts, not on the terrain of the historians.’87 
The quasi-legality of the TRC’s amnesty procedures was linked with, and 
articulated through, human rights discourse. For example, the Report states that: 
[i]n helping reveal details of gross human rights violations and the 
systems, motives and perspectives that made such violations possible, 
the amnesty process assisted the Commission in compiling as 
‘complete a picture as possible of the nature, causes and extent’ of 
past gross violations of human rights. The information acquired also 
helped the Commission in formulating recommendations aimed at the 
prevention of future human rights violations.88 
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Wilson, a strong critic of South Africa’s TRC, also associates human rights and amnesty; 
in fact, he argues that the ‘most damaging outcome of truth commissions is a result of 
their equating human rights with reconciliation and amnesty’ which ‘delegitimizes them 
enormously in relation to popular understandings of justice’.89 
Truth in the TRC Report 
At the same time, although the amnesty procedures introduced what Bisset 
describes as a ‘judicial aura’90 to the Commission, the Report also explicitly distinguished 
the Commission’s approach from the operations of the law. In so doing, it argued that 
truth commissions were more effective than trials in one area in particular: in reaching 
the truth. Tutu’s foreword baldly states that  
[t]he Malan trials and the Goniwe inquest have […] shown us that, 
because such legal proceedings rely on proof beyond reasonable 
doubt, the criminal justice system is not the best way to arrive at the 
truth. There is no incentive for perpetrators to tell the truth and often 
the court must decide between the word of one victim against the 
evidence of many perpetrators.91  
For the Commission, then, as Alison Bisset writes, ‘truth seeking was prioritised over 
the pursuit of criminal justice’ and ‘[a]mnesty […] acted as a ‘carrot’ to encourage 
former perpetrators to offer testimony to the Commission so that it could fulfil its 
mandate of establishing the truth about the past and creating a shared understanding 
from which to move forward.’92 Amnesty incentivized truth-telling in a way the Report 
argued that criminal trials could not accomplish; the law, it suggested, is lacking in its 
ability to access the truth.  
As Tutu writes in his foreword, through the amnesty procedures '[f]reedom was 
granted in exchange for truth'.93 But this of course invites many questions about how 
truth is to be understood in this context. The Report famously distinguishes between 
four ways of understanding truth: factual or forensic truth; personal or narrative truth; 
social or ‘dialogue’ truth and healing and restorative truth.’94 By factual or forensic 
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truth, the Report meant ‘[t]he familiar legal or scientific notion of bringing to light 
factual, corroborated evidence, of obtaining accurate information through reliable 
(impartial, objective) procedures.’95 It was in the service of this kind of truth that the 
Report made findings on individual human rights violations (‘what happened to whom, 
where, when and how, and who was involved?’96) and on the trends in and causes of 
gross violations of human rights. By narrative truth, the Commission referred to the 
individual perceptions and understandings of particular people; not the official or 
historical record, but the story as variously understood by the people involved. In this 
way, the Commission aimed to guarantee that ‘the truth about the past included the 
validation of the individual subjective experiences of people who had previously been 
silenced or voiceless.’97 
Social or ‘dialogue’ truth meant the truth that emerged from a multi-sided 
consultation process, a truth that was based on the views of as many people as 
possible; not a partial truth or a victors’ truth, but a carefully comprehensive truth, 
established through consultation. The Report states that  
not only the actual outcome or findings of an investigation counted. 
The process whereby the truth was reached was itself important 
because it was through this process that the essential norms of social 
relations between people were reflected.98  
Healing and restorative truth referred to the necessity of hearing and placing on record 
the suffering that been experienced during apartheid: the kind of truth that would aid 
the reconciliation of the nation. The Report states that ‘[i]t is not merely the actual 
knowledge about past human rights violations that counts’ because ‘often the basic 
facts about what happened are already known, at least by those who were affected. 
What is critical is that these facts be fully and publicly acknowledged.’99 Truths play 
social roles and have social meanings, the Report argued, and healing truth is ‘the kind 
of truth that places facts and what they mean within the context of human 
relationships- both amongst citizens and between the state and its citizens.’100  
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The Report’s distinction between different types of truth has been widely debated. 
Deborah Posel, for example, writes that  
[t]his is a very wobbly, poorly constructed conceptual grid. The 
grounds for differentiating the four types of truth are poorly specified 
and remain rather opaque. For example, the marker of 'healing truth' 
(putting truth in the context of human relationships) seems largely to 
reiterate the criterion for social truth (reflecting the essential norms of 
social relations).101  
Furthermore, she argues,  
definitional problems aside, the typology of truths restates the original 
challenge, of how to manage the tensions between competing 
versions and perspectives on the past. If the 'forensic' version of 
events is at odds with the ‘social’ truth in any particular community, 
on what basis is the conflict to be adjudicated?102  
Similarly, Wilson writes that ‘the plural model of truth is made up of discrete 
elements, and it is unclear how the elements are meant to relate to one another. The 
Report gives no guidance about the four categories of truth might be connected, 
integrated and synthesised.’103 Moreover, he argues, ‘[o]nly one of four types – forensic 
truth – is granted any epistemological value in the process of creating knowledge about 
the past.’104 The need to uncover and reveal the truth is presented in the Report as the 
central theoretical reason for the preference for a truth commission methodology over 
a legal process, though there were of course practical and political reasons too.  
As we have seen, the Report linked the amnesty process to the demands of 
human rights: 
[i]n helping reveal details of gross human rights violations and the 
systems, motives and perspectives that made such violations possible, 
the amnesty process assisted the Commission in compiling as 
‘complete a picture as possible of the nature, causes and extent’ of 
past gross violations of human rights.105 
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In this context, notions of truth became central to the Report’s articulation of the 
Commission’s task – it was granting ‘freedom […] in exchange for truth’106 – yet it 
becomes apparent on reading the Report how unwieldy are the understandings of truth 
which it employs. 
Ariel Dorfman’s Death and the Maiden 
It is here that the place of the literary begins to emerge: it is in order to articulate 
the value of truth that Desmond Tutu refers to Ariel Dorfman’s Death and the Maiden. 
The play is used as a type of evidence for his argument about the importance of 
bringing the truth to light. South Africa could not have adopted a strategy of forgetting 
the events of the past in the attempt to move forward, he writes, because  
such amnesia would have resulted in further victimisation of victims by 
denying their awful experiences. In Ariel Dorfmann’s play, Death and the 
Maiden, a woman ties up the man who has injured her. She is ready to kill 
him when he repeats his lie that he did not rape or torture her. It is only 
when he admits his violations that she lets him go. His admission 
restores her dignity and her identity. Her experience is confirmed as real 
and not illusory and her sense of self is affirmed.107 
Here Tutu is using a literary example to make the case that the truth can be healing and 
restorative. But this description of Death and the Maiden is surprising in a number of 
ways.  
First, Tutu fails to mention what the play makes specific about its political 
context. A reader of the Report unfamiliar with the play would have no sense of the 
extent to which – far from dealing with a universal, archetypal or non-specific woman 
and man or injury – it is rooted in a particular type of political situation, one of direct 
relevance to the TRC. The violence committed against ‘the woman’ is likewise of a 
specifically delineated type, placed in the context of a wider political system with 
obvious real-world parallels. Death and the Maiden is set during a period of transition to 
democracy, in a country which is not named, although Dorfman is Chilean and has 
discussed the way Chile’s transition influenced and inspired the play, and the links 
between the Chilean transition and the South African:  
[i]n a transition to democracy as in Chile, Bolivia, South Africa, there 
are different reasons why people do not want to remember. They say, 
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Look, if we keep on stirring up the past it’s going to destroy us. This includes 
many who were themselves repressed, hurt or part of the resistance. 
Gerardo in Death and the Maiden does that.108 
The play begins with a chance encounter between two men, Roberto and 
Gerardo, which leads to Gerardo’s wife Paulina holding Roberto hostage, believing 
him to be the ‘Doctor Miranda’ who had raped and abused her when she was a 
political prisoner during the previous regime. Gerardo has just been appointed a 
member of the Commission which is to investigate, he says, ‘human rights violations 
that ended in death or the presumption of death’ during that period.109  
Death and the Maiden is thus explicitly concerned with political violence and how 
past violations can be dealt with in newly democratic countries. This link is not alluded 
to in the foreword. It could perhaps be argued that the play’s popularity allowed Tutu 
to assume a degree of familiarity with the play on the part of readers (although, surely, 
not all readers): the play was first performed in its final version at the London 
International Festival of Theatre at the Royal Court in July 1991. It became 
enormously popular thereafter, with West End and Broadway runs, and by 1995 it had 
been staged in 57 countries.110 In 1994, the Roman Polanski-directed film version was 
released. However in describing the play without explicitly acknowledging the extent to 
which it deals with transitional justice, the foreword goes against the grain of critical 
opinion, which has tended to see this as central to its appeal for and resonance with 
audiences. Robert A. Morace, for example, writes: 
Dorfman had been able to take the century's pulse because the changing 
but still precarious political situation in Chile coincided with equally 
momentous changes occurring in many of the countries eager to stage 
his play […] productions in various countries allow for and adapt to 
significant differences within the set of seeming similarities both inherent 
in and evoked by Dorfman's text.111 
But when the play’s explicit engagement with truth commissions is not 
acknowledged, it can be used almost as objective evidence for the proposition that the 
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recognition of the truth about the past allows for a movement beyond victim status. 
This is one of the assumptions on which the TRC was based. Claire Moon writes that 
the ‘discourse of healing the individual, social, and political body became the hallmark 
of the TRC’: 
providing the language through which the effects of violent conﬂict in 
South Africa were understood and responses to it devised. Truth-telling 
was the key ‘therapy’ by which the TRC sought to address national and 
individual trauma […] [this] model is grounded in a grammar of trauma 
and suffering underpinned by claims that repressed memory causes 
untold and ongoing psychological problems; that ‘revealing’ or truth-
telling leads to healing; and that ‘closure’ on the past must be reached in 
order for the present to be lived and the future to be faced.112  
The TRC did not and, because of the unprecedented size and public nature of what it 
was attempting, could not provide much empirical evidence for the therapeutic 
assumptions it employed. But by divorcing Death and the Maiden from the context in 
which it was written, the foreword can invoke it as a more general lesson about dealing 
with the past, one which seems independent from the logic of truth commissions and 
their place in human rights discourse; the play seems to speak with a universal 
meaning. In this way Tutu’s reference to the play resembles a pattern I have noted 
throughout this thesis in relation to human rights discourse, in which the fact of injury 
tends to take rhetorical precedence over its social rootedness. 
But it is not merely the case that the play explicitly engages with truth 
commissions – it does so critically. Central to Death and the Maiden is an interrogation of 
the assumptions which underlie the institutional formation of the truth commission. In 
the play, getting to the truth is an intrinsically complex and never fully resolved 
process, even on the relatively mundane and small-scale personal level. At the very 
beginning, Gerardo claims that he has come home to ask his wife about her opinion of 
his serving on the Commission. But then Paulina, says: ‘[y]ou already said yes to the 
president, didn’t you? The truth, Gerardo. Or are you going to start your work on The 
Commission with a lie?’113 She has to ask again – ‘You told the president you accepted, 
didn’t you? Before you asked me? Didn’t you? I need the truth’ – before he reveals that 
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she is right.114 Before the truth is revealed – and on a fairly insignificant matter, 
between only two people – there is, as Paulina says, a lie, and this works to 
problematize, from the play’s outset, the difficulties likely to be faced in dealing with 
the truth about ‘human rights violations that ended in death or the presumption of 
death’ on the national level.115 Even Gerardo has certain doubts about the 
Commission’s work: ‘[w]hat this country needs is justice, but if we can determine at 
least part of the truth…’116 Within the play, justice as the refused alternative to the 
truth commission is explicitly acknowledged.  
Furthermore, when she takes Roberto hostage, Paulina is attempting a kind of 
revenge, vigilante justice which is explicitly contrasted with what the text’s truth 
commission will be able to accomplish, and the comparison between the two methods 
of dealing with the past is never settled emphatically in favour of truth commissions. 
When he is trying to persuade her to let Roberto go, Gerardo says  
[i]magine what would happen if everyone acted like you did. You satisfy 
your own personal passion, you punish on your own, while the other 
people in this country with scores of other problems who finally have a 
chance to solve some of them, those people can just go screw themselves 
– the whole return to democracy can go screw itself – ’117  
He tells her to ‘[l]et him go […] For the good of the country, for our own good.’118 If 
she kills Roberto, she might put the whole commission in jeopardy: ‘[m]y 
Commission? What Commission? Thanks to you, we may not even be able to 
investigate all the other crimes that – and I’m going to have to resign.’119 For her part, 
Paulina questions the commission’s ability to bring about acceptable solutions: ‘[t]he 
Commission can investigate the crimes but nobody is punished for them?’120 
Moreover, even if we accept as the foreword does that Roberto ‘admits his 
violations’121 (and this is also questionable, as I’ll discuss below) he does so at gunpoint, 
fearing that he is about to be killed. If ‘[h]is admission restores her dignity and her 
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identity’122 as the foreword states, then it is the hearing of an admission which is 
entirely tangled up with the reversal of power and with the holding of complete 
control over somebody who has gravely injured her. In the play, Paulina does not just 
hear a (questionable) account of what was done to her, she is also able to point a gun 
at the person she believes to be responsible; she is able to make him feel afraid. 
Whatever ‘dignity’ and ‘identity’123 is restored to her – and this, again, is debateable; 
there is very little evidence for the foreword’s argument about this in the play at all – it 
seems to have been restored not by the admission, but the opportunity to take revenge. 
The play holds out the possibility that truth commissions may not be the kind of 
solution to past injustices that victims desire, or need, in order to begin the process of 
recovery.  
On the one hand, then, Tutu does not mention the specifically located aspects of 
the play. However, on the other, the foreword interprets Death and the Maiden’s ending 
in such a way as to disregard central, crucial ambiguities. The foreword states that 
Paulina ‘is ready to kill him when he repeats his lie that he did not rape or torture her. 
It is only when he admits his violations that she lets him go.’124 Even critics such as 
Adam Geary, who is explicitly discussing the literariness of the foreword, have tended 
to read Death and the Maiden according to Tutu’s interpretation. Geary writes that 
‘Dorfman's play presents the torturer who takes responsibility for his acts, and, in so 
doing, allows the person who he has tortured to recover a sense of self.’125 However, 
the status of Roberto’s admission is ambiguous. Paulina has never fully told her 
husband Gerardo about what happened to her when she was in jail. When she does so, 
he repeats the story to Roberto, so that Roberto can tell it back to Paulina, so that, 
having heard him finally confess his guilt, she will let him go. Paulina hears the 
confession, but then says ‘[y]ou know the only thing that’s missing now, Doctor, the 
one thing I need to make this day really truly perfect? […] To kill you.’126 With the gun 
pointed at him, Roberto then reveals to Paulina Gerardo’s help in constructing the 
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admission of guilt, claiming once again to be innocent: ‘[t]hat confession, ma’am … It’s 
false. […] Your husband told me what to write.’127  
She has predicted this, and tells Roberto that she changed several small details in 
the story when telling it to Gerardo, anticipating that if he really was the Doctor who 
abused her, he will correct them to ensure total accuracy in the interest of sparing his 
life. She says: 
[i]t turned out just as I planned. You were so scared that if you didn’t get 
it right…But I’m not going to kill you because you’re guilty, Doctor, but 
because you haven’t repented at all. I can only forgive someone who 
really repents.128  
In the penultimate scene Roberto is on his knees in front of Paulina as she points a 
gun at him, before a giant mirror descends, forcing the audience to look at themselves. 
Although she says that she will not kill him if he repents, at no point does Roberto 
confess to being the Doctor. Paulina believes that she has caught him out, and this is a 
persuasive reading, but he does not ‘admit’; whether or not he is the person who 
tortured her is a question the play leaves open. 
Moreover, it is not clear that she ‘lets him go’.129 In the final scene, Gerardo and 
Paulina are at a concert hall when Roberto ‘enters under a light which has a faint 
phantasmagoric moonlight quality. He could be real or he could be an illusion in 
PAULINA’s head.’130 Gerardo is the only character to talk in this scene - a monologue 
in which he talks about the conclusion of the commission’s work, and the production 
of its final report. Because he has argued earlier that he would be unable to take part in 
the commission if Paulina kills Roberto, we might assume that, given his evident 
participation in it, she let Roberto live. On the other hand, the music that is played at 
the very end of the play, the music the characters are listening to at the concert, is 
Schubert’s Death and the Maiden.131 The Doctor had played Schubert when torturing 
prisoners, and Paulina has previously linked her future ability to be able to listen to the 
piece, which had been one of her favourites, to the killing of Roberto:  
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[y]ou know the only thing that’s missing now, Doctor, the one thing I 
need to make this day really truly perfect? […] To kill you. So I can listen 
to my Schubert without thinking that you’ll also be listening to it, soiling 
my day and my Schubert and my country and my husband. That’s what I 
need…132  
Similarly, when she has first tied him to the chair, she says ‘now I’ll be able to listen to 
my Schubert again, even go to a concert like we used to.’133 This ambiguity here is 
crucial. Watching the play, the audience is supposed to be unsure whether or not 
Paulina has killed Roberto or let him go, a question the foreword settles. In her critical 
study of Dorfman’s work, Sophia McClennen notes that ‘[c]ritics are as divided on 
what to make of the ending as they are on whether or not Miranda is guilty.’134 
Finally, the mention of the play in the Report is interesting because Death and the 
Maiden also includes what might be read as a cautionary note about a certain 
vulnerability which, it implies, is inherent in works of art. Describing what she had 
suffered, Paulina says, speaking of the Doctor, 
[a]t first, I thought he would save me. He was so soft, so – nice, after 
what the others had done to me. And then, all of a sudden, I heard a 
Schubert quartet. There is no way of describing what it means to hear 
that wonderful music in the darkness, when you haven’t eaten for the last 
three days, when your body is falling apart, when …135  
This is the moment at which the speaker shifts and Roberto begins to narrate the story. 
He says:  
I would put on the music because it helped me in my role, the role of 
good guy, as they call it, I would put on Schubert because it was a way of 
gaining prisoners’ trust. But I also knew it was a way of alleviating their 
suffering. You’ve got to believe it was a way of alleviating their 
suffering.136  
Because the ‘wonderful music’ is so associated with the torture she endured, Paulina is 
unable to listen to it from then on: 
[o]ne night we were dining with – they were extremely important people, 
and our hostess happened to put Schubert on, a piano sonata, and I 
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thought, do I switch it off or do I leave, but my body decided for me, I 
felt extremely ill right then and there.137  
Schubert’s music is at once very important to the play’s characters, and shown to 
be vulnerable to co-option. Paulina’s love for the music cannot survive what the music 
has been the background to in her life. There is of course no parallel at all between the 
use of a piece of music in the context of torture and the reference to a play in a truth 
and reconciliation report. But what the play suggests through its references to Schubert 
is that in a certain way art does not hold its form; it is contingent, its meanings shaped 
by circumstance. This acts as a note of caution, at least, concerning the extent to which 
art can be vulnerable in relation to the context of its invocation. The way Death and the 
Maiden is itself invoked in the TRC Report shows Tutu turning to literary writing in 
order to defend the Commission’s quasi-legality, underlining the problematic 
association of literature with the truth.  
Truth and the Literary 
Literary theorist Mark Sanders has argued that the TRC’s hearings displayed an 
openness to the literary. He defines this openness as the ability to operate within, and 
make meaning through, a space beyond the opposition of truth and falsehood. 
Nonetheless, as we have seen, when the Report tried to express and describe this aspect 
of the hearings they did so using the term ‘narrative truth’.138 Sanders argues that this is 
to reintroduce the legalistic conception of truth that the hearings themselves were able 
to transcend. To this extent, his argument develops some of the issues that are at stake 
in Tutu’s reference to Death and the Maiden.  
Narrative truth is, Sanders writes, ‘never quite defined’139 in the Report, but it 
tends to be described using the phrase story-telling. For example, the Report states: 
[b]y telling their stories, both victims and perpetrators gave meaning to 
the multi-layered experiences of the South African story […] The stories 
told to the Commission were not presented as arguments or claims in a 
court of law. Rather, they provided unique insights into the pain of South 
Africa’s past.140  
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However, for Sanders it is problematic to understand such storytelling through the 
notion of narrative truth. Ambiguity is central to the meaning of the literary; literature 
does not make a truth claim or tell lies, it is outside or beyond the dichotomy of 
truth/falsehood. What was crucial about the space the hearings opened, he argues, was 
that it allowed victims to tell the kind of stories that did not have to be judged to be 
true or false.   
The Report acknowledges this literariness, as it seeks to define exactly what the 
stories that were told at the hearing were, through distinguishing them from 
‘arguments or claims in a court of law’.141 But by then inserting such stories into a 
framework centrally concerned with truth, Sanders suggests, something essential and 
unique to literariness, and, crucially, what was literary about the hearings, might be lost. 
‘Truth’ introduces a return to the evidentiary, legalistic logic the Report ostensibly 
distances itself from: 
[b]y putting them under the heading of ‘narrative truth,’ the report runs 
the risk of exposing literature and orature to procedures of verification 
and falsification that have a limited bearing on what it is to tell a story 
and […] to ask a question, which, for the presiding commissioner, as for 
anyone else, is to call forth, and even propose a shape to, a story.142  
In the process of speaking and listening, of collaboratively bringing a story into 
being through questions and answers – as we do in ordinary life all the time, and which 
took on a unique and powerful purpose in the hearings – the concern is not primarily 
with obtaining and describing the truth but with something else.143 This something else 
is an essentially literary quality, because it can also be located in literary texts and the 
type of relationship they imply between reader and writer.   
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Moreover, as Sanders points out, processes of questioning and answering 
inevitably involve the counterfactual: ‘[a] question to an other presupposes foreignness, 
or dissimulated foreignness, and thus the projection of a possible world, either of the 
other, or of an alternative to that of the other.’144 When asking questions, the 
questioner allows for the existence of what happened and, crucially, what could have 
happened, of alternatives, of different versions of the story. Questions and answers 
assume and, crucially, invoke the possibility that things could have happened 
differently. Just as in Socratic dialogues, in which one party will sometimes espouse 
positions which are not actually believed in, evoking imaginative but to-be-disavowed 
possibilities in order to produce certain kinds of responses or to direct the 
conversation in a particular way, at the TRC, the questioners, in order to ask their 
questions, would feign a kind of ignorance. Sometimes the witnesses would do this 
too, as they asked counter-questions.145 In this way, through this adopting of positions 
and a particular kind of pretending, Sanders suggests, something occurred at the TRC 
which was ‘in the realm of fable and fictionality.’146  
Sanders’ argument helps to elucidate what happens when Tutu reads Death and 
the Maiden. Sanders suggests that the literary can be identified where what is at stake is 
neither truth nor falsity and I have been arguing that this is precisely the aspect of the 
play that Tutu does not acknowledge. The play’s meaning resides in the way we can 
never fully know whether or not the Doctor ‘admits his violation’ or what effect such 
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an ‘admission’ would have on Paulina.147 The play opens a number of possibilities open 
to the audience, but never fully resolves them.  
Tutu refers to Death and the Maiden to argue that it demonstrates the restorative 
capabilities of truth. The literary text is thus evoked precisely at the moment of most 
tension for the quasi-legal: it is supposed to show what truth can do that the law cannot, 
and in this way the literary takes on an association with the category of truth. My 
argument is that this brief moment has a wider significance. In the first part of this 
chapter I argued that the TRC was a quasi-legal body which was related to but not quite 
of the law, and I showed how human rights discourse was crucial for the description and 
justification of the Commission’s quasi-legality.  
For example, crimes against humanity require the prosecution of individual 
perpetrators. But the concept of gross violations of human rights allowed an alternative 
quasi-legal framework to be articulated which did not necessitate such prosecutions. As 
we saw, that was why, in defining gross violations of human rights, the TRC’s 
constitutive act used the terms ‘“killing” and “abduction” […] rather than murder or 
kidnapping. […] to try to avoid introducing concepts with a particular content in terms 
of the applicable domestic criminal law.’148 The quasi-judiciality of the amnesty 
procedure and its ‘judicial aura’149 was also explained and, crucially, justified through 
reference to the concept of gross violations of human rights: the amnesty process is said 
to ‘reveal details of gross human rights violations and the systems, motives and 
perspectives that made such violations possible.’150 Human rights discourse thus 
provides the rationale for the Commission’s quasi-legality. It was because of the 
Commission’s quasi-legality that the concept of truth became so important, and so 
fraught, for the Report. When Tutu reads Death and the Maiden he does so in such a way as 
to suggest that the play reveals what is lacking in the law – the law’s failure to access 
truth in its fullest sense. The play is therefore used to suggest the benefits of quasi-
legality. 
This has similarities with a model of reading we have encountered before. 
Slaughter argues that the Bildungsroman is important for human rights discourse 
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because international law is weak and so the novel can take on some of its functions. 
There is a parallel here – in both cases, literature is turned to when the law fails to match 
up to the purposes of human rights. Tutu’s reading of Death and the Maiden indicates 
some of the problems with this move: the play’s ambiguities have no place in such a 
reading. Consequently, in the final part of this chapter and in the next, I ask whether 
there are any alternatives to a model of the relationship between literature and human 
rights which understands literature to compensate for human rights’ quasi-legality.  
The Interim Constitution  
Aside from the TRC, human rights discourse also played a crucial role in 
another area of South Africa’s transition: the drafting of the interim Constitution. In 
1990, Nelson Mandela was released from prison, and the major opposition movements 
– the African National Congress (ANC) the Pan-African Congress (PAC) and the South 
African Communist Party (SACP) – were unbanned. The ruling National Party (NP), 
led by F.W. de Klerk, then began to repeal apartheid legislation. In February 1992, 
formal talks on the future governance of South Africa began. In their book on the new 
Constitution eventually produced by these talks, Lauren Segal and Sharon Cort explain 
that: 
[t]here would be a two-stage transition. During the first stage, an 
unrepresentative body, initially called Codesa and then the Multi-party 
Negotiating Forum, would negotiate an interim constitution that 
would contain a set of Constitutional Principles. In the second stage, a 
new democratic parliament would double as a Constitutional 
Assembly and would be responsible for writing the final constitution. 
The new text had to comply with the Constitutional Principles 
entrenched in the first stage.151  
It is worth underlining how much was at stake in the negotiation process. The 
negotiations were accompanied by violence, and though the transition ultimately led to 
free and fair election and produced a progressive, rights-respecting Constitution, this 
was by no means a given from the outset. As Richard Wilson notes 
[d]uring the negotiations, the NP was forced into significant 
concessions, notably to shift its position away from group rights to 
individual rights. Until late 1993, the NP had clung to an ideology of 
                                                 
151 Lauren Segal and Sharon Cort, One Law, One Nation: The Making of the South African Constitution 
(Sunnyside, Auckland Park: Jacana, 2012), p.57.  
172 
 
consociationalism which would entrench ‘minority rights’ through 
compulsory coalition government.152 
Legal theorist Martin Channock observes that before the elections in 1994 
brought the interim constitution into effect, the South African state was ‘bifurcated […] 
it essentially began with and continued to refine two constitutional orders – one 
democratic and one authoritarian’.153 It was, of course, race which determined which 
constitutional order an individual belonged to. As Channock writes, ‘[f]or the 
enfranchised there was, there had to be, constitutionalism: for those without the vote 
there did not’.154 
Wilson argues that it is in response to such racialized models of citizenship that 
an association between human rights and constitutionalism has developed:  
[s]ince 1990, nearly all transitions from authoritarian rule have 
adopted the language of human rights and the political model of 
constitutionalism, especially in Latin America and the new states of 
Eastern Europe. […] All converge on the view that nations must not 
be constituted on the basis of race, ethnicity, language or religion, but 
should be founded instead on a ‘community of equal, rights-bearing 
citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political 
practices and values’ (Ignatieff 1993:3–4). In this formulation, human 
rights are portrayed as the antithesis of nationalist modes of 
nationbuilding.155 
In South Africa, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty played a crucial role 
in the apartheid legal order. John Dugard argues that ‘loyalty to this principle has, more 
than any other legal factor, brought about the debasement of the South African legal 
system.’156 It meant that the courts had extremely limited powers of judicial review, and 
the will of the legislature was able to direct the development of legislation with very 
little hindrance. By contrast, the interim Constitution of 1993 introduced a bill of rights 
and it also created a Constitutional Court, able to use the bill of rights to rule on 
whether or not laws are constitutional.  
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I have suggested that where human rights become legal rights, they lose 
something of their distinctiveness. My argument here is that the ambiguity of human 
rights’ relation to the law is exemplified by the two key ways in which human rights 
were employed during the transition: on the one hand, the quasi-legality of the TRC, on 
the other the new model of constitutionalism. Together, these suggest the ways in 
which law is crucial for human rights discourse, but also the ways in which human 
rights discourse is always, in Costas Douzinas’ words ‘stretch[ing] [the law’s] boundaries 
and limits.’157  
Human rights discourse was crucial to the development of a constitutional legal 
tradition to replace that of the English parliamentary sovereignty model. For example, 
the first case heard by the Constitutional Court was on the abolition of the death 
penalty. According to Sangmin Bae, ‘[t]he court, actively looking up international and 
foreign law precedents and quoting the worldwide campaign against the death penalty, 
made it clear that to repeal capital punishment was to join the international human 
rights movement.’158 Indeed, in the judgement the Judge President, Arthur Chaskalson, 
made this explicit, stating: 
[t]he rights to life and dignity are the most important of all human 
rights, and the source of all other personal rights in Chapter Three. By 
committing ourselves to a society founded on the recognition of 
human rights we are required to value these two rights above all 
others. And this must be demonstrated by the State in everything that 
it does, including the way it punishes criminals. This is not achieved 
by objectifying murderers and putting them to death to serve as an 
example to others in the expectation that they might possibly be 
deterred thereby.159 
The House Gun  
Discussing Nadine Gordimer’s 1998 novel The House Gun alongside other South 
African texts published at around the same time, Brenna M. Munro writes that ‘[i]f we 
read these novels with the constitution in mind, it becomes clear that it is part of their 
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very fabric.’160 The central characters in The House Gun are a white middle class couple, 
Harald and Claudia Lindgard. She is a doctor; he works in insurance. At the beginning 
of the novel they find out that their son Duncan has shot and killed Carl Jesperson, his 
friend and former lover. The night before the murder, Duncan had found Carl having 
sex with Duncan’s girlfriend, Natalie. The novel focuses on the ways in which Harald 
and Claudia try to cope with the murder, and then on Duncan’s trial. In the text, the 
death penalty hearings happen while Duncan is still awaiting trial, and so this significant 
constitutional event is deeply personally affecting for the characters: before it is declared 
unconstitutional, Duncan’s parents fear that this is the punishment he will face.  
The novel is therefore set in the immediate post-apartheid period, against the 
backdrop of the constitutional changes I have just been discussing. It represents the 
new constitutional order as a decisive, admirable break with the past. It is also, in part, 
through their interactions with this legal system that the novel’s white middle class 
characters are forced to face their own complicity with apartheid and the extent to 
which it benefitted them even as they were unaware of these benefits and considered 
themselves to be opposed to the system.  
Munro has in mind a particular example when she discusses the novels 
embeddedness in the context of the development of the Constitution. South Africa’s 
Constitution was the first in the world to outlaw discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation. This was not a universally popular constitutional provision. In the period 
immediately following the first democratic elections there seemed to be a sense in which 
‘the figure of the gay person’ functioned ‘as a symbol of democratic modernity within 
this new national culture.’161 But there was also, she suggests, a risk that when hopes for 
the new South Africa were disappointed, the symbolic association of gay identity with 
‘democratic modernity’ could position gay and lesbian South Africans as targets for 
dissatisfaction with the new political order itself.162  
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There was, therefore, a gap between the progressive values of the new 
Constitution and some public opinion in this case. Munro argues that  
[w]hile literature doesn’t have the direct power of the law or the wide 
audience of popular culture, novels can help make legal recognition 
into shared structures of feeling about the nation and people’s place in 
it. The pleasures of reading realist fiction, of identifying with some 
characters and judging others, and of vividly imagining a recognizable 
world make it a powerful medium for shaping subjectivities and 
producing the ‘imagined community’ of nation.163 
For example, in The House Gun, Duncan, Carl and Natalie had lived with what 
Munro describes as ‘a loose group of friends, gay and straight, black and white’.164 David 
Medalie argues that this 
seems to be a new kind of family unit […] enacting, in a microcosmic 
way, the society which the new South African constitution is making 
possible, one in which there is no discrimination on the basis of race, 
gender or sexual preference.165 
Because of the association of the nation with the family, Munro argues, the new kind of 
family structure represented by Duncan’s friends works as a symbol of the new 
inclusivity of the nation itself. But, crucially, it is not just a symbol for her. She suggests 
that though they lack ‘the direct power of the law […] novels can help make legal 
recognition into shared structures of feeling’.166 She therefore sees the text as a support 
to the new constitutional provisions.  
This is obviously somewhat problematic, in a way that both Munro and Medalie 
acknowledge. It is difficult, for example, to fit the murder of Carl into this model. If the 
friendship group in the text works to make the new inclusivity of the constitutional 
order imaginatively accessible, the murder appears as a warning about its sustainability. 
Moreover, as I argued through an analysis of Derrida in Chapter Three, any place at 
which the inclusivity of the nation-state is figured through the metaphor of the family is 
risky, because the family is the always-ambivalent sign of the two desires of democracy: 
the desire to welcome difference, and the desire to constitute political community on 
the basis of resemblance. The family image encodes within it the suggestion that 
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national political community is always poised on a knife-edge between the welcoming 
and the exclusionary.   
But the part of her argument I will focus on here is her suggestion that ‘the 
pleasures of realist fiction’ work to produce individual, affective realization of 
constitutional provisions.167 I suggest that The House Gun is a difficult novel to make this 
argument about, because there is within it a conceptualization of justice which is 
explicitly contrasted with that of the new Constitutional Court, and it is one which can 
be traced through the way Gordimer depicts the reading of novels. As we have seen, the 
Constitutional Court made the case for the abolition of the death penalty on the basis of 
human rights norms. In The House Gun, while the Constitutional Court is celebrated, the 
characters’ readings of Dostoevsky and, in particular, Thomas Mann, are used to set up 
an alternative way of thinking about the crime of murder and its punishment, one which 
sees the death penalty as logical, sensible or necessary. The ideas about justice derived 
from reading literary texts in this novel are therefore shown to exist in disjunctive 
relation to those of the human rights-respecting legal order. They exist in a rigorous 
independence from the legal system. By examining how the novel describes the new 
constitutional order we will be able to see how the reading of literary texts sets up a 
conceptualization of justice that is explicitly distinguished from that order.  
The House Gun was only the second novel Gordimer published after the end of 
apartheid. Given her reputation as a writer intensely sensitive to changing political 
contexts and their complex effects on individual subjectivities, the nature of the crime 
which is at the centre of the novel has been considered somewhat surprising. As 
Stephen Clingman writes, ‘this must be the first time a trial in a Gordimer novel is not a 
political trial.’168 For David Medalie the murder ‘has no particularly South African 
dimension to it in that, from what we can gauge, it seems to be motivated by complex 
feelings of resentment and sexual jealousy’.169 Moreover, it  
cannot be designated the direct result of an unwanted bequest from the 
old South Africa. It does not proceed from a struggle for political 
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power; there is no economic element; it is not something which spills 
over from the 'random violence of night streets.'170 
But, at the same time, he writes, ‘the South African context is invoked, both by the 
narrator and during Duncan's trial, so that it cannot be ignored.’171  
The judge’s summing up at the end of Duncan’s trial is one of the ways in which 
this context – and more particularly, the context of the years immediately following the 
first democratic elections – is invoked. The judge says that one of the ‘mitigating 
factors’172 in the case is that ‘the gun happened to be there’.173 This, he argues,  
is the tragedy of our present time, a tragedy repeated daily, nightly, in 
this city, in our country. Part of the furnishings in homes, carried in 
pockets along with car keys, even in the school-bags of children, 
constantly ready to hand in situations which lead to tragedy, the guns 
happen to be there.174 
As Anthony O’Brien has argued, in the novel ‘Gordimer takes the South African furor 
over violence and crime since 1994 and displaces it: instead of crimes by the black and 
poor […] in the foreground of the plot there is a bourgeois murder’.175  While the 
murder itself is not political, O’Brien describes the book as an ‘an exercise in white 
conscientization, in paying back the wages of whiteness.’176  
 I particularly want to emphasize the role that the law plays in this process of 
‘white conscientization’.177 The murder brings Harald and Claudia into direct contact 
with the legal system, and it is this which forces them to reconsider the unacknowledged 
extent to which apartheid has benefitted their lives. For example, even though ‘[s]he’s 
not one of those doctors who touch black skin indiscriminately along with white, in 
their work, but retain liberal prejudices against the intellectual capacities of blacks’178, 
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when it comes to her son’s defence, Claudia (and Harald) find that ‘many compromises 
with stereotype attitudes easily rejected in their old safe life were coming about now that 
the other values of that time had been broken with.’179 Their anti-racism had been 
possible where their safety was protected, but when they find themselves faced with 
danger, it becomes a luxury. 
This is a prominent theme in Gordimer’s work. For example, her 1981 novel 
July’s People imagines a revolutionary future in which South Africa is in the grip of civil 
war as black political movements try to seize power from the intransigent white 
government. The middle-class white Smales family are forced to flee Johannesburg. 
Their long-term servant July, as he is known to Maureen and Bam Smales – Mwawate is 
the name by which his family and friends know him – offers them refuge in his village, 
with his family. As Bam and Maureen live in the village, the novel depicts the 
destruction of their sense of their relationship with July. Maureen and Bam are well-
intentioned liberals who are concerned to distinguish themselves from the white South 
Africans who actively support apartheid.  
However, in the context of the village they are forced to recognize the limits to 
their understanding, the extent to which they have been deluding themselves about their 
insight into July’s life. For example, Maureen has to reconsider her view of July’s 
relationship with his ‘town woman’:  
[w]e (Maureen sometimes harked back) understand the sacred power 
and rights of sexual love as formulated in master bedrooms, and motels 
with false names in the register […] The absolute nature she and her kind 
were scrupulously just in granting to everybody was no more than the 
price of the master bedroom and the clandestine hotel tariff.180 
Moreover, as Sophie Harrison notes, the sudden way in which the white couple 
in July’s People find themselves confronted with an entirely unfamiliar set of 
                                                                                                                                          
comma, and Claudia Lingard is not a doctor who touches black skin; read on, and she is not one of those 
whites who refuse to accept blacks as real equals even though they are all too happy to touch black bodies, 
in a purely professional capacity of course. It is a split second of self-incrimination.’ Jacqueline Rose, The 
Last Resistance (London: Verso, 2007), p.176. 
179 The House Gun, p.145.  
180 Nadine Gordimer, July’s People (London: Bloomsbury, 1981), p.79. 
179 
 
circumstances and are forced to rely on a black man to help them strongly resembles 
the plot of the later novel The House Gun.181  
 In The House Gun: 
Claudia is not the only woman with a son in prison. Since this 
afternoon she has understood that. She is no longer the one who 
doles out the comfort of its placebos for others’ disasters, herself safe, 
untouchable, in another class. And it’s not just laws that have brought 
about this form of equality; something quite other.182 
But although it is ‘not just laws that have brought about this form of equality’, I 
suggest that part of what enables her to move from her ‘untouchable’ class into a 
fellow-feeling with other South Africans is produced by her sudden catapulting into 
familiarity with the legal system.183 In particular, although the lawyer Duncan has hired 
is a black man, Hamilton Motsamai, Claudia wonders whether he will have the ‘wiliness’ 
necessary: ‘a special kind of shrewd ability […] that people whose generalized prejudices 
they used find distasteful attributed to lawyers who belonged to certain races. Jewish or 
Indian’.184 But, as their relationship with Motsamai deepens and develops over the 
course of the narrative, it to come to be represented as something more symbolically 
resonant, as something which represents broader, changing dynamics:  
there is awareness that the position that was entrenched from the 
earliest days of their being is reversed: one of those kept-apart 
strangers from the Other Side has come across and they are 
dependent on him. The black man will act, speak for them. They have 
become those who cannot speak, act, for themselves.185  
Later in the novel, Harald attends the hearings on the abolition of the death 
penalty at the Constitutional Court. Where, for everyone else, the hearings are on a 
‘higher plane of abstract justice’186and ‘[n]othing personal’187 he is ‘intensely aware of the 
extraordinary presence he is, in his reason, unbeknown to all these people, for being 
among them.’188 For Harald, the hearings are directly, immediately and terrifyingly 
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relevant. In his isolation at the Court, it is only the parents of the murderers appealing 
the legality of the death penalty he can relate to:  
[t]he only people with whom he would have common cause would be 
the parents of whoever Themba Makwanyane and Mvuso Mchunu 
might be, those to whom what is the subject of learned argument is 
not an issue but at home with them, forced entry there by sons who 
murdered four people, and by the son who put a bullet into the head 
of the man on the sofa. It was unlikely these parents would be among 
the crowd in court, almost certainly they are poor and illiterate, afraid 
to think of exposing themselves to authority in a process 
incomprehensible any other way than as whether or not a son was 
going to be hanged one daybreak in Pretoria.189 
The crime, the trial, above all the fear of the death penalty – these force Harald and 
Claudia into a resemblance to the black poor. There is nothing straightforward about 
this. It is an entirely theoretical resemblance: Harald doesn’t know the parents of 
‘whoever Themba Makwanyane and Mvuso Mchunu might be’190 and he assumes that 
he is distanced from them by income and by education. All of this is focalized through 
Harald’s perspective, which adds an additional layer of difficulty as they may not be who 
he imagines at all. Nonetheless, he feels that he is united with them in his 
incomprehension at the Court.  
One significant difference between the death penalty hearings depicted in the 
text and those held by the actual Constitutional Court concerns the location of the 
Court. In the novel, it is located in Johannesburg’s former Fever Hospital. In reality, the 
Court did not have a permanent location until 2004. The location at which the Court 
building was eventually constructed was the site of a former prison – the Old Fort in 
Johannesburg. According to Mark Gevisser, for black South Africans the site was  
this place of darkness in the middle of the city to which they’d be 
taken if their passes were out of order, or they had broken the curfew 
regulations, or any one of a number of other petty apartheid laws that 
criminalized their very existence. Given that all pass offenders in 
Johannesburg were brought here, there’s barely a black family in the 
city that doesn’t have some memory of what it was like inside. In 
black popular culture, the Old Fort is still known as Number Four 
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because the black male section was ‘section four,’ and those two 
words still send shivers down people’s spines.191 
Gevisser argues that locating the court on the site of the Old Fort was an act of 
reclamation, but one which linked the past and future together. The intention was not 
to erase the memories of ‘section four’ but instead to ‘put the Constitution into a 
historical context, to show that it was a consequence of a long and difficult struggle.’192  
 The site Gordimer chooses for the Court in The House Gun is also symbolic: 
[i]t is the old Fever Hospital façade [Harald is] looking along as he 
approaches but it is no longer a place of isolation for those who might 
spread disease down there among the population […] It will house the 
antithesis of the confusion and disorientation of the fevered mind: it is 
to be the venue of the furthest extension of measured justice that exists 
anywhere, a court where any citizen may bring any law that affects him 
or her to be tested against individual rights as entrenched in the new 
Constitution.193 
Gordimer’s biographer Ronald Suresh Roberts suggests that ‘Gordimer treats [the 
Constitutional Court] with undisguised reverence’, but choosing the Fever Hospital as 
the imagined location for the Court focuses this ‘reverence’ in particular ways.194 For 
example, it stresses that the Constitutional Court is one of the ways in which the 
apartheid past has been emphatically broken with. It is ‘not incongruous to Harald’ that 
the Fever Hospital has become the Court because ‘[e]verything has changed.’195 The 
building itself is ‘red-faced as the imperialist fathers who had constructed it’, but this 
serves to emphasize the change that has occurred.196 The new use of the building is the 
‘antithesis’ of what happened before.197 This is a different way of thinking about the 
redevelopment of an old building to the one the Constitutional Court would actually 
adopt. When the actual Constitutional Court was built, a link to the past sacrifices made 
in the struggle against apartheid was recognized in addition to the attempt to decisively 
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mark a break with the past. The Fever Hospital building in the novel instead symbolizes 
‘antithesis’.198  
The text also describes the judges at the Constitutional Court. The ‘swarthy man 
(Italian or Jew?) with a scarred grin, and eyes, one dark-brilliant, one blurred blind, from 
whom radiant vitality comes impudently since he gesticulating with a stump in place of 
one arm’199 is clearly Albie Sachs, though he is not named. The narrator observes: 
[t]he judges interrupt, cross question wittily, and expound their own 
views; the case for retention of the Death Penalty seems to come up 
against the unanswerable when the judge who has lost an arm and an 
eye by an agent of the previous regime’s attempt to murder him does 
not support an arm for an arm, an eye for an eye; does not express any 
wish to see the man hanged.200  
The President of the Constitutional Court is not named either. However, he is 
described: ‘[h]e does not smile but his eyes behind their panes have that expression, and 
further, a compassion- but perhaps it’s the distancing of the thick glasses that gives 
Harald the idea that this is there, and touches him’.201 The first President of the 
Constitutional Court in reality was Arthur Chaskalson, and the reference to the ‘thick 
glasses’202 seems to suggest that this is who Gordimer is describing, too. Gordimer 
emphasizes Sachs’ extraordinary forgiveness, his lack of desire for retribution, as well as 
his ‘radiant vitality’ and Chaskalson’s ‘compassion’.203 By the end of the text, the death 
penalty hearings have concluded:  
[t]he Last Judgement of the Constitutional Court has declared the 
Death Penalty unconstitutional. The firm and gentle tone of the Judge 
President has the confidence of a man who while he is conveying the 
ruling arrived at after several months of weighing scrupulously the 
findings of a bench of independent thinkers, himself has been given 
grace. There is serenity in justice.204 
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However, despite all of this celebration of the new constitutional order as 
‘serenity in justice’,205 there is way of thinking about justice in the novel which is 
contrasted with that of the Constitutional Court, and it is articulated through literature. 
In Gordimer’s novel, Harald and his son share a deep interest in literature and ‘have a 
need to read’ books ‘that are dangerous and indispensable, revealing to you what you 
are.’206 When Harald goes to Duncan’s cottage after the murder he discovers a 
notebook: 
scrawled on the last page to have been used there was a passage 
copied from somewhere – Harald’s love of reading had been passed 
on when the boy was still a child. Harald recognized with the first few 
words, Dostoevsky, yes, Rogozhin speaking of Nastasya Filippovna. 
‘She would have drowned herself long ago if she had not had me; 
that’s the truth. She doesn’t do that because, perhaps, I am more 
dreadful than the water.’207  
For his part, in the aftermath of the murder, ‘Harald’s dependence on books 
became exactly that, in the pathological sense’.208 There are two slightly different things 
he seeks in literature. On the one hand there is absorption:  
the substance of writers’ imaginative explanations of human mystery 
made it possible for him, reading late into the night, to get up in the 
morning and present himself to the Board Room. He turned to old 
books, re-read them; the mise en scène would remove him from the 
present in which his son was awaiting trial for murder.209 
But reading also has perhaps less pleasant consequences, or at least consequences which 
are less under his control: ‘like his son, he came upon his own passages, to be 
omnipresent in him if not to be copied out alongside the others in the notebook locked 
up in his office.’210 
One of these is a conversation from Thomas Mann’s novel The Magic Mountain: 
‘“…the man is as he has wished to be, and as, until his last breath, he 
has never ceased to wish to be. He has revelled in slaying and does not 
pay too dear in being slain. Let him die, then, for he has gratified his 
heart’s deepest desire.’ 
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‘Deepest desire?’ 
‘Deepest desire.’ 
‘It is absurd for the murderer to outlive the murdered. They two, alone 
together – as two beings are together in only one other human 
relationship, the one acting, the other suffering him – share a secret that 
binds them forever together. They belong to each other.’”211 
 For Harald, the quotations from Mann and from Dostoevsky become 
intertwined, and then become tools through which he attempts to understand his son 
and his actions: 
in what is fearful, surely there is always one who menaces and one 
who fears. How can menace be equalled? In deadlock; and that is 
exactly what it will be, deadly; so if it had been Natalie/Nastasya his 
son had killed there would have been an answer: they belong to each 
other. The reverse side of the conception of sexual love that 
romantically defines it as the blissful state of union, to which that 
good old-style marriage ceremony gives God’s blessing as one flesh.212  
As presented in The House Gun, one of the unnamed speakers suggests that there is a 
parallel between the relationship between the murderer and the murdered and ‘only one 
other human relationship, the one acting, the other suffering him’.213 By this, Harald 
understands that the murderer and the murdered, in their connectedness, are the ‘reverse 
side of the conception of sexual love that romantically defines it as the blissful state of 
union’.214 But this does not provide the answer he is looking for, because his son did not 
kill Natalie. 
 An answer, however, is provided later in the text, in a section narrated from 
Duncan’s first person perspective: 
[h]e brought me a book when I was awaiting trial, I think it was when 
he was so angry, so horrified that he wanted to accuse, punish me, but 
there was something in it he didn’t, doesn’t, never can know. The 
passage about the one who did it and the one to whom it was done.215 
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Duncan then quotes exactly the quotation from The Magic Mountain that has obsessed 
Harald (beginning ‘[i]t is absurd for the murderer to outlive the murdered’).216  Even 
though Duncan doesn’t believe his father has noticed this passage in particular, it is 
precisely the same section of text that Harald has used to think about his son, and to try 
and understand his actions. It becomes tremendously significant for Duncan: 
[w]riters are dangerous people. How is it that a writer knows these 
things […] I’ve copied that quotation again and again, I don’t know 
how many times, in the middle of the night from memory I’ve written 
it on a scrap of paper the way she used to scribble a line for a 
poem.217 
But there is a crucial difference in Duncan’s own case:  
this time it is the three of us, alone together. In the ‘human relationship’ 
– love-making and all the rest – Carl acted, I suffered him, I acted, 
Natalie suffered me, and that night on the sofa they acted and I 
suffered them both. We belong to each other.218 
Harald’s comprehension fails because it was Carl and not Natalie who became Duncan’s 
victim. He thinks that Natalie and Duncan ‘belong[ed] to each other’.219 His 
interpretation of the Mann quotation is that this kind of symbiotic, overwhelming 
relationship is the ‘reverse side’ of the irrevocable connection between the murderer and 
the murdered.220 Duncan agrees with this, but for him there were not just two people 
connected in this way but three: ‘he’s dead, and he and she and I share a secret that 
binds us forever together.’221  
When Claudia hears that the death penalty has been abolished ‘the news sets her 
visibly trembling […] while it still existed it would always have been what, for their son’s 
act one Friday night, could have been exacted’.222 Duncan’s response is, however, very 
different. Crucially, it is also articulated through the literary quotation: ‘I have this life, in 
here. I didn’t give it for his. I’ll even get out of here with it, some year or other. The 
                                                 
216 The House Gun, p.282.  
217 The House Gun, p.282.  
218 The House Gun, p.282.  
219 The House Gun, p.72.  
220 The House Gun, p.72.  
221 The House Gun, p.282.  
222 The House Gun, p.284.  
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murderer has not been murdered. My luck, this was abolished in my time.’223 The text is 
not, I think, suggesting that Duncan wishes that he could be killed by the state, but 
rather that the decision on the death penalty has upset an alternative conception of 
justice which the quotation from The Magic Mountain helps him to articulate.  
Ronald Suresh Roberts writes that during the constitutional court hearings on 
the abolition of the death penalty: 
Gordimer faxed an excerpt from The Magic Mountain to George Bizos at 
the Johannesburg Legal Resources Centre as he prepared to argue 
against the death penalty. The excerpt, she explained, pitted 
Settembrini, ‘the humanist democrat’ against Naphta, ‘the pre-fascist 
ideologue’. It was a slightly longer version of the quotation which she 
weaves through The House Gun.’224  
As Roberts notes, ‘[t]his cannot have helped Bizos in the abolitionist cause.’225 But the 
fact that the quotation is so unlikely, so apparently unhelpful for the lawyer in the death 
penalty hearings, indicates something of the way it is working in the text. It sets up a way 
of thinking about crime and its punishment which is not subsumed under legal 
categories. In the text, the quotation is what Duncan is left with, to think over and 
through and with, in his cell, as he tries to re-imagine his life. 
Moreover, it is not the only literary text which functions in this way. At the end 
of the novel, Duncan is reading The Odyssey. It, too, is interpreted in terms of its 
comments on justice. Duncan wants to understand what Odysseus feels about his 
killing. At the end of the text he is still waiting to find this out: ‘I haven’t come to the 
end of the book, I don’t know how Odysseus reconstructed what he did, what way he 
                                                 
223 The House Gun, p.294.  
224 ‘Naphta starts, with Gordimer’s emphasis: 
“He has revelled in slaying and does not pay too dearly in being slain. 
Let him die, then, for he has gratified his heart’s deepest desire.” 
“Deepest desire?” 
“Deepest desire” 
…Settembrini shrewdly remarked: “There is a kind of generalisation that has a distinctly personal cast. 
Have you ever had a desire to commit a murder?” 
“That is no concern of yours. But if I had, I should laugh in the face of any ignorant humanitarianism 
that tried to feed me on skilly till I died a natural death. It is absurd for the murderer to outlive the 
murdered…They belong to each other.”’ Roberts, p.540.  
225 Roberts, p.540.  
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found for himself. Put out your eyes. Turn the gun on your own head.’226 What is 
important here is how the text is thus associated with punishment, and, in particular, 
with violent, self-inflicted punishment. While The House Gun is celebratory about the new 
Constitution and the new human rights-respecting legal order symbolized by the 
abolition of the death penalty, there is nonetheless something which escapes or cannot 
be incorporated within it, or within the way it is represented in the text. This way of 
thinking about murder and its consequences, which is established in opposition to that 
of the Constitutional Court, is represented by literature.  
In this chapter I have shown that human rights discourse has an ambivalent 
relationship with legality. In the context of the South African transition to democracy, it 
was used both to found the Constitution and, in the TRC, to distinguish the demands 
of justice from the demands of the law. What I suggest about The House Gun is that it 
emphatically distinguishes literature from the law. Where for critics like Munro and 
Slaughter human rights’ quasi-legality might enable or encourage literature to take on 
some of law’s roles, in this text literature and legality are separated. This is to say that 
human rights, as I have described them in this chapter, and literature as it functions in 
The House Gun share something. In the next chapter I will go on to discuss the ways in 
which literary distance from legality might illuminate that of human rights discourse.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
226 The House Gun, p.294.  
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Chapter Five: Literature and the Ambivalent 
Legality of Human Rights Discourse 
 
The ambivalence of human rights’ relationship with legality has sometimes 
invited critics to focus on ways in which literature might do some of the work the law 
cannot. As we have seen, Brenda Munro argued that: 
[w]hile literature doesn’t have the direct power of the law or the wide 
audience of popular culture, novels can help make legal recognition 
into shared structures of feeling about the nation and people’s place in 
it. The pleasures of reading realist fiction, of identifying with some 
characters and judging others, and of vividly imagining a recognizable 
world make it a powerful medium for shaping subjectivities and 
producing the ‘imagined community’ of nation.1 
This link between literature and human rights law centres on a certain kind of 
literary text – ‘realist fiction’2 – which encourages identification and vivid imagination 
and provokes recognition. Munro is not the only critic to make such a link. According 
to Hephzibah Roskelly, Slaughter’s model of the human rights-literature relationship 
does not pay specific attention to traditionally marginalized subject-positions. The figure 
of the person around which his theory of human rights is hinged bears a strong 
similarity to the abstract individuals who populate liberal political theory – as many 
feminist critics have pointed out, such abstract individuals tend to take white 
masculinity as the neutral model for human existence. But for Roskelly, even where she 
expands the remit to include women, the basic literary paradigm of identification 
remains the same: 
[a]s readers read more coming of age stories that take a variety of paths, 
that do more than comment on the stereotypical western male one, but 
remake it in another image, female ones as well as male, they learn to 
symbolize and imagine ways to see humans that include human women 
more explicitly.’3 
                                                 
1 Munro, p.399.  
2 Munro, p.399.  
3 Hephzibah Roskelly, ‘Imagining Women as Human’, in Theoretical Perspectives on Human Rights and 
Literature, ed. by Elizabeth Swanson Goldberg and Alexandra Schultheis Moore (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2012), pp.215-230 (p.228).  
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Again, it is a certain type of literary writing which is being discussed here. She 
argues that ‘reading narrative carries powerful persuasive force for its ability to foster 
imaginative possibilities in the minds of readers.’4 As in Munro’s argument, literary texts 
are thought to inspire imagination for the purposes of creating recognition and 
familiarity: 
[t]he literary text creates symbolic dimensions of everyday life that 
invite readers to draw connections to lived experience; to locate 
differences and make them familiar; to interpret fairly and with 
empathy.5   
Underlying both of these arguments, I suggest, is an impulse towards the 
resolution of what Rancière terms dissensus. On the one hand, there is the imagined 
universality of human rights, and on the other there is the reality of existence in which, 
clearly, we do not all enjoy the rights we are supposed to possess. Roskelly, Munro and 
Slaughter all suggest that literature can work to reduce or, at least, minimize this gap. I 
suggest however that this gap is integral to what human rights are and how they work – 
in particular, for the purposes of this chapter, human rights claims have most meaning 
when they are made in the absence of legal protection.  
We have observed one consequence of human rights’ ambivalence about legality 
in the context of South Africa’s transition to democracy: even though there was an 
explicit attempt to build the new South African polity around respect for individual 
human rights, this was only partially accomplished through the law. In the context of the 
TRC, for example, human rights discourse was used to defend and justify a quasi-legal 
methodology which at once evoked and insisted on its distinction from full legality. 
Thus, even where there was an attempt to ensure respect for human rights, this was not 
accomplished exclusively through the law, but rather through a more ambiguous quasi-
legality.  
Having considered the ambivalence of human rights’ relation to the law from one 
perspective – the attempt to bring about full rights protection – in this chapter I 
consider the other side of the possession paradox. That is, the question of rights from 
the perspective of those who are lacking fundamental rights and have no recourse to the 
                                                 
4 Roskelly, p.226.  
5 Roskelly, p.216.   
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law to enact them. This was the case in South Africa during apartheid: legal scholar 
David Dyzenhaus argues that  
the exceptional nature of apartheid was not the human rights violations 
which it perpetrated. Other regimes in Africa and elsewhere have 
matched or even outdone the white governments of South Africa in 
this regard […] what made apartheid exceptional was that it was 
implemented and sustained through law.6  
The paradigmatic situation for the making of a human rights claim is one in which the 
law cannot be relied on to protect rights. This is where human rights as a discourse has 
most meaning – yet this is always (and must always be) an uneasy and perilous situation. 
South Africa is a particularly extreme example of this.   
Both texts I consider in this chapter are concerned with situations in which the 
possibility of legal recognition of human rights is remote – situations, in fact, where the 
law is actively hostile to human rights claims. Antjie Krog’s Begging to Be Black begins in 
1992, in the dying days of white rule, and deals with a murder trial in which Krog 
becomes involved. As the text progresses, the extent to which the security forces and 
legal system are implicated in the murder and in the context in which it occurred 
becomes apparent. Nadine Gordimer’s novel Burger’s Daughter is set in the 1970s. I will 
focus on the way the novel depicts a political trial and the aftermath of the Soweto 
uprising. This began on 16 June 1976 as a protest against the compulsory use of 
Afrikaans as the language in which teaching was conducted in schools, and the police 
responded to it with extreme violence, shooting and killing hundreds of protestors. 
Given the interpretative frames I have discussed so far, it might be expected 
that where the law cannot be relied upon to respect rights, literature might work in such 
a way as to, textually at least, resolve the problem. This is what Slaughter suggests about 
the Bildungsroman: 
[t]he Bildungsroman has acted as a cultural surrogate for the missing 
executive authority of international human rights law, expanding its 
purview by projecting the social and cultural conditions out of which 
human rights might be recognised as commonsensical.7 
                                                 
6 David Dyzenhaus, Judging the Judges, Judging Ourselves: Truth, Reconciliation, and the Apartheid Legal Order 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003), p.149.  
7 Human Rights, Inc., p.29. 
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According to Rosekelly and Munro, similarly, literature might be expected to forge 
imaginative connections which bring rights to life, even as the rights are not effectively 
possessed in the law. Or, as we saw with Tutu’s reference to Death and the Maiden, 
literature might be associated with truth, and might thus be able to compensate for the 
law’s inadequacies.   
But, in contrast to the literary works discussed by Slaughter, Roskelly and 
Munro, both Begging to be Black and Burger’s Daughter refuse to work in this way. Krog’s 
text is preoccupied by the limits of imagination, while the restless mobility of the 
narrative perspective in Burger’s Daughter continually draws attention to its own inability 
to provide access to an unmediated truth, and to its own contingency. But because of 
their own performed failures and insufficiencies, I argue, they allow a closer 
understanding of the impossibility of possession which is central to my account of 
human rights.  
My suggestion is that Begging to Be Black and Burger’s Daughter establish and 
maintain their own irreducibility to law. Here I am returning to a question I first raised 
in Chapter One: how might literary texts be able to stage, and thus move us closer to 
understanding, the difficulties of possessing human rights? In Chapter One I argued 
that the texts Slaughter describes as dissensual Bildungsroman cannot do this because 
they do not fully get to grips with the crisis at the centre of human rights – the fact that 
such rights always exist most fully in their non-possession. Instead, through positing the 
experimental Bildungsroman as the human rights-analogue, he suggests that non-
possession is simply what happens when rights cannot be fully realized, instead of a 
condition of the only realization which is possible for them. The form of the 
Bildungsroman is dependent on the idea of progression towards social incorporation, 
even where neither is fully realized in textual terms. But I have suggested that human 
rights cannot be absorbed into a developmental model. As Rancière suggests, they 
become fully possessed not at the end of a teleological process, but only when they 
enter into crisis.    
There is a rupture at the heart of human rights, the rupture which means that it 
is almost impossible for human rights to be fully possessed. It is the extent to which 
literature is able to express that rupture by precisely breaking the processes of 
imagination and familiarity which interests me here. Literature may be law-like as it 
facilitates feelings of national belonging in a realist mode. But I suggest that these 
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literary texts might have something to say about human rights discourse’s ambiguities of 
possession precisely in so far as they problematize the relationship between ‘vividly 
imagining’ and ‘a recognizable world.’8 In this way, they throw into question the 
relationship between literature and the category of truth – the link that Tutu made in 
the context of defending the TRC’s quasi-legality. 
Petrus’s Story  
Begging to Be Black is composed of a number of different strands woven together. 
It is a non-fictional work, but as I will argue below, the meaning and purpose of fiction 
are central to its purposes. Opening the book is an account of Krog’s involvement in a 
murder case. The murder is committed in 1992, when Krog is working as a teacher and 
living with her architect husband, J., in Kroonstad, in the Free State. Krog is an active 
member of the ANC and ‘[d]uring the height of apartheid’, she and her husband had 
‘consciously decided to live among poor people and bought a house near the railway 
line.’9 On 25th February 1992, Wheetie, the leader of the Three Million gang, ‘which 
rules with a reign open terror in Kroonstad’, is shot on the street.10  The killer is a 
member of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the armed wing of the ANC. He is driven to 
and from the scene by Denzil Hendricks, the deputy headteacher of the school at which 
Krog teaches. With them are two other MK men and ANC activist Reggie Baartman.  
Later that evening, Reggie arrives at Krog’s house with three men she has never 
seen before. He asks her to give them all a lift in her car, and to dispose of a red t-shirt. 
The t-shirt is the murderer’s, and the murder weapon has been left in a plant pot on her 
property. Later, when she realizes what has happened, she takes the t-shirt to a member 
of the security police who she and her husband went to school with. Reggie and the 
three MK operatives – Jantjie Petrus, Hankan Petrus and Dudu Mofokeng – are 
arrested and then released. Two days later, Hankan Petrus is shot and killed.  
This second murder causes the students at Krog’s school to protest: 
[o]ne of our students maintains that in the chaos of running away he 
saw the maths teacher, who plays in a soccer team funded by Wheetie’s 
Three Million Gang, bent over the dead body before he too ran away. 
The student body says pupils will only take classes after all staff 
                                                 
8 Munro, p.399.  
9 Antjie Krog, Begging to Be Black (Cape Town: Random House, 2009), p.4.  
10 Begging to Be Black, p.8.  
193 
 
members who play soccer with the Three Million have left the school 
grounds.11 
For Krog, this is intensely troubling: ‘I find myself wondering how the students argue in 
favour of one murderer over the other. Is there such a thing as a bad murderer and a 
good murderer?’12 Then a ‘declaration that killing is wrong comes from an unexpected 
source’: 
[a]s head of the school committee, Reggie leads a protest against the 
teacher who allegedly ran away from the murdered body of the accused 
Hankan Petrus. In the meeting he declares that the teacher must be 
fired immediately, because he, Reggie, does not want murderers, people 
without respect for the lives of others, to be teaching his children. I sit 
there too astonished to utter a word.13 
When the case comes to court, Krog is a state witness, though is she is deeply 
uncomfortable and conflicted about this. At the end of the trial: 
Reggie was found guilty of defeating the ends of justice and fined, 
Jantjie guilty of murder and, with mitigating circumstances, sentenced 
to fourteen years in jail […] Dudu Mofokeng was found not guilty. The 
newspaper reports that the judge has credited me and the other white 
state witness for the successful solving of the case. Therefore officially, 
in black and white, in legal language, I am partly responsible for the fact 
that a young man is sitting in jail and that Reggie’s political career has 
been destroyed by a criminal sentence.14 
Krog has a sense that the murderers of the Wheetie were operating in 
accordance with a moral system she does not understand, one which does not value the 
life of the individual above all other considerations, and she thinks that this other value 
system might be a specifically black South African philosophy of interconnectedness 
and community. The murder and its aftermath lead Krog to ask questions about moral 
judgement in South Africa and about whether the fracturing of society through 
colonialism and apartheid has produced incommensurable value systems.15 She says to 
                                                 
11 Begging to Be Black, p.45.  
12 Begging to Be Black, p.45.  
13 Begging to Be Black, p.46.  
14 Begging to Be Black, p.170.  
15 Similar questions are posed in Country of My Skull. In one example, Krog asks her colleague Mondli 
Shabalala ‘[w]hy would Mandela write in his biography about the cattle he and his cousin stole from his 
uncle? Do we understand the same thing when we talk about stealing?’ (Country of My Skull, p.19). He 
replies: ‘I don’t know. But what I do know is that I grew up with the notion that stealing from whites is 
not actually stealing. Way back, Africans had no concept of stealing other than taking cattle as a means of 
194 
 
J.: ‘[m]aybe there’s something important that I’m missing here. Maybe there’s a way to 
look at this murder that would turn it into an understandable moral act.’16 The book is 
presented – until, I will suggest, a particular turning point – as an attempt to understand 
what such a philosophy means and how it operates. Consequently, it is organized not as 
a discussion of a set of theories or ideas but as a textual re-enactment of precisely the 
attempt to understand, structured by the detours, dead ends and re-thinking which tend 
to characterize the process of beginning to think about a complex and politically 
freighted topic.  
This questioning takes many different forms, and the book operates through the 
interaction of its various strands. As well as the discussion of the murder and the 
subsequent trial, sections of the text describe the leadership of King Moshoeshoe, king 
of the Basotho, and his interactions with French missionaries, beginning in 1833. The 
other major thread concerns a fellowship Krog undertook in Berlin in 2007. Within the 
Berlin sections are sections from a diary, letters to her mother, and numbered 
conversations with a philosophy professor about topics including Giles Deleuze, 
African philosophies of interconnectedness and J.M Coetzee’s novel Disgrace. Chapters 
One to Six of the book alternate between describing the murder and the period before 
the trial, and describing the interactions between Moshoeshoe and the missionaries. 
Chapter Seven is about the fellowship in Berlin. This has the effect of presenting the 
Berlin conversations – which take literature as one of their central subjects – as a direct 
response to what troubles Krog about the murder, and as an attempt to think through 
its complexities. 
The text as a whole can be read as a literary representation of thought as it 
develops – it progresses towards its ideas, rather than presenting them to the reader 
fully-formed. In particular, I will focus on three key moments in the work which present 
different ideas about fiction and how it operates. The first is a reading of Coetzee’s 
Disgrace, in which one of its characters, Petrus, is read as a symbol of a specifically 
African model of communitarian ethics. Second is a subsequent rejection of fiction on 
the basis that imagination is insufficient to South Africa’s reality of segregation, in 
which the other is physically and perhaps then ultimately imaginatively inaccessible. This 
                                                                                                                                          
contesting power. But you whiteys came and accused us of stealing – while at that very same minute you 
were stealing everything from us!’ (Country of My Skull, p.19).  
16 Begging to Be Black, p.69.  
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argument works to undermine or problematize the argument made about Disgrace. 
Thirdly, there is a final moment of small-scale reconciliation between a black man and a 
white, Afrikaner woman facilitated by Marlene van Niekerk’s novel Agaat. These 
moments are disjunctive, and they do not necessarily fit into a cogent theory about the 
role of literature. This is, I suggest, precisely their point.   
During her fellowship in Berlin, Krog has a series of discussions with a 
philosopher who is unnamed in the body of the text.17 Krog chooses him as her 
interlocutor because she has ‘read a provocative paper he wrote on the concept of 
becoming-animal in J.M. Coetzee’s novel Disgrace.’’18 Krog is not interested in 
‘becoming-animal or becoming-woman as in Coetzee’s book, but becoming-black’19. 
Disgrace is the main topic of conversation two, and recurs again in conversation three. 
Krog says:  
[g]oing back to Disgrace. I am reminded of those haunting sentences by 
Lurie about Petrus’s side of the story. ‘Doubtless Petrus has been 
through a lot, doubtless he has a story to tell. He would not mind 
hearing Petrus’s story one day. But preferably not reduced to English. 
More and more he is convinced that English is an unfit medium for the 
truth of South Africa.’20 
The philosopher asks ‘So what is Petrus’s story?’ and she replies 
I hear Petrus saying: I function within an ethic that is communal to the 
core. The benefit to the community, whether they are the living, the 
living-dead or the still-to-come, is what determines whether something is 
good or bad. The deed is not per se good or bad – it depends on who 
the community is and what and for whom the benefits are.21 
Disgrace seems to work here as a tool to enable Krog to understand the murder 
and the questions it prompts. The novel, or rather Petrus’ role in it, is understood to 
articulate a community-oriented vision, in which the moral justification for particular 
actions is not understood through isolating individual acts or behaviours but rather by 
understanding what the acts or behaviours mean and achieve in the life of a group. This 
reading of Disgrace is linked explicitly to the questions Krog asks in the aftermath of the 
                                                 
17 He is named in the acknowledgements as Paul Patton. See Paul Patton, ‘Becoming-Animal and Pure 
Life in Coetzee’s Disgrace’, Ariel: A Review of International English Literature, 35.1-2 (2004), 101-119.  
18 Begging to Be Black, p.92.  
19 Begging to Be Black, p.92.  
20 Disgrace, p.117. Quoted Begging to Be Black, p.101.  
21 Begging to Be Black, p.102.  
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shootings of the Wheetie and of Hankan Petrus. It is after these murders that Krog 
reflects ‘I find myself wondering how the students argue in favour of one murderer 
over the other. Is there such a thing as a bad murderer and a good murderer?’22 Petrus, 
in the interpretation Krog puts forward in this section, can be read in order to provide 
an answer to exactly this question: ‘[t]he deed is not per se good or bad’ and what 
matters is ‘who the community is and what and for whom the benefits are.’23 Coetzee’s 
novel is read in such a way here as to make the murder of the Wheetie comprehensible, 
by suggesting a moral framework in which it can be understood.  
However, I suggest that the reading of Disgrace proposed in Begging to Be Black– 
in which Petrus’ silence is read by Krog in order to explain an ethics of communality – 
is set up in the text to be, at least partly, critiqued and shown to be inadequate. That is, 
the reader is invited to be suspicious of the work Disgrace is performing for Begging to Be 
Black, or, at least, to approach it with certain reservations. One of the reasons that the 
reading of Petrus should not be taken at face value is that Krog enters into to the 
discussions because she wants to understand ‘becoming-black’.24 But she acknowledges 
that the philosopher ‘has many things in my eyes that should disqualify him as a 
possible discourse partner (white, male, teaching Western philosophy in Australia)’.25 
The professor will himself caution Krog to ‘be careful not to let blackness become a 
voiceless group that you privately observe and define, instead of a varied, multiple 
people with which you should have multiple-way conversations.’26 That is, he says, 
‘don’t keep on talking to whites about blacks. Talk and listen to blacks.’27  
But if what Krog wants to understand is the process of ‘becoming-black’,28 the 
list of putative disqualifications (‘white, male, teaching Western philosophy in 
Australia’)29 seems slyly to imply before the discussion of Petrus even begins that, if the 
professor is not the ideal interlocutor, neither is Disgrace a perfect starting point. Petrus 
is a fictional construct of Coetzee’s; Coetzee is of course white, male and, since 2002, 
                                                 
22 Begging to Be Black, p.45.  
23 Begging to Be Black, p.102.  
24 Begging to Be Black, p.92.  
25 Begging to Be Black, p.92.  
26 Begging to Be Black, p.122-123.  
27 Begging to Be Black, p.123.  
28 Begging to Be Black, p.92.  
29 Begging to Be Black, p.92.  
197 
 
teaching in Australia (though not teaching philosophy).30 More importantly, whiteness, 
maleness and their imbrications with teaching the Western canon (though, again, not 
philosophy but literature) are central concerns of Disgrace itself.  
Neither the plot of Disgrace and nor the context of the quotation Krog is 
interested in are explicitly discussed in Begging to Be Black. It has been widely argued that 
Disgrace places too much of the burden of sacrifice for the new South Africa on women: 
that it seems willing to compromise women’s rights and lives in its vision of the pursuit 
of national reconciliation. 31  As a consequence, there is something uncomfortable about 
the way Krog invokes Disgrace. Petrus shelters a rapist as a member of his family: is this 
really the fictional character we should take as emblematic of South African 
philosophies of interconnectedness? Petrus is not just associated with violence, but 
specifically with sexual violence against women, and this is not acknowledged or 
discussed in Begging to be Black.  
But I suggest that a certain amount of discomfort about the way Krog refers to 
Disgrace is a useful strategy for reading the text. Coetzee’s novel does not quite fit her 
purposes. For example, in something like a hall of mirrors effect, the question of the 
function of literature in the new South Africa is tightly interwoven in Disgrace with the 
issue of translation and translatability, the ability to hear and communicate with the 
other. So though Krog is using a novel to think about the question of communication 
across South African cultures, the novel she refers to itself questions the role literature 
can play in facilitating intercultural understanding. The way in which Krog seems to 
read Disgrace in order to understand something about black South African morality is 
implicitly problematized, for those who know Coetzee’s text – and among Krog’s 
readers, this seems likely to be a significant proportion32 – by the relationship literature 
has with cross-racial understanding in South Africa in Disgrace.  
                                                 
30 See J.C. Kannemeyer, J.M. Coetzee: A Life in Writing (London: Scribe Publications, 2013), p.535.  
31 On the problematic role gender plays in Disgrace see Elleke Boehmer, ‘Sorry, Sorrier, Sorriest: The 
Gendering of Contrition in J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace’, in J.M Coetzee and the Idea of the Public Intellectual, ed. by 
Jane Poyner (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2006), pp.134-147. Carine M. Mardorossian, ‘Rape and 
the Violence of Representation in J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace’, Research in African Literatures, 42.4 (2011), 72-83.  
32 Andrew van der Vlies describes Disgrace as ‘one of the most widely read novels by a South African-born 
writer, and one of the later twentieth century’s most critically acclaimed novels in any language.’ Andrew 
van der Vlies, J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace: A Reader’s Guide (London: Continuum, 2010), p.x. See also his chapter 
on ‘The Novel’s Reception’ (pp.71-80), including the controversy which arose when the text was ‘cited in 
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In Disgrace, Lurie’s refusal to engage sincerely with the investigative inquiry, set 
up to hear the complaint of sexual harassment made about him by a student, Melanie 
Isaacs, means that he loses his job as a lecturer. If ‘English is an unfit medium for the 
truth of South Africa’,33 it might be thought to be a positive sign that his former head of 
department then tells him that he has been replaced by a specialist in ‘[a]pplied language 
studies. He is in language learning.’34  
But though the statement that ‘English is an unfit medium for the truth of 
South Africa’35 seems to be suggesting that an ability to hear and understand a language 
other than English might be a step towards that truth, it is also conspicuous that 
‘language learning’36 is depicted as directly replacing the study of literature in Lurie’s 
former university. Lurie thinks ‘[s]o much for the poets, so much for the dead masters. 
Who have not, he must say, guided him well. Aliter, to whom he has not listened well.’37 
Language learning is at once, in Lurie’s view, the possible route to the ‘truth of South 
Africa’38 and what edges out the poets. There is in Disgrace an opposition, and one which 
is not fully resolved by the text, between the communicative possibility symbolized by 
language learning and ‘the poets’.39  
‘Imagination for me is Overrated’ 
But what suggests more forcefully that Krog’s initial reading of Disgrace is not to 
be taken at face value is a discussion of the role of fiction in South Africa which occurs 
later in the text. This discussion takes up some of the key terms from the earlier 
conversation but offers a fundamentally different argument. In this sense, Krog’s initial 
interpretation of Disgrace forms something of a false start or dead end in the text; what 
she argues about it initially – that it can help to explain a black South African value 
system – is undermined or at least problematized by textually subsequent events. 
                                                                                                                                          
a submission made to the ANC Human Rights Commission of Inquiry into racism in the media in South 
Africa, in April 2000, as evidence of persisting racist attitudes among white South Africans’(van der Vlies, 
p.78).  
33 Disgrace, p.117.  
34 Disgrace, p.179. 
35 Disgrace, p.117.  
36 Disgrace, p.179.  
37 Disgrace, p.179.  
38 Disgrace, p.117.  
39 Disgrace, p.179.  
199 
 
(Importantly, these events are not chronologically subsequent). There is a turning point 
very near the end of the text, in chapter twenty three of twenty four, when the central 
role the security forces played in creating the tension which led to the murder in the 
first place is revealed at a TRC amnesty hearing. 
According to Mr Nelson Ngo, called as an expert, the Three Million 
Gang was created and supported by the Security Branch on instruction 
from the highest regional level, as part of its counter-insurgency 
strategy to neutralize and undermine UDF- and ANC-aligned activism 
in the mid-1980s […] The strategy was supported right to the top. 
Justice officials, including magistrates and prosecutors, worked to 
undermine criminal prosecutions against these gang members.40 
This revelation changes the way Krog understands the murder; it shows that the 
killing was a direct consequence of the attempts to maintain the apartheid system, even 
as that system appeared to be crumbling. When she realizes the extent of the security 
forces’ involvement with the Three Million, and the lengths to which the white 
government was willing to go to damage the ANC even after the release of Mandela and 
the talk of democratic elections, Krog fundamentally reassesses her role in the trial:  
I made a triple mistake: what I did was politically naïve, legally 
uninformed and morally wrong. Although I myself typed all those names 
of people accusing the Three Million of terrorizing them, I refused to 
believe that the white government was behind it and would go to the 
trouble of actively putting structures up in a tiny town like Kroonstad in 
order for black people to kill each other.41  
She says this in conversation with her husband, J., and he offers an alternative 
perspective: 
You’re again missing the point here: what exactly was offered to kill 
another black person? What would make you kill a person who’s fighting 
for your political freedom? What kind of person does that? This 
collaboration between the police and the gangs was so deeply cynical and 
degenerate that I would say thank God that we didn’t have the capacity 
to imagine such a pact.42 
The revelation gives a new complexion to the questions she has been asking 
about South Africa’s moral systems – in a sense, the text implies, she has been asking 
                                                 
40 Begging to Be Black, p.256. For the TRC Report’s discussion of the special character of violence between 
1990 and 1994, including the escalation of violent incidents and discussion of the third force, see TRC 
Report, vol.2, chapter 7, p.583-613. See also Stephen Ellis, ‘The Historical Significance of South Africa’s 
Third Force’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 24.2 (1998), 261-299.  
41 Begging to Be Black, p.259.  
42 Begging to Be Black, p.259.  
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the wrong questions. Perhaps the issue is not whether she, a white woman, can 
understand African philosophies of community and interconnectedness, or whether the 
individuals involved in the murder felt that the right to life could be subordinated to the 
will of the community. Instead, perhaps the question which should be asked is: what 
chance – historically and in the present – do African lives and the philosophies of the 
community which have been embodied in them stand against the abuses of power 
characteristic of white rule in South Africa? This I take to be one of the meanings of the 
narratives about Moshoeshoe in the text: these sections present an extraordinarily 
successful ruler but, ultimately, Krog writes, 
it seems that most of what Moshoeshoe had been saying was 
misunderstood within the framework of French missionary beliefs, 
British imperialism and Afrikaner land hunger. He was unable to 
convince any foreign power that the diversity he had accommodated in 
his nation was extended to them (at least initially) and that goodness 
could come into a society when its interconnected humanness was 
prioritized.43 
Moshoeshoe’s ideas about the connections between all people and about the power of 
community could not exert significant influence on any of the various iterations of 
white power he came into contact with.  
What is revealed by the TRC changes the way she thinks about the trial and her 
participation in it, but it also changes what she thinks about literature, in a way which 
undermines or at least draws into question the earlier reading of Disgrace. Krog’s final 
conversation with the philosopher is presented after the full story about the Three 
Million has been revealed at the TRC hearings. He asks her what she plans to do with 
their talks; ‘[a]re you writing a novel?’44: 
‘No, I can’t. I don’t want to write novels.’ 
‘Why not? With novels you can explore the inner psyche of 
characters; you can imagine, for example, being black. So what is it 
about non-fiction that you don’t want to give up?’ 
‘The strangeness. Whatever novelistic elements I may use in my non-
fiction work, the strangeness is not invented. The strangeness is real, 
and the fact that I cannot ever really enter the psyche of somebody 
                                                 
43 Begging to Be Black, p.227.  
44 Begging to Be Black, p.267.  
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else, somebody black. The terror and loneliness of that inability is 
what I don’t want to give up on.’45  
Her changing perception of the role of fiction is linked to what she understands 
to be the limit of imagination. She goes on to say that ‘I want to suggest that at this stage 
imagination for me is overrated.’46 The philosopher replies ‘That’s a terrible statement!’ 
and Krog responds by saying ‘I know, so let me not generalize and stick to the pronoun 
“I”’.47 But this pronoun is soon discarded, and Krog says: 
 I think I am saying that in a country where we have come from 
different civilisations, then lived apart in unequal and distorted 
relationships that formed generations of us, our imagination is simply 
not capable of imagining a reality as – or with – the other.48 
The text suggests that this new way of thinking about fiction is prompted by the 
revelations of the TRC. It does so through the use of the words ‘imagination’ and 
‘imagining’.49 When, after the Amnesty Hearing, she and J are discussing her 
involvement in the original trial, J says ‘[t]his collaboration between the police and the 
gangs was so deeply cynical and degenerate that I would say thank God that we didn’t 
                                                 
45 Begging to Be Black, p.267. In the section of Country of My Skull dealing with the evidence given by the 
shepherd Lekotse, Krog writes that in ‘a desperate attempt to understand the behaviour of others, 
Lekotse imaginatively transplants himself into several other positions. The farmer. How could a farmer 
give permission for this kind of action? The police. They must be hungry if they are carrying on like this – 
and he offers them food and drink’ (Country of My Skull, p.331). But though he, the victim of human rights 
abuse, is able to make such moves, they are shown to be one-sided: Krog writes that ‘what makes his 
story all the more poignant is the fact that he can imagine himself in the other characters’ positions, but 
no one seems able to empathize with his own’ (Country of My Skull, p.331). But then only two pages later, 
the positions seem to be reversed: ‘[a]lthough the police penetrate his world, they refuse him access to 
theirs, and even to their intentions’. (Country of My Skull, p.333). This amplifies the danger of the kind of 
empathetic identification with which Krog is engaged in Begging to Be Black. In Country of My Skull, it is 
shown always to be one-sided – either a desperate appeal to the other which goes unacknowledged, or 
experienced as a violation.  
46 Begging to Be Black, p.268.  
47 Begging to Be Black, p.268. Recall in Gordimer’s novel July’s People, as in Begging to Be Black, the attempt to 
evade the pronoun ‘we’ and its seeming inescapability: ‘[w]e (Maureen sometimes harked back) 
understand the sacred power and rights of sexual love as formulated in master bedrooms, and motels 
with false names in the register [...] The absolute nature she and her kind were scrupulously just in granting 
to everybody was no more than the price of the master bedroom and the clandestine hotel tariff’ (July’s 
People, p.79).  
48 Begging to Be Black, p.268.  
49 Begging to Be Black, p.268.  
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have the capacity to imagine such a pact’.50 When Krog later describes the reason that 
she doesn’t want to write novels, she uses exactly the same phrase: ‘our imagination is 
simply not capable of imagining a reality as – or with – the other.’51 
She has been told about the Three Million: she ‘typed all those names of people 
accusing the Three Million of terrorizing them’ but ‘refused to believe that the white 
government was behind it and would go to the trouble of actively putting structures up 
in a tiny town like Kroonstad in order for black people to kill each other.’52 This is a 
very clear illustration of the limits of ‘imagination’53 – she had significant information at 
her disposal, and yet she could not make the leap required. Where fiction might provide 
the illusion of understanding, what has to be faced, Krog suggests, are precisely 
imagination’s limits, like the failure of imagination which would not allow her to believe 
in the white government’s duplicity. What nonfiction is able to preserve that fiction 
cannot is ‘the fact that I cannot ever really enter the psyche of somebody else, 
somebody black. The terror and loneliness of that inability.’54 
This is a new way of thinking about fictionality in the text, and one which 
directly contrasts with the arguments advanced earlier about Disgrace. She had previously 
used Disgrace to understand becoming-black: the philosopher proposes that ‘[w]ith 
novels you can explore the inner psyche of characters; you can imagine, for example, 
being black.’55 So when she then rejects this way of thinking about fiction, arguing that 
‘our imagination is simply not capable of imagining a reality as – or with – the other’ 
what she is questioning or undermining is the original reason that she turned to Disgrace, 
and the way she understood that text.56 
This is concern which does not just reverberate through Krog’s writing, as we 
have seen in Country of My Skull, but also has profound links with Gordimer’s work. I 
have already mentioned July’s People, and Gordimer’s earlier short story ‘Which New Era 
                                                 
50 Begging to Be Black, p.259.  
51 Begging to Be Black, p.268.  
52 Begging to Be Black, p.259.  
53 Begging to Be Black, p.268.  
54 Begging to Be Black, p.267.  
55 Begging to Be Black, p.267.  
56 Begging to Be Black, p.268.  
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Would That Be’ takes on related questions.57 As the story begins, Jake Alexander – ‘a 
big, fat coloured man, half Scottish, half African’ – is cooking bacon for a group of his 
friends in the back room of his printing shop in Johannesburg.58 Then he is visited by a 
white couple. Jake recognizes the woman’s ‘type’, the type of ‘white women’ who ‘felt as 
you did.’59 
They were sure of it […] breathless with stout sensitivity, they 
insisted on walking the whole teeter-totter of the colour line. There 
was no escaping their understanding. They even insisted on feeling 
the resentment you must feel at their identifying themselves with 
your feelings.60  
As Jacqueline Rose suggests, ‘[t]he story is an allegory of white writing. Its genius 
is the way it portrays the complete breakdown of understanding between black and 
white […] even as Gordimer goes inside the thoughts of the black characters to make 
her point.’61 That is, an impossibility is being enacted here: in order to represent Jake’s 
cynicism about these utterly understanding white women, Gordimer has to take on their 
position precisely: she has to identify with ‘the resentment you must feel at their 
identifying themselves with your feelings’.62 Dorothy Driver argues that Jake ‘holds on 
to the world from which [the woman] wish[es] to embark in [her] desire to establish 
common ground.’63 But it is also the case that his suspicion, his feeling that there are 
forms of empathy or identification which are intrusive and excessive, is justified: here 
indeed is the white woman writer, insisting on imagining not only his feelings but his 
resentment at that identification. 
‘Kindred Reading Spirits’  
Nonetheless, the question of fiction in Begging to Be Black is not left there. There 
is a third moment in the text which, yet again, complicates the text’s discussion of the 
value of fiction. Presented immediately after the conversation with the philosopher, in 
                                                 
57 Nadine Gordimer, ‘Which New Era Would That Be?’, in Nadine Gordimer, Selected Stories (London: 
Penguin, 1975), pp.81-95. 
58 ‘Which New Era’, p.81. 
59 ‘Which New Era’, p.82.  
60 ‘Which New Era’, p.82-3.  
61 Rose, pp.179-180.  
62 ‘Which New Era Would That Be?’, p.83.  
63 Dorothy Driver, ‘Nadine Gordimer: The Politicisation of Women’, English in Africa, 10.2 (1983), 29-54 
(p.48).  
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the same chapter section, separated only by a horizontal line on the page, is a description 
of a visit Krog makes to Denzil. Denzil is now in prison as a result of a separate matter: 
‘[a]fter our murder case, nothing wanted to work out in his life.’64 She brings with her a 
novel, Marlene van Niekerk’s Agaat, which has been given to her by her mother for this 
purpose: 
I give him the book. He looks astounded. ‘Can you believe it?’ he says, 
his voice breaking like a teenager’s. ‘I’ve heard about this book! Can 
you believe this…’ He weighs it in one hand, instinctively looking 
around for somebody to show what he has just found, but, like my 
mother earlier that morning, knowing the futility of looking for 
kindred reading spirits.65 
When she leaves, ‘Denzil, who wrote literary reviews for the book page I ran in Cape 
Town, presses Agaat like a treasure or a shield to his chest when we say goodbye.’66  
Krog describes Denzil as ‘knowing the futility of looking for kindred reading 
spirits’.67 But she also describes him as ‘like my mother earlier that morning’, which 
implies a tenuous and uncertain kind of connection between the two, based around the 
novel.68 Though Denzil will not find ‘kindred reading spirits’ in the prison, and though 
Krog’s mother hands her the book saying that she has ‘two copies, and know[s] no one 
to whom I can give it’69, the value Agaat has for them links them, even as this link is at a 
distance and through an intermediary.  The connection is symbolic: Krog’s mother is in 
the text closely associated with Afrikaner identity and tradition. Krog remembers her 
teaching her about beskuit, made from ‘my mother’s bread-yeast plant that she got from 
her mother, who got it in turn from her mother, and so forth, back to the Anglo-Boer 
War’.70   
Her mother is also associated with the apartheid system. When she is in Berlin, 
Krog goes to hear Daniel Barenboim conduct Tristan and Isolde. Presented in the text as 
one of the letters to her mother, Krog writes 
                                                 
64 Begging to Be Black, p.275. 
65 Begging to Be Black, p.271.  
66 Begging to Be Black, p.272.  
67 Begging to Be Black, p.271.  
68 Begging to Be Black, p.271.  
69 Begging to Be Black, p.269.  
70 Begging to Be Black, p.47.  
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[e]ven on the train I see long dresses, capes, scarves and coats – 
everyone with the glow of pleasure on their faces. An evening like this 
one does not forget. And I write this to you, liewe Ma, because it 
started with you, many years ago, buying the LP record of Tristan and 
Isolde from the Jewish-owned record shop in Kroonstad. As you 
listened to it, it rubbed off on me. Now I wonder whether you were 
aware how deeply racialized this simple act was, of selling music, 
claimed by the Nazis, to you a supporter of apartheid.71 
Agaat was published in 2004 and is, like Disgrace, a post-apartheid novel which has often 
been read in allegorical terms.72 Unlike Coetzee’s text, it was written in Afrikaans. It 
concerns the relationship between an Afrikaner woman and her black maid and carer. 
When Agaat enables a connection between Krog’s mother and Denzil, therefore, the 
reconciliatory potential of this moment is heightened by Agaat’s own subject-matter.   
Across Begging to Be Black there are various positions presented about the role of 
fiction. There is an attempt to read Disgrace as an attempt to understand something 
about black South African understandings of community, followed by a reconsideration 
of the extent to which the imaginative leaps into what feels like the consciousness of 
another are useful in a society in which people have been separated from each other to 
such a significant extent. But this is itself followed by a moment of connection between 
Denzil and Krog’s mother, facilitated through a novel, which seems to draw into 
question the earlier rejection of fiction.  
Krog turns to literature because the law seems to her a blunt instrument that 
cannot take into account the complexities of South Africa’s history. After the trial, she 
writes 
[t]he only scale used was the law. Because you broke the law against 
murder, you did wrong. It feels as if the sentence is suggesting that to 
kill or to steal or to lie is not wrong because it harms others per se, 
but wrong because it is against the law – as if to confirm that in this 
country laws mostly do not develop from moral beliefs. So it became 
possible that an activist like Reggie could decide that, because he was 
fighting against those who initially made the unjust laws that took away 
his freedom and trampled his human rights, he could despise those 
laws and function outside them.73 
                                                 
71 Begging to Be Black, p.244.  
72 Marlene van Niekerk, Agaat (Portland: Tin House Books, 2010). It was published in the UK under the 
title The Way of the Women (London: Abacus, 2008).  
73 Begging to Be Black, p.171.  
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Disgrace seems initially to function as an alternative scale to the law, and this is a move I 
have drawn attention to before: it is what happens in Slaughter’s account of the 
Bildungsroman and in Tutu’s reading of Death and the Maiden. In all three cases, though 
in different ways, literature is invoked where the law is insufficient to the demands of 
human rights.  
However, Begging to Be Black ends ambiguously. A rejection of fiction’s 
possibilities is followed by a moment of fleeting distanced connection facilitated by a 
fictional text. Here, then, where law is unreliable or uncertain, where it is unable and 
unwilling to protect human rights, we do not find literature functioning as a 
replacement for the law. It does not ‘invite readers to draw connections to lived 
experience; to locate differences and make them familiar; to interpret fairly and with 
empathy’ as in Roskelly’s description of women’s adaptations of the Bildungsroman.74  
Instead Begging to Be Black suggests that there are some differences that cannot be made 
familiar, and that the ‘connections’ drawn to ‘lived experience’ may completely miss the 
point.75 Here, where the law cannot achieve the aims of human rights – where it is 
uncertain and in abeyance – we also find literature at its own limit-point. This is 
something which can be explored further through Burger’s Daughter.  
Burger’s Daughter  
The central character in Burger’s Daughter is Rosa Burger, the daughter of Lionel 
Burger, a prominent figure in the struggle against apartheid. Burger is closely modelled 
on Bram Fischer, a South African lawyer, anti-apartheid activist and Communist Party 
leader who was imprisoned for life in 1966 under the Suppression of Communism Act 
and died under house arrest in 1975. Early in the novel Burger is arrested for his 
political activities, tried, and imprisoned. This causes Rosa to consider her own political 
commitment, and the extent to which she is prepared to sacrifice her own life for the 
sake of the country. She leaves South Africa for a non-political life in France. When she 
returns, she joins her father’s old comrades, as well as working in a hospital in 
Johannesburg where she treats the children and young people who have been injured in 
the Soweto uprising.  
                                                 
74 Roskelly, p.216.   
75 Roskelly, p.216.  
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As Saul Dubow has shown, opposition to apartheid in South Africa itself in the 
1970s did not tend to be framed through the language of human rights; the novel does 
not itself therefore comment on, nor is it imbricated in, human rights discourse – the 
discourse itself was not significant enough at the time of its publication for the novel to 
be read in these terms.76 However, as we have seen so far, the inadequacy of the law is at 
the heart of the possession paradox; that is, on the one hand the legal protection of 
rights is not enough, and human rights discourse requires a more ambivalent sense of 
legality – as in the TRC – and on the other human rights are most important where their 
protection is not forthcoming. This is both what gives human rights discourse its 
distinctiveness (it is evoked where the law is weak, or unjust, or insufficient) and what I 
suggest opens a particular opportunity for literature.  
For this reason, even though human rights discourse was not a contextual 
influence on the novel itself, the particular characteristics of the text’s engagement with 
the immorality of apartheid law have significant relevance for thinking about the 
relationship between contemporary human rights discourse and literature. In her 1976 
‘Letter From Johannesburg’, Nadine Gordimer explained the stark way in which Soweto 
drew the legitimacy of the law into question. White South Africans, she writes:   
knew how to feel outrage or pity when we saw newspaper 
photographs of the first corpses of children caught by the horrible 
surprise of a death nobody believed, even in South Africa, would be 
meted out by the police […] We whites do not know how to deal with 
the fact of this death when children, in full knowledge of what can 
happen to them, continue to go out to meet it at the hands of the law, 
                                                 
76 Dubow, p.14. See, however, Samuel Moyn, who argues that events in Soweto did contribute to the 
development of international human rights discourse (as opposed to that within South Africa), even 
though it was an exceptional case: ‘[in] the rise of human rights in the 1970s, human rights did not mean 
the campaign for collective liberation against racial inequality or colonial legacies, at home or abroad 
(except for the escalating engagement with South Africa, especially after the Soweto uprising in 1976). 
(Last Utopia, p.106). Moreover, in retrospect the events at Soweto have been viewed in human rights 
terms. The TRC, for example, described the state and police responses as gross human rights violations, 
stating: [t]he police adopted a shoot-to-kill policy and […] Captain Swanepoel and the Deputy 
Commissioner Wandrag of riot control were responsible for the excessive use of force which led to the 
death of more than 575 students, most of them under 25 years of age. During this period, 2380 people 
were wounded. The Commission finds the former state, the then Prime Minister and the Ministers of 
Education and Police responsible and directly accountable for gross human rights violations. (TRC Report, 
vol.3, p.570). 
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for which we are solely responsible, whether we support white 
supremacy or, opposing, have failed to unseat it.77 
Discussing a white woman she knows who has had her husband buy a gun, 
Gordimer observes: 
[s]he needn’t have felt so ashamed. We are all afraid. How will the rest 
of us end up? Here is the conflict of whites who hate apartheid and 
have worked in ‘constitutional’ ways to get rid of it. The quotes are 
there because there’s not much law-abiding virtue in sticking to a 
constitution like the South African one, in which only the rights of a 
white minority are guaranteed.78 
Gordimer is discussing constitutional, rather than human, rights here. But her literary 
response to the utter injustice of the law, its partiality and its violence, enables a 
reflection on the modes of connecting human rights and literature we have considered 
so far.  
Perspective 
 Burger’s Daughter begins with a distanced, third person perspective: 
[a]mong the group of people waiting at the fortress was a schoolgirl in a 
brown and yellow uniform holding a green eiderdown quilt and, by the 
loop at its neck, a red hot-water bottle. Certain buses used to pass that 
way then and passengers looking out will have noticed a schoolgirl. 
Imagine, a schoolgirl: she must have somebody inside. Who are all 
those people anyway?79  
There appears to be a traditional third person narrator here, but, without yet breaking 
from this mode, attention is being drawn from the second sentence to the question of 
perspective – the location from which the scene is being viewed. If Gordimer had 
written ‘[c]ertain buses used to pass that way then and passengers looking out noticed a 
schoolgirl’, the effect of ‘[i]magine, a schoolgirl…’ would be quite different.80 It would 
be read as the thoughts of the passengers on the bus, the omniscient narrator having 
moved seamlessly into their position.  
                                                 
77 Nadine Gordimer, ‘Letter from Johannesburg, 1976’, in The Essential Gesture: Writing, Politics and Places, 
ed. by Stephen Clingman (London: Penguin, 1988), pp.118-132 (p.121).  
78 ‘Letter from Johannesburg, 1976’, p.122.  
79 Nadine Gordimer, Burger’s Daughter (London: Penguin, 1979) p.9.  
80 Burger’s Daughter, p.9.  
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But the use of ‘will’ – ‘passengers looking out will have noticed a schoolgirl’ (my 
italics) – introduces a slight doubt, drawing attention to the dubious mechanics of the 
section’s description of the passengers’ thoughts.81 It suggests that an assumption is 
being made by the narrator and in this way it changes the final sentence from a 
description of what particular passengers did think, to something more like a 
speculation about what such passengers would have been likely to think. From the 
novel’s opening sentences the reader’s sense of perspective is slightly unsettled and this 
becomes progressively more complex over the first pages.  
For the first three paragraphs of the novel the distanced narrative position is 
maintained; none of ‘the group of people waiting at the fortress’ is named.82 Instead 
‘the schoolgirl’ is joined by ‘an old man with a thrust-back head of white floss’, ‘several 
young men’ and ‘a tall blonde woman’.83 These characters are simply sketched in on 
the basis of appearance; all that is known of them is what can be seen from the 
outside. But then, in the fourth and fifth paragraphs, more detail about ‘the schoolgirl’ 
is provided, and her significance for the narrative (given the novel’s title) is revealed: 
[t]he schoolgirl was urged on, given way to by others; Lionel Burger’s 
daughter was among them that day, fourteen years old, bringing an 
eiderdown quilt and a hot-water bottle for her mother.  
Rosa Burger, about fourteen years old at the time, waiting at the prison in 
a brown gymfrock over a yellow shirt and brown pullover with yellow 
stripes outlining the V-neck, was small for her age, slightly bottle-legged 
(1st hockey team) and with a tiny waist. Her hair was not freshly washed 
and the cartilage of her ear-tips broke the dark lank, suggesting that the 
ears were prominent though hidden.84 
The identity of the schoolgirl is revealed here, but not straightforwardly. As Louise 
Yelin notes,  
[t]he three ways that Rosa Burger is designated in this sequence seem 
initially to be synonymous or complementary ways of describing the same 
person, but the three designations – schoolgirl, Lionel Burger’s daughter, 
Rosa Burger – actually represent the relationship of a perceiver or narrator 
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83 Burger’s Daughter, p.9.  
84 Burger’s Daughter, p.10.  
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and the person/things described: How Rosa is seen depends on who is 
seeing her and from where.85  
A slight shift in narrating voice between these two paragraphs is also signalled by the 
reference to Rosa’s age. In the fourth paragraph she is ‘fourteen years old’.86 This is 
stated as fact, without equivocation. In the next, though, a note of uncertainty is 
introduced: she is ‘about fourteen years old at the time’.87 The narrator might be 
reconsidering; on the other, hand there might be two (or more) slightly different 
narrators. Either way, what is important about this is that it creates a slight shift or jolt in 
the narration. 
Moreover, where so far in the text we have only been given the barest indications 
of who the characters are, here the narrator from paragraph five onwards suddenly 
possesses quite a lot of knowledge of Rosa’s life – that’s she’s in the hockey first team, 
for example.88 But, alongside such details which are known by the narrator but cannot 
be directly observed in the scene – Rosa is also in the second swimming team, the 
narrative says – there is an uncertainty about certain physical details because of the 
particular physical arrangement of that moment in time.89 ‘Her hair was not freshly 
washed and the cartilage of her ear-tips broke the dark lank, suggesting that the ears 
were prominent though hidden.’90 The perspective in this sentence is spectatorial, the 
narrative observing Rosa very closely but nonetheless limited by what can be directly 
observed; the prominence of the ears is only ‘suggested’.91 In this way, the narrative’s 
vantage point shifts subtly around and there is a wavering between facts from outside of 
this scene which are known by the narrator, and details which can only be assumed 
because of the limits of a particular viewpoint at a specific moment in time.  
Another description of the same scene follows. This account is presented in italics 
and quotation marks, which work to distinguish it from the rest of the text and suggest 
that it has some kind of different status – it seems to be a quotation from something 
else, though this is not explicitly confirmed: 
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[a]mong us was a girl of thirteen or fourteen, a schoolgirl still in her gym, the 
daughter of Lionel Burger. It was a bitter winter day. She was carrying blankets 
and even a hot-water bottle for her mother. The relatives of the people detained in a 
brutal dawn swoop had been told they could bring clothing etc. to the prison. We 
were not allowed to bring books or food. Little Rosa Burger knew her mother, that 
courageous and warm-hearted woman, was under doctor’s orders.92  
Here, replacing the speculations of those passengers who ‘will’ have been on a passing 
bus, are the memories of someone who was in the group outside the prison.93 Where 
the passengers on the bus might, the first narrator imagines, ask ‘[w]ho are all those 
people anyway’, the second narrator is one of them.94 The two accounts are similar, but 
though both list the objects the schoolgirl is carrying, only the second offers an 
explanation of these items.  
The next page is blank except for a single sentence, also in italics but not in 
quotation marks, which says: ‘[w]hen they saw me outside the prison, what did they 
see?’95 As Brian Macaskill writes ‘[t]he way this sentence is placed – isolated from its 
neighbours and set apart by italics – emphasizes that its origin is curiously obscure.’96 
Who is asking this question? The following chapter is from Rosa’s first person 
perspective, and begins – as if in answer to the question ‘When they saw me outside the 
prison, what did they see?’97 – ‘I shall never know. It’s all concocted’.98 But if both the 
question and the chapter following it are from Rosa’s own perspective, why set the 
question off from the subsequent chapter in this way? Macaskill writes that ‘[the 
question’s] origin’: 
is not the same as that of the response immediately presented – both 
right away and with less mediation – over the page: ‘I shall never 
know’ (unequivocally attributable to Rosa). Nor yet does this sentence 
originate from the authority that picks up the narrative three pages 
later with the utterance, ‘After the death of her father…’  Instead, it 
comes from some other place.99  
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This question – ‘When they saw me outside the prison, what did they see?’ – presented 
starkly by itself on the page, also encourages a different kind of reading of what has 
preceded it.100 One interpretation of the novel so far, with its two different versions of 
the scene outside the prison, is that it has been Rosa’s attempt to see herself from the 
outside, to understand what ‘they’ saw.  
 As Macaskill states, the text then switches to Rosa’s first person account, and 
the moment outside the prison is worked over again. This first person section in 
Rosa’s voice goes back over some of the perspectives on the scene outside the prison 
already included in the narrative:  
I understand the bland heroics of badly-written memoirs by the 
faithful – good people in spite of the sanctimony. I suppose I was 
aware that ordinary people might look down from a bus and see us. 
Some with wonder, knowing whose relatives and friends we must be 
– even somebody’s daughter, look, a kid in a gym.101  
It seems likely that the ‘badly-written memoirs by the faithful’102 refers to the section 
presented in quotations and italics, beginning ‘[a]mong us’.103  
However the sentence immediately afterwards in Rosa’s narration, ‘I suppose I 
was aware that ordinary people might look down from a bus and see us’, suggests a 
dialogue with – or an attempt to present her own perspective on – not the italicized 
section, but the opening of the novel. 104 This, to repeat, says: 
[a]mong the group of people waiting at the fortress was a schoolgirl in a 
brown and yellow uniform holding a green eiderdown quilt and, by the 
loop at its neck, a red hot-water bottle. Certain buses used to pass that 
way then and passengers looking out will have noticed a schoolgirl. 
Imagine, a schoolgirl: she must have somebody inside. Who are all 
those people anyway?105  
As I have suggested, there are a number of similarities between this opening section 
and the passage distinguished from the body of the novel through italics and quotation 
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marks, which clearly seems to be one of the ‘badly-written memoirs’.106 For example, 
‘[a]mong the group of people waiting at the fortress was a schoolgirl brown and yellow 
uniform’107 is replaced by ‘[a]mong us was a girl of thirteen or fourteen, a schoolgirl 
still in her gym, the daughter of Lionel Burger.’108 This creates a doubt about whether 
the opening of the novel, the only place in the narrative so far that the hypothetical 
passengers on the bus have been mentioned, might also be one of the sanctimonious 
texts by the faithful.  
I don’t think that the opening is necessarily supposed to be read as one of the 
memoirs. But Rosa’s first person section creates at least the suggestion that it might be, 
through the placing next to each other of a criticism of the faithful’s memoirs and a 
reference to the bus passengers described only in the novel’s opening. In order to 
make a decision one way or the other, the reader is encouraged to judge whether or 
not the novel’s first paragraphs are ‘badly-written’, and if such criteria have to be used 
to separate out the voices mingling in the text, attention is drawn to the existence of 
these voices and, crucially, to their writtenness, their status as narrative.109 
In Rosa’s narration, it becomes apparent that some of the assumptions of the 
second narrator are wrong. The hot water bottle is not demonstration of ‘Little’ Rosa’s 
consideration for her mother’s health: instead it is demonstration of Rosa’s 
sophisticated understanding of the conditions of clandestine anti-apartheid activity.110 
Hidden inside is a note to Rosa’s mother mentioning Rosa’s father: ‘[s]he would know 
at once I was telling her my father had not been taken since she had gone.’111 From the 
third person narrator and the imagined perspectives of the passengers on the bus, to the 
perspective of someone in the group, to Rosa’s account, which corrects the version of 
the story which precedes it: there is a sense, in these repeated retellings, that the reader 
might be moving closer and closer towards the centre, towards the truth of what is 
going on. For example, where in the opening account there is ‘an old man with a thrust-
back head of white floss’,112 in Rosa’s account there is ‘Wally Atkinson who had no one 
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inside but had been in many times himself, and came to fly the standard of his white 
hair among us’.113  
This sense is deepened when there is yet another account of the same scene 
outside the prison, this time from Rosa’s own first person perspective and in the 
present tense: 
I am aware of the moulded rubber loop by which the hot-water bottle 
hangs from my finger, and the eiderdown I hold against my belly is my 
old green taffeta one Granny Burger gave me when I was not old enough 
to remember her; my father thought my mother’s double-bed one was 
too big and too beautiful to get spoilt in prison.’114  
Here the way Rosa experienced the scene physically is stressed – the feeling of the 
‘moulded rubber loop’115 on her finger – as is the family meaning of the objects. The 
blanket is not just a blanket, it is an object embedded in the lives of those who have 
owned it, with its own family history. 
Moreover, what Rosa’s first person account adds, that could not be observed 
from the outside, is that she is ‘alternately submerged below and thrust over the 
threshold of pain’116 and though she is looking at the prison door: 
real awareness is all focused in the lower part of my pelvis, in the 
leaden, dragging, wringing pain there. Can anyone describe the 
peculiar fierce concentration of the body’s forces in the menstruation 
of early puberty? The bleeding began just after my father had made 
me go back to bed after my mother had been taken away. No pain; 
just wetness that I tested with my finger, turned on the light to verify: 
yes, blood. But outside the prison the internal landscape of my 
mysterious body turns me inside out, so that in that public place on 
that public occasion (all the arrests of the dawn swoop have been in 
the newspapers, a special edition is on sale, with names of those 
known to be detained, including that of my mother) I am within that 
monthly crisis of destruction, the purging, tearing, draining of my own 
structure. I am my womb and a year ago I wasn’t aware – physically – 
I had one.117  
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The sense of moving closer, of getting at the truth, is emphasized by the intimate, 
bodily detail of Rosa’s account, in which the experience of her physicality is vividly, 
viscerally described. There is a sense here that bodily life is overflowing its bounds: ‘the 
internal landscape of my mysterious body turns me inside out’ in ‘that public place on 
that public occasion’.118 The distinction between the public and private breaks down, 
and it is menstruation which absorbs all of Rosa’s attention, however dramatic the 
political context.  
  As Daphne Read points out, ‘[t]his discussion of menstruation in conjunction 
with the arrest of her mother highlights Rosa’s entry into adulthood, both as a woman 
and a political being.’119 We have considered narratives of female coming of age at 
length in Chapter Three, but here, crucially, the sense of moving towards the truth of 
the story – a vivid female corporeality which reaches a culmination in the intimacy of 
the description of the ‘fierce concentration of the body’s forces’120– is itself then 
undercut as we read in Rosa’s narration:  
[m]y version and theirs. And if this were being written down, both 
would seem equally concocted when read over. And if I were really 
telling, instead of talking to you in my mind the way I find I do…One 
is never talking to oneself, always one is addressed to someone. 
Suddenly, without knowing the reason, at different stages in one’s life, 
one is addressing this person or that all the time, even dreams are 
performed before an audience.121 
Instead of the sense that the narrative is moving closer to the full story, here the 
alternate versions are reduced to an equivalence – ‘my version and theirs’.122 What is 
more, a distrust of the ability of written texts themselves to approach the reality of lived 
experience is expressed – both the stories ‘would seem equally concocted when read 
over’.123 But this suspicion of the concocted nature of written narrative is something the 
reader is invited to share with Rosa. Her narration suggests that reading a text creates a 
sense of its having been concocted. We might take to mean that written narrative loses 
something of the way experience feels, that it tends towards structure and pattern, 
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where experience is unpredictable. But, of course, though Rosa says that this is what 
would happen ‘if’ these ‘versions’ were written down, of course they have been written 
down – that is, as they appear in the novel.124 This is, itself, a concocted realization of 
narrative’s concocted nature.  
 As the overwhelming ‘destruction’125 of the body takes over the political scene, 
and as the reader only learns of the extreme pain Rosa is in after having moved from 
observing her from the imagined perspective of the bus, to the view of the others in the 
crowd and only then into her own first-person narration, there seems to be a sense that 
the truth of the body – her body – is the truth. But immediately it becomes clear that 
written narration does not work perfectly in this way; it cannot provide perfect access to 
a truth which exists corporeally. Here, the sense that the reader is being provided with 
progressively more insight into the scene outside the prison reaches a crisis-point. 
What the story would be like if it were being truly told to the audience Rosa 
imagines is unpredictable, as the ellipsis indicates (‘if I were really telling, instead of 
talking to you in my mind the way I find I do…’).126 The narrative suggests that it 
represents a progressive movement towards a closer understanding of the scene. But 
just when it seems as if the reader has reached the most intimate understanding 
possible, everything breaks down. All of the narrative perspectives are shown to be 
‘concocted’ and none of them has a superior claim to the truth of the scene. These are 
the novel’s opening pages. I suggest that the mode of narrative established here has 
important consequences for the rest of novel. 
The Censoring of Burger’s Daughter  
 
After its publication in London, Burger’s Daughter was imported into South Africa, 
where it was embargoed and then, on 11th July 1979, banned.127 The structure of 
censorship operating in 1979 had been brought into being by the new publications Act 
of 1974, which inaugurated what Peter McDonald has described as ‘the most repressive 
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era in the history of the system.’128 Under this Act, the censorship system consisted of a 
central Directorate of Publications in Cape Town overseeing censorship committees 
(intended to be located around the country), which would make decisions on whether 
or not to ban particular texts, and a Publications Appeal Board (PAB).  
In the wake of the controversy over Etienne Leroux’s novel Magersfontein, O 
Magersfontein, published in 1976, some amendments to the 1974 law were introduced, 
which became significant in the case of Burger’s Daughter. Indeed, according to J.M. 
Coetzee, the Magersfontein incident ‘can in retrospect be seen as a minor watershed in 
the history of censorship in South Africa.’129 Leroux’s novel had been examined by a 
committee and passed for publication. Then in 1977 a religious-based Afrikaner group 
succeeded in campaigning for an intervention by the Minister of the Interior, causing 
the Appeal Board to ban the book.  
In ‘siding with the moral pressure groups, the Church, and the politicians,’ 
McDonald writes, ‘the Appeal Board […] alienated a wide spectrum of Afrikaans 
literary intellectuals’,130 and the government changed tack after it won that year’s 
general election, ‘switching allegiance, once again, though this time in favour of the 
literary elite.’131 In 1978 it ‘introduced various amendments intended to protect 
literature without granting it full exemption’132 and in particular, and most relevantly in 
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the case of Burger’s Daughter, it allowed that, as John Dugard writes, ‘[i]n appropriate 
cases the PAB may be advised by a committee of experts comprising persons with 
both the necessary educational qualifications and a special knowledge of art, language 
or literature.’133 
Therefore when Burger’s Daughter entered South Africa it was first sent by the 
head of the Directorate of Publications to a reader who produced a report 
recommending its banning.134 This report was adapted and developed by a committee 
of ‘security censors’, and the book was then banned.135 This decision was appealed by 
the Directorate of Publications on 1st August, although as McDonald has shown, the 
Director was, as the appeal was ongoing, dismissing the novel to various 
correspondents via the unlikely tactic of pointing to a critical review written by 
Auberon Waugh in London’s Evening Standard.136 Following the new procedures in 
the wake of the Magersfontein controversy, the PAB was assisted in its decision by a 
committee of literary experts. The committee recommended the novel’s unbanning, 
and the Publications Appeal Board duly unbanned it, after also taking advice from a 
security expert who judged the book to pose little danger to security.   
The Words of Others 
 
In support of his suggestion that ‘[t]he authoress uses Rosa’s story as a pad from 
which to launch a blistering and full-scale attack on the Republic of South Africa’ the 
first censor argued that she ‘often adopts the literary technique of presenting what are in 
truth expressions of personal opinion as statements of fact. To this end, she uses what 
is said during (imaginary) court trials and in political group-discussions.’137 As 
McDonald argues,  
[w]hat he appeared to mean by this was that she ‘uses what is said during 
(imaginary) court trials and in political group-discussions’ to promulgate 
her own political views. Like all the censors, he did not recognize that 
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some of the dialogue in the ‘court trials’ was based upon actual testimony 
Bram Fischer gave during his own trial for sedition in the 1960s.138  
Whatever the parenthetical ‘imaginary’ is supposed to indicate, McDonald suggests, it 
is not wholly accurate, as the testimony Burger gives at his trial has a real-life model, 
and what Gordimer is doing in the court scenes is related to this interaction of fictional 
and actual speech.  
Bram Fischer was imprisoned for life in 1966 under the Suppression of 
Communism Act.139 Gordimer attended his trial and in one of the essays she wrote 
about it, she says: 
[f]rom 1958 to 1961 [Fischer] devoted himself to the defence of Nelson 
Mandela, the African National Congress leader, and twenty-nine other 
accused in the first mass political trial that, because it represented so many 
shades – both skin and ideological – of political thought, became known 
as ‘the Opposition on trial’. In 1964 Fischer was leading defence counsel 
at the trial of the ‘High Command’ of combined liberation movements, 
which had been based at Rivonia, north of Johannesburg.140  
In acting for the defence in the Rivonia trial, Fischer took a great personal risk as he 
himself had been a frequent presence at Lilliesleaf Farm, the headquarters of the 
underground movement in Rivonia.  
In 1964 Fischer was arrested for the first time. He was granted bail and travelled 
to London, to continue his work as a lawyer. He then returned to South Africa, despite 
the charges he faced. On 25th January 1965 he vanished ‘leaving a letter to the court’, 
Gordimer writes, ‘saying that he was aware that his eventual punishment would be 
increased by his action, but that he believed it was his duty both to remain in South 
Africa and to continue to oppose apartheid’.141 While in prison he became terminally 
ill, and he was eventually, briefly, released into house arrest before he died in May 
1975. It is clear from the essays that Gordimer believed Fischer and his family to be 
exemplars of an extraordinary bravery and moral virtue:  
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there has been, about Abram Fischer and his wife and children, the 
particular magnetism of deeply honest lives. Paradoxically, the pull is 
strong in a country were so many compromises with conscience are 
made by so many decent citizens.142 
McDonald states that ‘the dialogue in the “court trials” was based upon actual 
testimony Bram Fischer gave during his own trial’.143 However, Burger gives a speech – 
he does not engage in dialogue. Bram Fischer was not cross-examined at his trial 
because he did not want to incriminate his comrades. Instead he gave an address from 
the dock, and it is for the same reason that, in the novel, Lionel Burger gives a speech 
before his sentencing. The novel makes it very clear that Burger’s speech is not a 
dialogue in the sense of a conversation or interaction. Gordimer repeatedly stresses 
that the speech Burger gives is very long; the sections of it in the novel are presented 
as excerpts, with ellipses. She also emphasizes that he is speaking without interruption 
or interaction with anyone else: ‘[a]n hour and a half. Nobody would dare stop 
him…Not the squat stern pantomime dame in a curly grey wig up on the bench: 
nobody dared silence him…One hour and forty-seven minutes.’144  
But perhaps what McDonald means is that the speech is, as Louise Yelin has 
suggested, dialogic in Bakhtin’s sense.145 For Bakhtin, the ‘author is not to be found in 
the language of the narrator, not in the normal literary language to which the story 
opposes itself’; instead:  
the author utilizes now one language, now another, in order to avoid 
giving himself up wholly to either of them; he makes use of this verbal 
give-and-take, this dialogue of languages at every point in his work, in 
order that he himself might remain as it were neutral with regard to 
language, a third party in a quarrel between two people (although he 
might be a biased third party.)146  
Dialogue in Bakhtin’s sense refers not to the representation of conversation but rather 
to the way that literary writing can incorporate within itself, and mediate between, 
different voices. 
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 In this sense, Burger’s address is certainly a dialogue. First, as McDonald states, 
it incorporates material based on Fischer’s address to the court. Fischer’s speech begins 
by describing the parts of his own biography that led him to his beliefs, then he 
discusses elements of Marxist theory which relate to the South African situation, before 
reiterating the moral necessity of the struggle, and Gordimer adopts this structure.147 
In the novel, Burger says, in a passage whose beginning is deliberately elided in 
the text: 
‘…stand before this court accused of acts calculated to overthrow the 
State and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat in this country. But 
what we Communists black and white working in harmony with others 
who do not share our political philosophy have set our sights on is the 
national liberation of the African people, and thus the abolishment of 
discrimination and extension of political rights to all the peoples of this 
country’148 
This adapts and borrows from a longer section of Fischer’s statement in which he too 
first recounts what he is charged with and then describes how that differs from his 
aims and the aims of those he works with. The whole of the section is not directly 
quoted; specific phrases are echoed, as is the overall sentiment. Both speeches deny 
that their speakers are working towards a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’149, instead 
arguing that their aim is ‘national liberation.’150 Burger described ‘the abolishment of 
discrimination’, Fischer ‘abolishing discrimination’, Burger the ‘extension of political 
rights’, Fischer ‘extending political rights’.151 
There are other examples which follow the same pattern. Fischer describes 
whites he met in the Communist party ‘who could have obtained lucrative employment 
and social position, but who instead were prepared for the sake of their consciences, to 
perform the most menial and unpopular work at little or sometimes no 
remuneration.’152 Burger saw that ‘white Marxists worked side by side with blacks in an 
equality that meant taking on the meanest of tasks – tasks that incurred loss of income 
                                                 
147 The Sun Will Rise: Statements From the Dock By Southern African Political Prisoners, rev’d edn, ed. by Mary 
Benson (London: International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1981), pp.35-50.  
148 Burger’s Daughter, p.26.  
149 The Sun Will Rise, p.41 
150 The Sun Will Rise, p.41. 
151 The Sun Will Rise, p.41.  
152 The Sun Will Rise, p.38.  
222 
 
and social prestige and the risk or arrest and imprisonment – as well as sharing policy-
making and leadership.’153 There is no direct quotation at all here, but a similar idea.  
Another novel from the period, André Brink’s Rumours of Rain, published in 
1978, makes use of exactly the same material, and comparing it with Burger’s Daughter 
illuminates Gordimer’s method. In Brink’s novel, Fischer’s words are put into the 
mouth of a character called Bernard Franken, who resembles Fischer closely in a 
number of ways (his initials included). Franken is a lawyer, like Fischer (Gordimer’s 
Burger is a doctor) and he had represented seven defendants in ‘the so-called 
“Terrorism Trial”’.154 Brink writes that ‘the full irony of that trial wasn’t grasped by 
anyone apart from Bernard himself […] Bernard was not only their counsel in the case 
but their accomplice. More than that, he was their leader.’155 When Bernard is arrested, 
he escapes – as Fischer did – and ‘it took no less than thirteen months before Bernard 
was arrested again […] In the interim, it was revealed later, he’d even spent a few 
months abroad.’156 This shocks the novel’s narrator, Bernard’s childhood friend Martin 
Mynhardt: ‘[i]f a man wants to get out of the country, let him. It’s bad enough. But 
then to return knowing he’s bound to be arrested, is quite beyond me. It just makes no 
sense at all. It’s madness.’157  
In Rumours of Rain’s depiction of Bernard’s speech, unlike in Burger’s Daughter, 
large sections of Fischer’s testimony are repeated verbatim. For example, at his trial 
Fischer said: 
when I was driving an old ANC leader to his house far out to the west of 
Johannesburg […] I propounded to him the well-worn theory that if you 
separate races you diminish the points at which friction between them 
may occur and hence ensure good relations. His answer was the essence 
of simplicity. If you place the races of one country into two camps, said 
he, and cut off contact between them, those in each camp begin to forget 
that those in the other are ordinary human beings, that each lives and 
laughs in the same way, that each experience joy and sorrow, pride or 
humiliation for the same reasons. Hereby each becomes suspicious of the 
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other and each eventually fears the other, which is the basis of all 
racialism.158 
In Brink’s novel, this whole section is included. It is very lightly edited; Franken says 
‘[a]t the end of an exhausting court case in Johannesburg I drove an old ANC leader to 
his house in Alexandria one night’, and Fischer says ‘basis of all racialism’ where 
Franken says ‘racism.’159 But apart from these very minor changes, the whole section is 
simply reproduced in the novel. 
 
But in Burger’s Daughter, the material based on Fischer’s address is intermingled 
with a number of other voices. Before Burger’s speech, the text states that Rosa knew 
‘what [Lionel Burger] was going to say because the lawyers had worked with him on 
the material and she herself had gone to the library to check a certain quotation he 
wanted.’160 Gordimer here establishes the textuality, the constructedness, of Burger’s 
speech and draws attention to the fact that it incorporates the words of others. This is 
something the reader is consequently likely to bear in mind when reading his speech. 
There are a number of sentences and phrases which appear in quotation marks in the 
text of the speech which are possible candidates for the quotation Rosa has looked up. 
There is an attributed quotation from Martin Luther: ‘I say with Luther: Here I stand. 
Ich kann nicht anders.’161 There are also unattributed quotations in quotation marks – 
for example, a reference to William Blake: ‘the “dark Satanic mills” of the industry that 
brought [black South Africans’] labour cheap’.162  
  
Burger also says: 
[f]or as a great African leader who was not a Communist has 
since said: ‘The white man’s moral standards in this country can 
                                                 
158 The Sun Will Rise, pp.49-50.  
159 Brink, p.110.  
160 Burger’s Daughter, p.24.  
161 Burger’s Daughter, p.26.  
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gymnastics, a statement by Marx, given in a footnote by Slovo, appears in unattributed quotation marks 
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only be judged by the extent to which he has condemned the 
majority of its population to serfdom and inferiority.’163  
The ‘great African leader’ is unnamed, but is Nelson Mandela; the quotation comes 
from his application for the recusal of Magistrate WA Van Helsdingen at his 1962 
trial.164 As well as the quotation from Mandela’s courtroom speech presented in 
quotation marks, there is also an echo of another part of his testimony which is not 
identified as such. Mandela said at the same trial ‘[w]hy is it that no African in the 
history of this country has ever had the honour of being tried by his own kith and kin, 
by his own flesh and blood?’165 Burger says ‘why is it no black man has ever had the 
right of answering, before a black prosecutor, a black judge, to laws in whose drafting 
and promulgation his own people, the blacks, have had a say?’166This is not the only 
place in the novel to make use of other people’s words: Stephen Clingman has argued 
that ‘Burger’s Daughter is full of quotation’,167and forms something like a ‘textual 
collage.’168 He notes that at various points in the novel Gordimer also incorporates 
quotations from a wide range of sources – including Steve Biko, Joe Slovo and Lenin.  
Where Brink incorporates Fischer’s speech, he does so verbatim. But 
Gordimer weaves sections from it in with a range of other quotations, and she 
announces this in the text before the speech begins: Rosa ‘had gone to the library to 
check a certain quotation he wanted.’169 I suggest that this contributes to Burger’s 
Daughter’s shifting and unstable surface. As we have seen, at the beginning of the novel, 
Gordimer takes a simple scene – a group of people waiting outside a prison – and then 
works it over, switching from perspective to perspective. There is initially a sense that 
the reader might be moving closer to the truth of the scene, as several small details 
from the earlier narratives are corrected when Rosa’s first person narrative begins. But 
then this is undermined.  
                                                 
163 Burger’s Daughter, p.25.  
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This, I suggest, should be connected with what happens during the court 
scene. Where in the opening pages it is perspective which roves around, in Burger’s 
speech we do not just hear the voice of an imaginary character and nor do we even 
merely hear the voice of Bram Fischer, as in Rumours of Rain. What the speech is, 
instead, is a textured combination of the words of a number of speakers. At the 
opening of the novel, attention is drawn to narrative’s ‘concocted’ nature.170 In the 
scene at the courtroom, the speech is a melange of different speakers, intermingled. 
The origins of the quotations can be identified, as I have done with some of them 
here, but what is more important in the reading of the text is the way they become 
mixed up in the speech. In the courtroom speech it becomes impossible to securely 
locate or identify one speaker, or one source of ideas.  
‘Enormous Lies Incarcerating Enormous Truths’  
 
In a letter to the publisher of Burger’s Daughter, the Director of Publications set 
out the reasons for the initial banning of the novel. Reason number three is that ‘[t]he 
standpoint of an unlawful organisation, the “Sowete [sic] Students’ Representative 
Council” is propagated…through the document published on pages 346 and 347.’171 
The letter states that ‘[t]his pamphlet (P77/6/208) was declared to be undesirable […] 
on 6 July 1977 […] Possession was also prohibited […] and the prohibition was 
confirmed by the Appeal Board’.172 Moreover, ‘[o]n 19 October 1977 the SSRC was 
declared to be an unlawful organisation in terms of section 2 of the Internal Security 
Act, 1950 (Act 44 of 1950).’173  
This ‘undesirable’174 pamphlet is indeed included in Burger’s Daughter. It is not 
run into the text of the novel or enclosed in a chapter, and no character in the novel is 
explicitly pictured reading it – it forms its own separated section. As Stephen Clingman 
writes  
[c]onsidered solely within the text there is no way of telling whether the 
pamphlet is a reproduction of an actual one or has merely been 
                                                 
170 Burger’s Daughter, p.14.  
171 What Happened to Burger’s Daughter, p.11.  
172 What Happened to Burger’s Daughter, p.11.  
173 What Happened to Burger’s Daughter, p.11.  
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‘simulated’ by Gordimer, but in fact this pamphlet did appear on the 
streets of Soweto during the Revolt, and has simply been inserted in 
full into the text.175  
In his comments on the inclusion of the pamphlet, one of the literary experts who 
advised the PAB, Professor PJH Titlestad, disavowed any responsibility for the legal 
issues at stake (‘I have not checked that this is in fact the genuine pamphlet that is 
banned. This had better be ascertained. The interpretation of the legal situation must 
be left to the lawyers.’176) However, he argued that there were important questions of 
literary interpretation which had been left unaddressed: ‘[w]hat the committee does not 
do, and what needs doing, is adequately discuss the function of this pamphlet in the 
novel.’177  
Titlestad argues that the reproduction of the document cannot be understood 
as the censor understood it as ‘propagation’ of the SSCRC’s views:  
[w]hile [Gordimer’s] attitude is one of compassion there is no 
indication that the rather pathetic rhetoric has her total assent […] The 
whole structure of the novel, the arranging and presenting of the 
debate which it contains, gets involved in the discussion of any one 
particular point.178  
 
Commenting on the censor’s response to this aspect of the novel, Gordimer later 
wrote: 
I reproduced this document because my stylistic integrity as a writer 
demanded it: it is a necessary part of the book as a whole. I 
reproduced it because it is sometimes essential, for the total concept 
of a work of fiction, to incorporate blunt documentary evidence in 
contrast to the fuller, fictive version of events. Rosa says of the 
document (speaking to her dead father), ‘The kind of education the 
children’ve rebelled against is evident enough; they can’t spell and 
they can’t formulate their elation and anguish. But they know why 
they’re dying.’  
I reproduced the document exactly as it was, in all its naïveté, leaving 
spelling mistakes and grammatical errors uncorrected, because I felt it 
expressed, more eloquently and honestly than any pamphlet I could 
have invented, the spirit of the young people who wrote it.179 
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 The uprising was a transformative moment in South Africa’s history. The TRC 
Report: notes that ‘1976 has frequently been described as a turning point in South 
Africa’s political history.’180 As David Black suggests, ‘[t]he events sparked by Soweto 
both graphically illustrated and deepened the apartheid regime’s growing domestic and 
international vulnerability. They eventually prompted the NP government to undertake 
significant tactical concessions.’181 He argues that because ‘the government was 
unprepared for the repercussions of these concessions’ it then ‘overestimated its ability 
to control the tempo and direction of change.’182 
Gordimer situates Rosa’s fictional political commitment in relation to the wider 
real-life context of the pamphlet’s production; the resistance that sprung from the 
massacre at Soweto on 16 June 1976 is presented as a crucial turning point for Rosa’s 
perception of the struggle against apartheid. Burger’s Daughter describes the extensive 
bannings and mass arrests which took place on 19 October 1977, as the government 
attempted to finally put down the resistance, and places Rosa’s arrest on that date. At 
the end of the novel, it is not clear what charges Rosa will face, but her lawyer knows 
that it’s likely that they ‘would allege incitement, and aiding and abetting of the 
students’ and schoolchildren’s revolt.’183  
What both Gordimer and Titlestad note about the pamphlet is its language. 
Titlestad describes its ‘pathetic rhetoric’;184 Gordimer mentions its ‘spelling mistakes and 
grammatical errors’.185 I suggest that the relationship Gordimer establishes between the 
actions of the children of Soweto and language is important. The novel itself notes the 
rhetorical value of children for political purposes: ‘[c]hildren and children’s children. 
The catchphrase of every reactionary politician and every revolutionary, and every 
revolutionary come to power as a politician. Everything is done in the name of future 
generations.’186   
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As we have seen, at the beginning of the novel the narration, from Rosa’s first-
person perspective, states ‘I understand the bland heroics of badly-written memoirs by 
the faithful – good people in spite of the sanctimony.’187 Later in the text, a connected 
idea appears:  
I’ve heard all the black clichés before. I am aware that, like the ones 
the faithful use, they are an attempt to habituate ordinary 
communication to overwhelming meanings in human existence. They 
rap out the mechanical chunter of a telex; the message has to be 
picked up and read. They become enormous lies incarcerating 
enormous truths, still extant, somewhere.188 
What is being drawn into question here is the ability of language to access truth. Rosa 
suggests language becomes trapped in cliché and fails before the ‘overwhelming 
meanings in human existence’.189  
 The children of Soweto are crucially important in relation to this idea about 
language’s failures. In her ‘Letter From Johannesburg’, Gordimer drew attention to the 
shock of observing the children’s actions: ‘[w]e whites do not know how to deal with 
the fact of this death when children, in full knowledge of what can happen to them, 
continue to go out to meet it at the hands of the law’.190 In the novel, the political 
change they instigate is articulated through the way it shows up language, the way it 
reveals the emptiness of cliché and repetitious political verbiage. Gordimer writes: 
[y]ou knew it couldn’t be: a change in the objective conditions of the struggle 
sensed sooner than the leaders did. Lenin knew; the way it happened after 
the 1905 revolution: as is always the case, practice marched ahead of theory. 
The old phrases crack and meaning shakes out wet and new. They 
seem to know what is to be done. They don’t go to school any more 
and they are being ‘constantly re-educated by their political 
activity’191 
The ‘you’ here is her father, and she is quoting the address he made in court – he, in 
turn, is quoting Gramsci. But what the children do means that the ‘old phrases crack 
and meaning shakes out wet and new’.192 Clichés, Rosa thinks, ‘become enormous lies 
                                                 
187 Burger’s Daughter, p.14.  
188 Burger’s Daughter, p.348.  
189 Burger’s Daughter, p.328.  
190 ‘Letter from Johannesburg, 1976’, p.121.  
191 Burger’s Daughter, p.328.  
192 Burger’s Daughter, p.348.  
229 
 
incarcerating enormous truths, still extant, somewhere.’193 But, for a moment, the 
children’s actions are able to change this, to make language come alive again, to bring it 
closer to accessing the truth that cliché normally imprisons.  
But this is only momentary. Cliché retains its hold and soon slips into the 
narrative voice again. The children are ‘“constantly being re-educated by their political 
activity”’, and their parents: 
people who were Uncle Toms, steering clear of the Mofutsanyanas, 
Kotanes, Luthulis, Mandelas, Kgosanas, Sobukwes who went to jail 
for the ANC and PAC have begun to see themselves at last as they 
are; as their children see them. They have been radicalized – as the 
faithful would say – by their children.194 
The quotation marks and the ‘as the faithful would say’195 indicate the persistence of the 
‘enormous lies’ which incarcerate ‘enormous truths.’196 But there is, nonetheless, just a 
moment where the children cause the ‘old phrases’ to ‘crack’.197 
 In light of the arguments I have made throughout this thesis, I suggest two 
things about this elusive moment in Burger’s Daughter. On the one hand, in Chapter Two 
I argued that the presentation of child soldiers in human rights discourse exemplifies 
the problems and limits of the discourse. Children are depicted as apolitical, innocent 
and continually vulnerable to harm. For this reason, I suggested that they are symbols of 
the version of human rights discourse which would locate possession of rights in mere 
humanness. In Chapter Three I showed that the lingering on the imagery of childbirth 
and the family in Kyomuhendo’s Bildungsromane can be read as the haunting of the 
citizenship model of rights by the merely human version – that it is the ambivalent sign 
of the inseparability of the possession and the non-possession of human rights. As they 
are represented in Burger’s Daughter, the children of Soweto stand in clear critique of the 
limits of the way human rights discourse understand and depict the child. It is the 
children who lead from the front, who are willing to be killed: ‘[t]hey seem to know 
what is to be done.’198 
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 And yet, what is important is the way this is realized in the text: it is a fleeting 
moment. For a moment, the ‘old phrases crack and meaning shakes out wet and new’.199 
But then, only two sentences later, the clichés re-emerge and begin to shape the 
narrative voice. It is as if the narrative cannot hold on to the children’s accomplishment. 
There is no suggestion here that literature can function as truth – throughout the novel, 
I’ve suggested, its voice and perspective are shown to be unstable. They ask to be 
interrogated rather than trusted unquestioningly. Instead, the children of Soweto have a 
sudden, faltering, enervating impact on language – ‘meaning shakes out wet and new’,200 
but the ‘enormous lies’201 emerge again, while truth is ‘still extant, somewhere.’202  
 I have argued that human rights are ambivalent about their own relationship to 
law. Where there is an attempt to protect rights, this is manifested in quasi-legality, as 
we have seen in the TRC. Furthermore, it is where human rights are not guaranteed 
through the law, or where the law appears actively to crush human rights, that a human 
rights claim seems to have most value: Antjie Krog writes of ‘the unjust laws that took 
away [Reggie’s] freedom and trampled his human rights’.203 In the shifting perspectives 
of Burger’s Daughter’s opening scene, set outside the prison in which political activists are 
incarcerated, in the intermingled voices of the political trial and, finally, in the difficulty 
of expressing what it is that the children of Soweto have accomplished without falling 
into cliché, literature finds itself at its own breaking point, unable to fully capture – let 
alone transform – the painful realities of the failure of the law. In this way it brings us 
closer to understanding – rather than seeking to compensate for – the flickering and 
uncertain possession of human rights.  
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Conclusion 
  
I have made two main arguments in this thesis. First, human rights discourse is 
troubled by a contradiction concerning the possibility of possessing human rights. I 
have not merely suggested that human rights possession is sometimes incomplete or 
difficult to realize. Rather I have sought to show that the discourse is fundamentally 
conflicted and ambiguous in such a way as to make the full possession of human rights 
appear as an impossibility. Consequently I have argued secondly that it is literature’s 
ability to sustain complexity and ambiguity, notably in texts which address situations 
where rights are precarious, threatened or missing, which makes it particularly apt for 
illuminating the limit-points inherent to the discourse of human rights. In writing 
engaged with a world of absent rights or systematic suspension of rights, there are 
moments at which literature’s own conditions of possibility are also drawn into question 
– even in solidly realist texts like Burger’s Daughter.  
  In Chapter One I made the case that there is a tension in human rights 
discourse between the idea that rights are possessed on the basis of citizenship and the 
idea that it is humanness alone which grounds them.  We saw through Hannah Arendt, 
however, that merely human identity has traditionally tended to be constructed as the 
opposite of the abstract, formally equal individual. Consequently, the idea of simply 
human rights risks a dangerous conflation of rights possession with those characteristics 
which have typically been thought to suggest rightlessness – vulnerability, innocence 
and isolation. This is why, as we saw in Chapter Two, the Ugandan child soldier 
narrative Girl Soldier seems to re-entrench the consequences of rights abuse in the 
process of trying to campaign against it. Mere humanness is thought to be the only 
grounds on with empathy and imaginative connection can be forged. But analyzing the 
way Grace Akallo’s vulnerability to suffering was textually prolonged made clear the 
extent to which this emphasis on innocent passivity is a limiting representation of those 
who have experienced rights violation.  
   The tendency towards passive representations of victims in human rights 
narratives has been widely noted. I have argued that it should be understood as a 
consequence of a fundamental and unresolved tension in the discourse. It is this central 
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contradiction which became visible in Chapter Three through the uses to which Goretti 
Kyomuhendo’s texts put the Bildungsroman and, in particular, through their insistence 
on the inescapability of the family. Of course, this is partly a textual recognition and 
representation of the fact that, for many young women in particular, familial life is 
restrictive, that education and social mobility are inaccessible, and that the home can be 
a location of profound oppression. However I also interpreted the texts’ obsessive 
repetition of familial imagery as a type of experimentation with the form of the 
Bildungsroman which brought to light the limit-point of human rights examined here.  
For Slaughter, the Bildungsroman is intricately entwined with human rights 
discourse because both aim towards the incorporation of the individual into the society 
of the nation-state. This is symbolized in the traditional plot of the Bildungsroman by 
the way the protagonist leaves his or her home and family, and develops towards some 
form of social role. The Bildungsroman thus reflects conventional theorizations of 
democratic politics: as Carole Pateman argued, the family has tended to be understood 
as the antithesis of the political sphere. But, crucially, the family is not consistently the 
antithesis of the political sphere: for Derrida, indeed, it represents a fundamental 
contradiction in articulations of democratic politics. The political sphere, composed of 
abstractly equal citizens, the sphere which is defined in opposition to the family, is 
described through terms like fraternity and birth. That is, it is described through familial 
terms. The family at once symbolizes political belonging and, at the same time, stands 
for its opposite.  
 In this framework, Kyomuhendo’s versions of the Bildungsroman offer key 
insights into the contradictions of the discourse of human rights. Familial concepts such 
as fraternity and – in particular in Kyomuhendo’s texts, birth – symbolize at one and the 
same time the difference of pre-political, merely human, identity and the sameness of 
formal equality which describes the political sphere. Slaughter proposes that the 
Bildungsroman is implicated in human rights discourse –  it is both a way of 
disseminating its norms and a way of understanding what those norms are. Read in 
these terms, the repetition of familial imagery in Kyomuhendo’s Bildungsromane is 
suggestive of precisely the tension I have described: it signifies the contradiction 
between the idea that human rights are the rights of abstract persons and the idea that 
they are the rights of humans defined solely through their humanness.  
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In this the language of literary writing is key. There is something excessive about 
the familial language which is used in Kyomuhendo’s texts. Like the liquidity which so 
preoccupies Waiting, the imagery of childbirth, daughters, sons, blood overspills, turns 
up in unexpected places. The language is too much. These novels suggested to me that 
the relationship between literature and human rights cannot be one in which literature 
simply adopts and then makes comprehensible the logic underlying human rights ideas. 
There is always something stranger than this going on in literary texts. In Chapters Four 
and Five I suggested that this kind of strangeness in the literary text is illuminating for 
the points of tension that reside at the heart of human rights discourse. 
  One of the consequences of the difficulty over the possession of rights is that 
the possibility of legal enforceability of human rights is drawn into question. Either 
rights are fully possessed through the law and yet lose their identity as simply human 
rights, or they are possessed in their absence, particularly where the law is disinterested 
in, or hostile to, human rights claims. Where there is an attempt to protect and 
guarantee human rights – as in post-apartheid South Africa – there is nonetheless a 
sense in which human rights discourse requires something the law cannot provide. This 
was exemplified by the TRC’s quasi-legality, which, as we saw, was explained through 
the language of human rights. Human rights discourse is thus associated with the 
insufficiency of the law.  
My question then became what particular opportunities do these points of 
contradiction and tension open up for literature. Desmond Tutu used Death and the 
Maiden rhetorically to defend the Commission’s quasi-legality. For Tutu, the quasi-legal 
can provide a form of truth which the fully legal cannot, and its value is indicated 
straightforwardly by Death and the Maiden. But when he employed the play in this way, its 
key ambiguities were flattened as it became associated with truth as category. This led 
me to ask whether there is another way of thinking about the relationship between 
literature and the ambivalent legality of human rights discourse. For Tutu literature 
became associated with truth in the context of the TRC, where the law could not be 
appealed to. For Slaughter, meanwhile, literature was appealed to as compensatory 
where international human rights law was weak. In both cases, literature filled in for 
what is missing from the law.  
Here I turned to texts which engage with the other dimension of the ambivalent 
legality of human rights discourse – the fact that, where rights are not possessed by the 
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law, the discourse of human rights becomes most meaningful. I examined two texts 
concerned with the absence of legally-recognized rights – Burger’s Daughter and Begging to 
Be Black. In both texts the law cannot – in fact, will not – meet the demands of human 
rights. But here literature neither offers a compensation for that failing nor does it 
perform a version of truth. Instead, it shows a profound tension between truth and 
narrative; in Burger’s Daughter, language attempts to hold on to (but cannot quite grasp) a 
truth which is ‘still extant, somewhere.’1  
In Country of My Skull, Krog writes: ‘[t]he word Truth makes me uncomfortable 
[…] [e]ven when I type it, it ends up as either turth or trth.’2 The difficulty of writing the 
truth is also central to Begging to Black. At first it seems as if a literary text – Disgrace – is 
being used to provide access to the truth about a black South African communitarian 
ethic. However, as the text progresses, this is drawn into question until it is not the 
truth of the other’s experience, but rather the impossibility of ever fully imaginatively 
accessing it, which is associated with the literary:  
[w]hatever novelistic elements I may use in my non-fiction work, the 
strangeness is not invented. The strangeness is real, and the fact that I 
cannot ever really enter the psyche of somebody else, somebody 
black. The terror and loneliness of that inability is what I don’t want 
to give up on.3 
If we position literature as that which can make up for the limits of human 
rights discourse’s legal enforceability, as Tutu and Slaughter do in different ways, those 
limits disappear from critical scrutiny, they seem to become less urgent.  Notably, 
because they refuse to associate themselves fully with the category of truth, both Begging 
to Black and Burger’s Daughter are difficult to incorporate into those models of reading 
which would use literature to make up for the ambivalences of human rights discourse’s 
relation to the law. These literary texts cannot provide the truth where the law is weak 
or unavailable, because truth in both texts is difficult to grasp and to hold. Thus, in their 
attentiveness to strangeness rather than to familiarity, the texts I have discussed do not 
compensate for the limits of human rights discourse, but allow those limits to be 
thought. 
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There remain many aspects of the crisis of human rights possession which still 
invite consideration. For example, I have discussed the ambivalence of human rights 
discourse regarding the law and the nation-state at length. However, Derrida argues that 
the foundation of law in a nation-state always depends on violence: ‘no matter how 
democratic it is, and even if it seems to conform to the principle of the equality of all 
before the law, the absolute inauguration of a state cannot presuppose the previously 
legitimized existence of a national entity.’4 For this reason 
[a] ‘successful’ revolution, the ‘successful foundation of a state’ […] 
will produce après coup what it was destined in advance to produce, 
namely, proper interpretative models to read in return, to give sense, 
necessity and above all legitimacy to the violence that has produced, 
among others, the interpretative model in question, that is, the 
discourse of its self-legitimation.5  
The particular problems raised by this issue can be seen in the case of South 
Africa. From the moment of the Union in 1910, as Heinz Klug writes, there was ‘a 
bifurcated state […] the Union Constitution granted parliamentary democracy to the 
white minority […] [but] it subjugated the majority of black South Africans to autocratic 
administrative rule.’6 However Derrida argues that what distinguishes the South African 
nation-state is not the original violence per se, because this characterizes all states:   
[i]n the case of South Africa, certain ‘conventions’ were not respected, 
the violence was too great, visibly too great, at a moment when this 
visibility extended to a new international scene, and so on. The white 
community was too much in the minority, the disproportion of wealth 
too flagrant. From then on this violence remains at once excessive and 
powerless, insufficient in its result, lost in its own contradiction. It 
cannot manage to have itself forgotten, as in the case of states 
founded on a genocide or a quasi-extermination. Here, the violence of 
the origin must repeat itself indefinitely and act out its rightfulness in 
a legislative apparatus whose monstrosity fails to pay back: a 
pathological proliferation of juridical prostheses (laws, acts, 
amendments) destined to legalize to the slightest detail the effects of 
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fundamental racism, of a state racism, the unique and last in the 
world.7  
Violence is not antithetical to the law of the nation-state, even the democratic nation-
state – it must necessarily precede it.  
Here we see yet another reason why human rights discourse might be 
ambivalent about rights protection effected through the law of the nation-state. Is it 
possible for the nation-state to be at once originally violent, even genocidal, and also a 
protector of rights? I have proposed in this thesis that literature can illuminate the 
tensions and difficulties of human rights discourse. The question of the entanglement of 
the locations of rights protection with the forms of violence opposed by human rights 
discourse is a further contradiction which might be able to be discussed through the 
particular qualities of literary writing.  
Because my focus in this study has been on the way literature might illuminate 
the limits of human rights discourse and, in particular the problem of possession, I have 
not attempted to suggest ways in which the discourse might become more theoretically 
coherent. Nonetheless, further work on literature and human rights might engage with 
the attempts to think of human rights outside of the notion of possession. In the 
Introduction, I mentioned de Bolla’s suggestion that human rights can be understood as 
aspirations for humanity as a group rather than possessions of individuals. Douzinas 
proposes a related argument: that we can understand human rights as mediators in the 
process of recognition. He writes:  
[f]rom a Hegelian perspective, the main function of rights is to help 
establish the recognition necessary for the constitution of a full 
personality. Subjectivity passes through the mutual recognition by the 
other and rights are a necessary intermediary, an indispensable tool in 
this process.8 
 What is important for Douzinas about the Hegelian analysis is that, in its account of 
self-consciousness as an intersubjective phenomenon, it points to the deep connections 
between self and other which maintain the subject.  
Rights, in this sense, do not protect the lone individual against the whims of the 
larger social group but nor do they demarcate the boundaries of the isolated person. 
                                                 
7 ‘The Laws of Reflection’, p.18.  
8 The End of Human Rights, p.274.  
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Instead, they are markers of the development of the subject through the relationship 
between the self and the other. Douzinas argues that  
[r]ights do not find their limit in others and community, as liberal 
theory claims. On the contrary, if the function of rights is to give rise to 
reciprocal recognition, they presuppose the existence of others and of 
community, and they express the identity-forming contribution of 
others.9  
Rights are the signs which show that one is a subject and thus allow recognition by the 
community; ‘[h]aving rights’, Douzinas argues, ‘is nothing more than the symbolic 
expression that one is equal in his freedom with everyone else or, what amounts to the 
same thing, that one is a legal subject.’10 Human rights always presume and depend 
upon the construction of the legal subject through the mediation of the other.  
 This is a useful corrective to the idea of rights as based on possession. I have 
been considering the limits of a version of rights which is conflicted as to whether they 
belong to a merely human subject or to an incorporated citizen. But Douzinas’ version 
of human rights shows that rights do not have to be thought of as the property of an 
individual. Instead they can be understood as a way of constructing community.  
 Further work in this area might also consider the distinctions – as well as the 
similarities – between various forms of literary writing, as they are related to human 
rights discourse. In this study I have considered Dorfman’s play, Bildungsromane, 
Krog’s non-fictional writing, child soldier narratives and realist novels by Gordimer. I 
have sought to show how these different types of literary text relate to the discourse of 
human rights and, thus, how reading them together allows for an elucidation of the 
discourse. However, there are other literary forms whose particularities surely have 
distinctive contributions to make to the discussion of human rights and literature. For 
example, in his foreword to the TRC Report, Tutu writes: 
[a] Dutch visitor to the Commission observed that the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission must fail. Its task is simply too demanding. 
Yet, she argued, ‘even as it fails, it has already succeeded beyond any 
rational expectations’. She quoted Emily Dickinson: ‘the truth must 
dazzle gradually […] or all the world would be blind’.11 
                                                 
9 The End of Human Rights, p.287.  
10 The End of Human Rights, p.276.   
11 TRC Report, vol.1, p.4.  
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I have discussed the category of truth in the context of the quasi-legal TRC through 
Death and the Maiden, the fiction of Nadine Gordimer and Begging to Be Black but Antjie 
Krog is also a poet. The distinctiveness of poetry’s engagements with truth in this 
context would be a path for the future development of this thesis.   
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